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During the past few minutes, while writing and rewriting this paragraph, I have felt 
anxiety about finishing this dissertation (“Deadline approaching!”). I have also been 
worrying about something I said to a friend last night (“Did I insult him with that 
joke?”). Besides these different shades of anxiety, I also experienced a glimpse of 
happiness. Having finally started writing, I felt some kind of enjoyment (“I stopped 
procrastinating!”). I hope that my mind is not too peculiar, and that most people 
agree that mental lives are dominated by emotions. 
I found myself slightly disappointed that during my undergraduate studies, 
emotion was rarely discussed. In my introductory course to philosophy of mind, the 
word “emotion” was not mentioned once. The textbook we used literally does not 
contain the word “emotion”; I checked. I do think that every philosophy of mind 
textbook should discuss emotion in great detail. Not just because it is central to 
human psychology, but also because it touches upon questions that are central in the 
philosophy of mind.  
One of the grand philosophical questions is: “How do we relate to the world?” In 
order to answer this question most philosophers have looked at perception and 
belief. Many philosophers accept that perceptual experience somehow provides us 
with information about the external world. Sceptics put this view into question and 
idealists claim that what we perceive is not the mind-independent world as such. 
Most contemporary philosophers, however, refute both scepticism and idealism and 
claim that perception does give us access to the mind-independent world. It is 
debated whether perception is a direct relation (naïve realism) or a representation of 
the world (representationalism).  
Emotion, on the other hand, has not gained as much attention by philosophers of 
mind as perception has. Nevertheless, philosophical theories that aim to clarify how 
we as human beings relate to the world must be able to say something about how 
emotional experience relates us to the world. Not to say that emotion plays a role in 
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every experience, as many things we encounter leave us indifferent. However, a great 
number of phenomena we encounter in everyday life are emotionally experienced. 
We experience emotions all the time and emotional experiences relate us to the 
world.  
Despite their common presence, emotions are quite peculiar. On the one hand 
emotions seem to be good examples of representational mental states. On the other 
hand it is not clear how exactly emotions fit into a representationalist framework.  
Emotions are often used as paradigm examples of representational states. That is 
because emotions are always “about” something. Consider the following example. I 
am discussing philosophy with my friend in a coffee shop. All of a sudden a lion 
walks in. As soon as I see this lion, I am afraid of it. After it has eaten my friend, I 
am sad that she is dead. This experience evolves into anger. In a heroic act, I manage 
to kill the lion. I am very proud of that act. Each of these emotions is about 
something. I am afraid of the lion, sad that my friend just died, angry at the lion for 
killing her and proud that I managed to kill the lion. One way of articulating this 
phenomenon is to say that emotions are representations. I represent the lion as being 
a certain way. Emotions are good examples of the common sense view of mental 
representation: you experience something as being a certain way. 
However, once you think further about emotions, they do not seem to fit the 
representationalist framework without any difficulties. For instance, emotions often 
seem to be very unreliable. They seem to misfire all the time. We are often afraid 
when there is nothing to be afraid of. Why is it that emotions present us with so 
many false alarms? If they are supposed to “represent the world”, they seem to be 
very bad at it.  
In this dissertation, I aim to explore how well emotional experiences fit a 
representationalist framework. I presuppose representationalism and discuss the 
difficulties this causes for theories of emotional experiences. How do emotions 
represent the world?  
The specific branch of philosophy I specialize in is so-called empirically informed 
philosophy of mind. I am interested in how emotion science relates to philosophical 
questions about emotion. There are a number of theories and models of emotion 
that are employed in scientific research. These theories and models seem to 
constitute scientific paradigms which are quite isolated from each other. 
Disagreement between these paradigms is often not based on conflicting empirical 
data, but on conflicting theoretical assumptions and fundamental ideas about the 
mind. I want to discuss these fundamental assumptions but I do not want to create 
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another model of emotion: we already have enough of them. Yet, I try to understand 
how emotions represent the world, while being informed by the scientific literature. 
Additionally, aesthetics plays an important role in this dissertation. I am aware that 
the choice of discussing so much aesthetics in a dissertation on how emotions 
represent the world might seem to be a bit uncommon. There is, however, an 
obvious connection between emotion theory and value theory. The representational 
content of an emotion is intrinsically evaluative and emotivist theories of value 
understand values as intrinsically related to emotions. Also, a great number of 
philosophers of emotion have thought about the relation between emotion and 
evaluative judgements. What I noticed, however, is that those evaluative judgements 
that philosophers of emotion discuss are often moral judgements. I want to do 
something different: I want to focus on aesthetic value. I think that emotion is a great 
source of information about aesthetic value and this should be discussed in a 
dissertation on how emotions represent the world. 
My chapters on aesthetics could be labelled as “applied philosophy of emotion”, 
or to paraphrase Nanay’s Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception (2016): “Aesthetics as 
Philosophy of Emotion”. I think that a great number of topics in aesthetics are very 
interesting for a philosopher of emotion. We can apply the tools and the conceptual 
apparatus of philosophy of emotion to these topics in aesthetics. 
My dissertation consists of five chapters. In the first chapter, I discuss what I call 
the emotional unreliability problem. As I said a few paragraphs ago: I presuppose 
representationalism and I will explore how emotions fit in. If emotions are 
representations of the world, then, at first sight, they seem to be less good at it than 
perception. Consider this example. I have spent a part of my summer holidays writing 
in a cabin in the woods. There were no houses anywhere near this little house. One 
night, me and my friend were playing a board game outside of the cabin. All of a 
sudden, we heard a weird noise in the woods quite close to us. We looked in the 
direction of the sound, but all we could see was a black nothingness. I suggested: 
“Maybe we should go inside…” And so we did. I have to admit, I was a bit scared. 
However, this fear was probably a false alarm. It is more likely that there was nothing 
to be afraid of than that my fear was justified. In some sense, the emotion of fear 
seem to provide us with the information that there is danger present. However, often 
when you are afraid, this fear is just a false alarm. If you compare this to perception, 
then emotions seem to be less reliable. If I would have perceived a dangerous animal, 
I would not doubt that there was, in fact, danger present. Whereas emotions do not 
seem to be as trustworthy. Emotion seems to provide us with some information 
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about the world. But if emotions are so unreliable, then what function do they have 
in our representational system? This is the emotional unreliability problem.  
In the first chapter, I defend the pragmatic account of emotional representation 
in order to solve this problem. I argue that emotional representations are not reliable 
in the Cartesian sense but they are reliable in the Jamesian sense. Simply put, it means 
that emotional representations aim to be better safe than sorry. It is better to 
represent something as dangerous, based on little evidence, with the possibility that 
it will end up in a false alarm, than to miss danger when it occurs. You might end up 
hurt. So you better be scared than sorry.  
I will make clear in the first chapter that “emotional representation” is not the 
same thing as “emotion”. I do not think that we can reduce an “emotion” to a single 
emotional representation. In the second chapter, I argue that emotions have a 
complex content. A number of philosophers of emotion seem to think that each 
instantiation of an emotional kind has a fixed content. Each experience of anger, for 
instance, represents “offensiveness” or something similar. I argue that, in fact, 
emotional content is more complex. It could be that different instances of the same 
emotional kind have differences in content. For instance, different experiences of 
fear have different contents. It could also be that some contents of experiences which 
are instantiations of different emotional kinds have something in common. An 
instance of fear might have something in common with an instance of anger. In 
arguing for the Complex Content View of emotion, I refer to a large body of work 
in emotion science. In emotion science more people seem to defend something 
similar to the Complex Content View. I will discuss why philosophers might be 
hesitant to accept such a view and argue that they should not be. 
In the third chapter, I show how the pragmatic account of emotional 
representation and the Complex Content View of Emotion relate to each other. I 
address some worries one might have with these views. A concern may be that I do 
not address bodily feelings in the first two chapters of my dissertation. Yet, they seem 
to be important aspects of emotional experience. I will motivate why bodily feelings 
are not directly relevant to how emotions represent the world, which is the topic of 
this dissertation. In this chapter I also briefly address the ontology of emotion. 
I will focus on aesthetics in the remainder of my dissertation. In Chapter Four, I 
claim that we affectively represent aesthetic properties. With this chapter, I do not 
just want to contribute to aesthetics but also to the philosophy of emotion as such. 
In philosophy of perception there is a debate on which properties can be represented 
in perception. I introduce a similar debate to the philosophy of emotion.  
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A number of aestheticians and philosophers of perception believe that aesthetic 
properties, such as grace, balance, and elegance, are perceived. I reject this claim and 
argue that the experiential attribution of aesthetic properties is, in fact, an affective 
representation, which is the obvious candidate for acting as the missing mental link 
between a representation of non-aesthetic properties, such as colours and shapes, 
and a representation of an aesthetic property. Also, aesthetic properties are attributed 
to some non-perceptible objects. For example, a mathematical proof can be 
experienced as elegant. The affective account of experiential aesthetic property 
attribution, which I defend, gives a unified explanation of aesthetic property 
attribution to both perceptible and non-perceptible objects.  
Nevertheless, I think that emotional responses to art are richer than that which is 
described by the idea of aesthetic property attribution. Therefore, together with 
Florian Cova, I did some empirical studies to investigate whether how “ordinary” 
people (people who are not art historians, art critics or philosophers) think about 
which art is good or bad, and how we should make these evaluative judgements. We 
studied the nature of a guilty pleasure, which is the phenomenon of feeling bad about 
feeling good. Guilty pleasures reveal that sometimes we think that our enjoyment in 
a work of art is “wrong” in some sense. Our results indicate that what causes these 
guilty pleasures is not so much a violation of aesthetic norms, but a violation of what 
we call appraiser-directed normativity. Ordinary people are much more concerned 
with their own personal identity, ideals and social group they belong to than with 
aesthetic features of objects. The emotions we experience in an aesthetic context 
thus reveal more than just aesthetic properties; they reveal something about 
ourselves. This is another example of how emotions provide us with information 
about the world.  
The aim of this dissertation is to find out how emotions represent the world. I will 
argue that emotional representations are reliable in the Jamesian sense, as they are 
aimed at maximizing true representations about relevant phenomena. Additionally, I 
will defend the claim that emotions have complex content. After that, I will argue 
that a theory of how emotions represent the world is not necessarily a theory of what 
an emotion is. In the remainder of the dissertation, I will show that emotions are an 
important source of information about aesthetic value. I will argue that the claim that 
aesthetic properties are affectively experienced. However, aesthetic properties are not 
the only features revealed by emotions in an aesthetic context, as I will show with 
my empirical work on guilty pleasures. I hope that I will convince you that emotions 




Better Scared Than Sorry:  
A Pragmatic Account of  Emotional 
Representation 
1.1 The Emotional Unreliability Problem 
When walking through the jungle, Jack suddenly hears a weird sound. He is startled 
and afraid. However, it turns out that all he heard was a branch falling from a tree. 
Therefore, he had no reason to be afraid. This sort of emotional misfiring seems to 
be much more common than perceptual illusions. 
Emotions such as fear seem to provide us with information about the world. I will 
call this representational aspect of emotion “emotional representation”. Emotional 
representation seems to be less reliable than perception and reasoning. Intuitively, 
we are sceptical towards our emotions, as they are too quick and dirty to collect 
information we can trust. In his seminal work, Goldman (1986, p. 43) uses beliefs 
caused by feelings and by being in a bad mood as paradigm examples of unreliability. 
As Brady (2013) argues, we often seek other evidence before we fully trust our 
emotions. If one hears a suspicious sound when alone at home at night, one’s fear 
will not count as a reason to call the police. One will typically look for other evidence 
before fully trusting one’s gut feelings. Whereas, should one perceive a stranger in 
one’s house, one will not hesitate to call the police. A reason why emotional 
representation might be treated as unreliable is that it often misfires.  
For another example, Lucy is watching a 3D movie when suddenly a 3D snake 
jumps towards her. She is startled, although she is fully aware that there is no real 
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snake there. We often respond emotionally to things that do not exist, such as 
fictional movie characters. 
In addition, emotional representations could sometimes be considered as an 
exaggeration of the facts. For instance, when we are angry at someone, we often say 
things that we regret later on. When we have calmed down, we realize that we might 
have exaggerated somewhat.  
The seeming unreliability of emotional representation creates a problem for 
philosophers of mind. Emotional representations are unarguably an important aspect 
of the human mind. Nevertheless, if they are so unreliable, what do we need them 
for? As emotional representations do not seem to be very good at representing 
reality, why could we not just rely on perception and reasoning alone? What function, 
then, do emotional representations have in our representational system? Let us call 
this the “emotional unreliability problem”.1 In this chapter, I will present the 
pragmatic theory of emotional representation as a solution to this problem.  
First, I will develop an understanding of the representational content of emotion. 
Then, I will explain the difference between the two kinds of reliability, after which I 
will present and defend the pragmatic account of emotional representation as a 
solution to the emotional unreliability problem. In the section after that, I will discuss 
how emotional representations epistemologically relate to other mental states. 
  
 
                                                     
1 The empirically inclined reader might not be entirely convinced about the emotional unreliability 
problem at this point. In section 5, I will demonstrate how my ideas are consistent with a dominant 
way of thinking in cognitive science. 
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1.2 Emotional Representation 
Before I present a solution to the emotional unreliability problem, I need to clarify 
the claim that emotions seem to provide us with information about the world. This 
section is mostly concerned with clearing the ground.  
Although I use “emotion” and “emotional representation” interchangeably, we 
have good reasons to claim that these phenomena are not identical. “Emotion” is a 
somewhat vague concept. It is possible that our folk psychological concept 
“emotion” refers to a set of mental states, rather than to one monolithic 
representation. In fact, most emotion scientists claim that an emotion consists of 
multiple components.2 Depending on which emotion theory one defends, emotions 
might include different components, such as directive content (or “action 
tendencies”), bodily feelings, facial expressions, behaviour and higher cognitive 
thoughts. If you accept such a view of emotion, you should note that “emotional 
representation” refers to the aspect of emotion that is representational and is distinct 
from higher cognition.3 Emotional representations are primitive emotional 
responses. It is this kind of representation that seems to be unreliable in the examples 
I gave in the beginning of this chapter. Primitive fear is an emotional representation. 
Existential angst, on the other hand, is a more complex mental phenomenon and I 
do not think that the emotional unreliability problem applies to such complex mental 
phenomena. The claims of this chapter are limited to the nature of emotional 
representation. When I talk about “emotion” in this chapter, I mean “emotional 
representation”, while remaining neutral on the definition and ontology of 
“emotion” as a folk psychological concept.  
I take it to be uncontroversial enough to presuppose that emotional 
representations provide us with information about the world in some sense, but I 
would like to say a bit more about which kind of information is conveyed. First of 
all, emotional representations can be more or less intensely positive or negative. One 
 
                                                     
2 See e.g. (LeDoux, 2014; Moors, 2017). 
3 It is likely that the contents of emotional representations are not linguistically structured and 
propositions might not be the best way to capture these contents. Following Nanay (2013, 2015), 
I will refrain from defining mental representation directly in terms of language-like or 
propositionally structured representations. Doing so might be a good idea for determining the 
contents of sentences and beliefs but there is no reason to already presuppose that all mental 
representations are structured in the same way. (See also Crane, 1992, 2009).  
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way of describing this phenomenon is by saying that emotional representations 
represent their objects as more or less good or bad. If one fears a lion, for instance, 
one experiences it as “bad” in some sense. More specifically, one experiences the lion 
as “dangerous”, by means of emotional representation. Emotional representations 
also vary in intensity. Hearing your favourite song on the radio might give you joy, 
but seeing your newborn child will undoubtedly give you a more intense experience 
of joy because it signals something of greater importance. 
Emotions represent the world in relation to one’s needs, interests, dispositions, 
desires, and general well-being. One represents objects as, for example, “bad for me”, 
and not necessarily “bad for everyone”.4 We do not necessarily think someone is 
mistaken if she experiences different emotions than we do about the same object. 
Another way of describing this is to say that emotional representations represent 
their objects as “relevant to me” in a good or bad way.5  
If you presuppose the belief-desire model of the mind, you can say that emotional 
representations are the things that compare beliefs or belief-like representation with 
desires or desire-like states.6 If a belief-like state matches a desire-like state in a good 
way, the emotional representation represents the object of the belief-like state as 
“good” in a particular way. If it does so in a bad way, one represents the object as 
“bad” in a particular way. If there is no match at all, there is no emotional 
representation. 
One can criticize the belief-desire model of the mind (see, for example, Frost, 
2014) and argue that mental phenomena display more diversity than it allows for. I 
do think that thinking only in terms of beliefs and desires is too limited when it comes 
to emotions. Instead of “desire”, I would like to use the concept of “personal 
significance” to refer to a broader category of mental states. Psychologists have 
described what is personally significant in terms of “goals” and “needs”.7 In the 
 
                                                     
4 Before an emotional representation occurs, the object of that representation arguably needs to be 
represented by some prior mental state, such as a perception, belief, or imagination. Deonna and 
Teroni (2012) call this an emotion’s cognitive base. The represented object might be something of 
the past, as in regret. It might be something in the future, as in anxiety. 
5 See e.g. (De Sousa, 1987; Goldie, 2007; Greenspan, 2006; Griffiths, 1997). 
6 One might argue that desires are also valenced. Sometimes desires are said to ascribe positive 
valence to objects. One can argue that according to this way of thinking, desires are also an affective 
kind, like emotion. Others might argue that an affective and evaluative representation is a 
component of a desire. I remain neutral on this debate.  
7 For an overview, see e.g. (Smith & Kirby, 2009). 
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philosophy of emotion, there is an ongoing debate regarding what personal 
significance is referencing. Price (2015, pp. 116–131) distinguishes between the 
interest-based account and the preference-based account. The interest-based account 
conceptualizes significance as a list of objective “goods” or “interests”, such as 
“health; security; adequate material resources; good social status; autonomy; good 
social relationships; intellectual stimulation” (Price, 2015, pp. 117–118). The 
preference-based account holds that personal significance is thought of as 
preferences, such as desires, values, likes, and dislikes. It could be argued that these 
accounts are not opposites, as the interest-based account could be an idealization of 
the preference-based account (see also Döring, 2007; Solomon, 2003). 
We only emotionally react to what is personally significant and emotional 
representations provide us with information about why an object is relevant.8 As it 
stands, this characterization of what is represented in emotional representation is too 
broad. Arguably, our emotions can represent only a limited amount of different kinds 
of good and bad, such as being dangerous or being lovable. These kinds are often 
called “formal objects” (Kenny, 1963). It is, however, not my aim to give an account 
of which kinds of relevance or which formal objects an emotional representation can 
represent. This is the topic of the next chapter. In this section, I wanted to clarify 
what I mean by the statement that emotions seem to provide us with some 
information about the environment. 
Having done this, we can now reconsider the emotional unreliability problem: 
emotional representations seem to be unreliable, as they often present us with false 
alarms. What function, then, do they have in our representational system? I will argue 
that the pragmatic account of emotional representation shows that emotions are 
reliable in a distinctive way. First, I will discuss the philosophical framework that is 
able to distinguish between two kinds of reliability.  
 
                                                     
8 However, one can misrepresent this relation. Salmela (2006) argues that there is a distinction 
between objective probability and subjective probability. For instance, when you fear that a terrorist 
attack will happen at the concert you are planning to go to; you might be “correct” according to 
your own standards, but not to objective standards. 
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1.3 Two Kinds of Reliability 
There is an intuitive sense that emotional representation is more closely related to 
the primitive urge to survive than to truth. This might be a possible solution to the 
emotional reliability problem: emotional representations keep us alive, although they 
are not reliable representations of reality. However, the distinction between “truth” 
as a goal and “survival” as a goal can be deflated. For instance, Quine (1969) famously 
says that organisms that do not represent reality accurately would probably die before 
they can reproduce. It is a mainstream view that representing correctly is 
advantageous in the light of survival. Many philosophers agree with Quine and 
consider this as an evolutionary argument that guarantees that our cognitive 
capacities are aimed at representing reality accurately (Dennett, 1987; Millikan, 1984; 
Papineau, 1987). If one presupposes that our representational systems are aimed at 
accurately representing reality, emotions seem to be terrible at doing what they are 
supposed to do.  
Stich (1990), on the other hand, argues that sometimes it is selectively 
advantageous to misrepresent. Often one is better “safe” (but false) than “sorry”:  
 
A very cautious, risk-aversive inferential strategy – one that leaps to 
the conclusion that danger is present on very slight evidence – will 
typically lead to false beliefs more often, and true ones less often, 
than a less hair-trigger one that waits for more evidence before 
rendering a judgement. Nonetheless, the unreliable, error-prone, 
risk-aversive strategy may well be favored by natural selection. For 
natural selection does not care about truth; it cares only about 
reproductive success. And from the point of view of reproductive 
success, it is often better to be safe (and wrong) than sorry.  
(Stich, 1990, p. 62) 
 
An organism that is sensitive to danger might misrepresent things as dangerous 
that really are not. However, when it matters, the organism will represent the possible 
killer as dangerous. It will act upon this representation and survive. In contrast, an 
organism that is not sensitive to danger might never misrepresent something as 
dangerous, but perhaps it will not detect some present and true danger. 
Misrepresenting something as dangerous is not as bad as not representing the danger 
that could kill you. 
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One might think that Stich (1990) implies that it is a virtue that our 
representational system is not fully reliable. This is, however, not true if we 
distinguish between two kinds of reliability, as Godfrey-Smith (1991, 1998) does. A 
process that produces beliefs can be reliable if it maximizes true beliefs and it can be 
reliable if it minimizes false beliefs. Following Godfrey-Smith (1998), we can call 
these conceptions of reliability Jamesian reliability (maximizing true beliefs) and 
Cartesian reliability (minimizing false beliefs). Godfrey-Smith (1991, 1998) argues 
that, because our senses are imperfect and the environment is not epistemically co-
operative, it is impossible to believe truly all the time. Still, a large number of mental 
representations reliably correlate with the world. An explanation for this is that in a 
representational system, there is always a trade-off between the two kinds of 
reliability. In every context, there is a specific optimal balance between the two kinds 
of reliability which is evolutionarily advantageous. In a hostile environment where 
there are many dangers, it is good for an organism to maximize true beliefs about 
danger. An organism that is sensitive to danger is better able to survive in this 
environment. On the other hand, in an environment where there is an abundance of 
water but not all of it is drinkable, the organism might want to minimize false beliefs 
about what is drinkable. Otherwise, it will get sick quite soon. Of course, these two 
examples are oversimplifications. In reality, the trade-off between the two kinds of 
reliability is very complex. 
The names Godfrey-Smith (1998) gives to these two kinds of reliability obviously 
refer to the philosophical claims of William James (most importantly James, 1899) 
and René Descartes (most importantly Descartes, 1724).9 Nevertheless, the idea of 
distinguishing between the two actually comes from psychophysical applications of 
signal detection theory, in which Cartesian reliability is referred to as “conservative 
bias” and Jamesian reliability as “liberal bias”.10 
Traditionally, philosophy of mind and epistemology have conceptualized the 
reliability of our mental states in Cartesian terms (Dretske, 1981; Fodor, 1975; 
Goldman, 1986). According to the Cartesian, our representational system is aimed at 
 
                                                     
9 In (Godfrey-Smith, 1991), he uses the slightly more confusing concepts posited by Field (1990), 
namely world-head reliability and head-world reliability. 
10 The basics of signal detection theory are effectively explained in (Godfrey-Smith, 1991). For 
more information on signal detection theory, see (Lynn & Barrett, 2014; Macmillan & Creelman, 
2004; or Swets & Green, 1964). Signal detection theory also mentions “neutral bias” in which the 
bias is strictly speaking neither Jamesian nor Cartesian (Lynn & Barrett, 2014).  
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mirroring reality as correctly as possible. It is better to miss out on endorsing a true 
claim than to misrepresent the world. Stich and Godfrey-Smith both challenge this 
idea. Stich argues that we are often better safe (but wrong) than sorry. In fact, he 
argues that the mind is more Jamesian than Cartesian. Godfrey-Smith, on the other 
hand, convincingly shows that in a representational system, there is always a trade-
off between the two kinds of reliability. Despite their differences, Stich agrees with 
Godfrey-Smith’s idea that “it is not just producing more truths and fewer falsehoods 
that makes one system of reasoning better than another; the system must excel at 
producing certain kinds of truths and avoiding certain kinds of errors” (Stich, 1990, 
p. 162. n. 7). 
The take-home message of this section is that our representational system is not 
strictly speaking Cartesian, as sometimes it aims to be reliable in the Jamesian sense. 
1.4 The Pragmatic Account of Emotional Representation 
Stich and Godfrey-Smith do not discuss emotions in this context, but we can see 
how their theories might well offer a solution to the emotional reliability problem. 
In this section, I will argue that emotional representations are not reliable in the 
Cartesian sense, but they are Jamesian-reliable. Emotional representations aim at 
maximizing accurate representations11 about relevant phenomena. This implies that 
emotional representations are Jamesian-reliable. 
It might be evolutionarily advantageous for an organism to have a fear response, 
and represent “danger” or something similar when there is very slight evidence that 
something is dangerous: the sound of a branch falling in the jungle, a weird sound in 
your house at night, or a 3D snake jumping towards you. This will result in many 
false alarms, but it will keep the organism alive when it matters. 
In the same sense, exaggeration can be considered as a maximization of accurate 
representations. It is better to be really angry and overly aggressive than to 
underestimate the importance of the situation and be killed. In another example, 
 
                                                     
11 “True belief” might sound a bit awkward in this context because it might seem to suggest that 
an emotional representation is, in fact, a belief. Therefore I replaced “true/false belief” when 
talking about emotional representation by the more neutral “accurate/inaccurate representation”. 
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when you are at an office party, your social anxiety might give you the impression 
that you are constantly being judged by other people attending the reception. Even 
if this is an exaggeration, it might help you to show the best of yourself. In other 
words, all the examples I gave to suggest that emotional representations are not 
reliable do in fact show that these emotional representations are very reliable in the 
Jamesian sense. 
This insight is the basis of the pragmatic theory of emotional representation. 
Emotional representations are Jamesian-reliable and not Cartesian-reliable. It might 
be confusing to call emotion “Jamesian” in this context, because the so-called 
Jamesian account of emotion is very different from the idea that emotions are 
Jamesian-reliable. Another way to point out that emotions are strictly Jamesian is to 
say that they are ruthlessly pragmatic. In order to avoid confusion, I will not call my 
account the “Jamesian-reliable theory of emotional representation” but the 
“pragmatic theory of emotional representation”.12  
Emotional representations are Jamesian-reliable processes that provide relevant 
information about the world when it matters. An emotion represents the way 
relevant phenomena are indeed relevant. Often it is more costly for an organism to 
miss the relevance of something than to misrepresent it. We do not respond 
emotionally to everything we see, but when it matters, we do. Emotional 
representations are often inaccurate, which is a consequence of the Jamesian strategy: 
to be safe rather than sorry. Often that means that one is better scared than sorry. 
One can remark that what it takes to fully maximize accurate representations is to 
represent everything at once: one should have all the emotions all the time. In this 
way, every time when something relevant happens our emotional representations will 
have picked it up, although one will be presented with a massive amount of false 
alarms. This is, however, not implied by saying that emotions are Jamesian-reliable 
and not Cartesian-reliable. There is always a trade-off between maximizing accurate 
representations and minimizing inaccurate representations. What determines the 
trade-off is the calculation of what is more costly for the organism: to misrepresent 
it or to miss it? Experiencing every emotion at once is not advantageous or useful at 
all. It is very costly for an organism to experience every emotion all the time, because 
the organism would be constantly overwhelmed and not able to function. The 
amount of evidence which is required for a Jamesian strategy to represent something 
 
                                                     
12 See (Tanesini, 2008) for a pragmatist (but not “pragmatic”) theory of emotion, stressing the value 
and virtue of fallibilism, which is also inspired by Jamesian philosophy. 
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is significantly lower than it is for a Cartesian. But that does not mean that there is 
no threshold whatsoever. Also, reliability does not imply infallibility. Emotional 
representations are, however, significantly more likely to present you with a false 
alarm than to miss out on something important. That is what it means to be 
Jamesian-reliable but not Cartesian-reliable. 
Emotional representations are very quick; they respond quickly and often give 
incomplete or false information, but they provide information when it matters. 
Moreover, when we respond emotionally, the things that are of great importance are 
those that must be responded to quickly. If you deliberate too long about whether 
something might possibly kill you, you might be dead before you figure it out. Again, 
responding rapidly will lead to many false positives. This might also be the reason 
why emotional representations are sparse on the information they convey. If the 
emotional representation of a snake provided a very detailed explanation of why the 
snake is “bad”, one might be killed before one acts. In order to survive, it is not 
necessary to know exactly why something is relevant. It is, however, very important 
to distinguish between what is good and what is bad. An emotional representation 
represents relevance in an efficient but slightly indeterminate way. 
I have been using examples which refer to primitive emotions rooted in survival. 
Yet, most emotions we experience in everyday life, however, relate to phenomena 
which are personally significant for various reasons, as I have discussed in the second 
section. There are many phenomena we encounter which are relevant for our well-
being and this includes more than just the things that might get us killed. At the same 
time, one could argue that the pragmatic account does not work for complex 
emotions, and I agree. As I said in the second section, “emotional representation” 
only refers to a very specific kind of representation. Emotional representation is a 
primitive aspect of our mind and it would be a mistake to reduce our complex 
emotional life to these emotional representations. It is a technical notion, so it does 
not match perfectly with all of one’s intuitions about “emotion”. Most of the time 
when we refer to our emotions, we are referring to complex mental episodes; 
including higher cognitive thought, action tendencies, and so one. One could argue 
that many of our emotional experiences are not explained by the pragmatic account 
of emotion, but the pragmatic account of emotion is only aimed at solving the 
emotional unreliability problem. The pragmatic account offers an explanation for the 
seeming unreliability of primitive emotional representation, which is nevertheless a 




The pragmatic account of emotional representation shows that emotional 
representation is reliable after all, albeit in the Jamesian sense. Suppose that 
emotional representations are not strictly aimed at maximizing accurate 
representations about things that matter, and thus not strictly aimed at Jamesian 
reliability. This would mean that emotions are not reliable. If this is true, then it 
becomes hard to identify the function of emotional representation in our 
representational system. If emotional representations are not aimed at minimizing 
false beliefs and not at maximizing accurate representations, what are they supposed 
to do? 
A common way to think of mental representations is as those mental states that 
have the function to reliably correlate with what they represent. This does not imply 
infallibility, because what can represent, can also misrepresent. But if a mental state 
does not reliably correlate with what it is supposed to represent, it seems that this 
mental state is not what we traditionally would call a mental representation. Suppose 
that all maps of London do not reliably correlate with the geographic facts about 
London. You would wonder why people would use these maps and you would even 
question whether maps of London are actual maps. Because reliability is closely tied 
to the notion of representation, a mental state which “unreliably correlates” with 
what it is supposed to represent almost seems paradoxical.  
Tappolet (2016, pp. 41–42) states that, because emotions misfire more often than 
not, we have reason to give up thinking of emotion in terms of reliable correlation 
altogether. The pragmatic account of emotional representation, however, shows how 
emotional representations are reliable, albeit in the Jamesian sense, and have a 
specific function in our representational system. Consequently, we do not have to 
give up on representationalism about emotion. 
Emotional representations aim at maximizing accurate representations about what 
is relevant and in doing so they will often produce a false alarm. This is the pragmatic 
account of emotional representation, which I have defended in this section. In the 
next section, I will discuss how emotional representations epistemically relate to 
other mental states 
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1.5 Jamesian Emotion and Cartesian Re-Evaluation 
The pragmatic account of emotional representation states that in a representational 
system, there is always a trade-off between Jamesian and Cartesian reliability. 
Emotional representations are only reliable in the Jamesian sense. But while our 
emotional representations might be ruthlessly pragmatic, our representational system 
as a whole will seek a balance. Therefore, pragmatic emotions in our representational 
system are typically kept in balance with a Cartesian re-evaluation. I will clarify this 
idea, while discussing the most relevant scientific research. I aim to show that the 
pragmatic account is consistent with a dominant way of thinking in cognitive science. 
The pragmatic account is not repetitive of this research but complementary, as it is 
able to show how certain cognitive mechanisms correspond to personal level 
description of mental representations. 
Compare the idea of the Jamesian-Cartesian trade-off to neuroscientist LeDoux’s 
research on fear, which is arguably one of the greatest successes in the science of 
emotion. LeDoux describes how a pragmatic emotion is corrected rapidly by an inner 
Cartesian in the following – often quoted – passage: 
 
Imagine walking in the woods. A crackling sound occurs. It goes 
straight to the amygdala through the thalamic pathway. The sound also 
goes from the thalamus to the cortex, which recognizes the sound to 
be a dry twig that snapped under the weight of your boot or that of a 
rattlesnake shaking its tail. But by the time the cortex has figured this 
out, the amygdala is already starting to defend against the snake. The 
information received from the thalamus is unfiltered and biased toward 
evoking responses. The cortex’s job is to prevent the inappropriate 
response rather than to produce the appropriate one. Alternatively, 
suppose there is a slender curved shape on the path. The curvature and 
slenderness reach the amygdala from the thalamus, whereas only the 
cortex distinguishes a coiled up snake from a curved stick. If it is a 
snake, the amygdala is ahead of the game. From the point of view of 
survival, it is better to respond to potentially dangerous events as if they 
were, in fact, the real thing than to fail to respond. The cost of treating 
a stick as a snake is less, in the long run than the cost of treating a snake 
as a stick.  
(LeDoux, 1996, pp. 163–164) 
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We can translate the roles LeDoux ascribes to neural mechanisms in terms of the 
difference between the Jamesian and the Cartesian strategy. The amygdala is more 
Jamesian than the cortex: it is faster, but also more likely to present a false positive. 
However, this is better in the light of survival. Interestingly, our representational 
systems often rapidly correct our misrepresentations. When a 3D snake jumps 
towards you, you might be scared for an instance, but you calm down right before 
you decide to run away. This system is incredibly useful for survival. One quickly 
represents something as dangerous, but it can be corrected easily. This resembles a 
widespread psychological theory, namely the dual process theory that distinguishes 
between System 1 and System 2 (see Evans, 1984; Kahneman, 2003). System 1 is 
automatic and more primitive; in this case, the emotional representation would be 
part of System 1. System 2 consists of higher-cognitive processes, which in this 
example might be responsible for reappraising the initial emotional representation. 
One could say that System 1 and the amygdala “aim” at maximizing accurate 
representations, whereas System 2 and the cortex “aim” (in this context13) at 
minimizing false beliefs. System 1 is often related to emotional responses, System 2 
is often related to reason. 
Many psychologists have argued for something similar. Appraisal theories of 
emotion interpret emotion as a series of “appraisals” or representations. Lazarus 
(1991), for instance, distinguishes between primary and secondary appraisals. The 
primary appraisal would represent the snake as dangerous, while the secondary 
appraisals would reappraise the situation in the light of new information and prevent 
the organism to act as if it were in a full-blown state of fear. Scherer’s model includes 
a number of appraisals, ranging from very primitive and direct to more complex and 
possibly conceptual (Scherer, 2001, 2005). Inspired by these scientists, philosopher 
Robinson (2005) distinguishes between non-cognitive appraisal and cognitive 
monitoring in an emotional episode. Thus, there is consensus amongst many 
emotion theorists that, within the emotional process, there is a distinction between a 
direct, primitive response and a re-evaluation of this information. 
Note that up until now, I have used “emotional representation” or “emotion” to 
refer to the initial response, the non-cognitive or primary appraisal. As I said in the 
second section, many emotion scientists claim that an emotion consists of multiple 
 
                                                     
13 I would say that in higher cognitive thought, there is always a trade-off between the two kinds of 
reliability. But, in this context, as a response to a Jamesian representation it probably will take up 
the role of a Cartesian re-evaluation. 
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components. Some include the re-evaluation of the initial emotional response in the 
emotional process. If one endorses such a view, the pragmatic theory of emotional 
representation only holds for the initial, non-cognitive emotional response.  
A reason why some hold that the initial emotional response and the re-evaluation 
are parts of one single process is that, as Brady (2013) argues, the initial emotional 
response motivates and usually facilitates re-evaluation. Brady argues that we do not 
take emotions at face value because they do not silence the demand for justification. 
This is different from perception because perceiving that P is said to give prima facie 
justification for believing that P. An emotional experience essentially motivates one 
to look for additional reasons and evidence to justify an evaluative judgement. Brady 
argues that this is achieved by the influence of emotion on attention.  
I agree with Brady that emotions typically motivate re-evaluation. As an emotional 
representation is strictly Jamesian, it represents something on very slight evidence. A 
Cartesian system only claims something when it has sufficient evidence for near 
certainty. The pragmatic account of emotion entails that in a representational system 
there is always a trade-off between the Cartesian and the Jamesian strategies. 
Consequently, we do not take our emotions at face value, as Brady states. Cartesian 
re-evaluation is set up to search for further evidence. 
Cartesian re-evaluation can go top-down, by modifying one’s attention, as Brady 
argues. A large body of research indicates that emotion indeed influences attention 
(for a good overview see Brady, 2010, 2013). In this chapter, we will not focus on 
attention, but instead on how emotional representation relates to higher cognition. 
When interacting with an emotional representation, higher cognition often plays 
the role of the Cartesian re-evaluation. When a 3D snake jumps towards you, the 
Jamesian emotion represents the 3D snake as negatively significant relative to your 
desire to stay safe and alive. Your higher cognitive deliberation, which plays the role 
of Cartesian re-evaluation, will rapidly calibrate this emotional representation because 
other evidence shows that you are watching a movie and that the snake is not a real 
snake. Cartesian re-evaluation is slower because it gathers more information before 
it makes its claim.14 The Jamesian emotion is quick, and often wrong, but it will keep 
you safe when it matters. 
 
                                                     
14 When the 3D snake jumps towards you, you already know that you are watching a movie. The 
emotional representation, however, does not use this information to determine whether the object 
that is seemingly moving towards you is dangerous. Cartesian re-evaluation does take this 
information into account and because it takes time to deploy this information, it is slower. 
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Our representational system is constantly re-evaluating the information it 
processes. In the example of the weird noise at night, one’s gut feeling only takes us 
so far. It is perfectly rational to look for other evidence before calling the police. In 
this case, our reason has the function of minimizing false beliefs. However, a conflict 
between a Jamesian and a Cartesian representation does not always get resolved. An 
unresolved conflict often results in a so-called recalcitrant emotion. 
A recalcitrant emotion is defined as an emotion that persists although it is in 
conflict with an evaluative judgement (Brady, 2007, 2009; D’Arms & Jacobson, 2003; 
Döring, 2009; Goldie, 2009; Greenspan, 1988; Helm, 2001, 2015; Roberts, 2003; 
Salmela, 2006; Tappolet, 2012). Fear of flying and other “irrational” fears are the 
paradigm examples: one continues to be afraid of flying, spiders or small spaces, 
although one rationally judges them not dangerous. Much of the debate is based on 
the intuition that there is a rational conflict. A subject who makes an evaluative 
judgement that contradicts an emotional response is violating a norm about how 
evaluative judgements and emotional experiences should relate. 
In this chapter, I do not aim at resolving this normative issue. More modestly, I 
would like to show how most paradigm cases of recalcitrant emotions can be 
described by the pragmatic account of emotion as an unresolved conflict between 
the Jamesian emotional representation and Cartesian re-evaluation.  
Consider the following example. Sarah knows that flying is rather safe, but still 
feels anxious whenever she is on an airplane. Her anxiety represents a relation 
between flying and her desire to stay safe and not get hurt. There is very little chance 
that the plane will crash, but the mere possibility is of great significance. Therefore, 
an emotional representation with something like the following content kicks in: 
“taking this flight is relevant in a negative way, more specifically there might be 
danger for your life and safety.” This might encourage Sarah to believe that it is, in 
fact, dangerous to get on this plane. Cartesian re-evaluation knows that there is very 
little chance that the plane will crash, but it does not have sufficient evidence that the 
situation is dangerous, so it does not know for certain that being on the plane is 
dangerous. Here is the conflict: there is enough evidence for the pragmatic emotional 
representation to occur, whereas Cartesian deliberation leads Sarah to think that 
being on the plane is rather safe. Unlike in the 3D snake example, the emotional 
representation does not vanish. Why is that? In the 3D snake case, it is clear that 
there is nothing to be afraid of, whereas in the plane case, there is greater uncertainty 
as to whether or not the plane is going to crash. This, combined with the high 
significance of the possibility of being killed, causes Sarah’s emotional representation 
to remain unmoved by the Cartesian re-evaluation. The conflict does not get resolved 
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because there is enough reason to be afraid for a Jamesian strategy, whereas for a 
Cartesian strategy, there is not. Cartesian re-evaluation is not able to recalibrate the 
emotional representation because one does not know for certain that the emotional 
representation is wrong. In the 3D snake example, or in the moving branch example, 
Cartesian re-evaluation is more confident. High significance combined with great 
uncertainty might result in a recalcitrant emotion.  
A recalcitrant emotion is an emotion that persists even though the individual who 
is experiencing this emotion makes an evaluative judgement that contradicts this 
emotion. I hold that this contradicting evaluative judgement is often not made with 
absolute confidence. In the fear of flying case both the evaluative judgement and the 
initial emotional representation are based on insufficient evidence according to 
Cartesian standards.15 One cannot know with certainty whether the plane is going to 
crash. The conflict is not between believing that P and believing that not P, as there 
is not enough evidence to say conclusively either P or not P. The conflict is between 
believing that P and what James (1899) calls “doing without it”; that is, not making 
a claim at all.16 This might be another interpretation of the phrase “conflict without 
contradiction” (Döring, 2009). The choice is not between believing that the plane is 
dangerous or safe; the choice is between believing that the plane is dangerous and 
“doing without” the belief that the plane is dangerous. The Jamesian system has to 
make the decision, while the Cartesian does not feel confident to make its claim.  
Significance varies from person to person. Different people judge things to be of 
importance to varying degrees.17 Bad experiences and trauma might cause the 
pragmatic emotions to react differently. Past feelings of loneliness might stimulate a 
person’s sensitivity to cues of social exclusion.18 The Jamesian emotional system does 
not need much evidence to signal to its owner that somebody is laughing at her or is 
mad at her. A previous bad relationship might cause an individual to have fear of 
commitment or abandonment. A bad ex-boyfriend might stimulate an individual to 
 
                                                     
15 In this sense is the uncertainty high: it is high enough not to make a claim according to Cartesian 
standards. 
16 This notion is similar to “suspending judgement” (see e.g. Levi, 1967, 1981).  
17 This has been the subject of a large body of research. (See e.g. De Houwer et al., 2001; Hofmann 
et al., 2010). 
18 Paradoxically, the ordinary language notion of “sensitivity”, in the sense I am using it here, is not 
what sensitivity means in signal detection theory (SDT). Sensitivity in SDT is the ability to 
distinguish a particular signal from particular noise. The common-sense notion of sensitivity as I 
am using it here has more in common with the SDT notion of bias (Lynn & Barrett, 2014). 
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be hypersensitive to cues that the next boyfriend may leave her. A trauma causes a 
person to be hypersensitive to a trauma-related stimulus. In each of these cases, what 
is personally significant to an individual changes and the bar for the Jamesian 
emotion to fire is set lower. Many “irrational” emotions may be explained by this 
pattern. 
This is, however, only one way emotions can “go wrong”. There are many other 
ways emotions can be incorrect, irrational, or pathological. The pragmatic account 
of emotion does not resolve the issue of recalcitrant emotions, but it can describe 
what is going on in some paradigm cases.  
In this section, I have discussed how Jamesian emotional representations relate to 
other mental states. Sometimes, emotional representation and Cartesian re-
evaluation are in conflict, but the conflict is settled quite quickly, as in the 3D snake 
example. The emotion represents the 3D snake as negatively relevant to one’s desire 
to stay safe (“dangerous”). In this case, there is sufficient evidence for the Cartesian 
re-evaluation to claim that one is, in fact, not in danger. The pragmatic account of 
emotion describes how a Jamesian-Cartesian conflict that cannot be settled because 
both significance and uncertainty are high can result in a recalcitrant emotion. 
1.6 The Function of Emotional Representation 
Although the pragmatic account of emotional representation matches well with the 
dual process theory, there is, however, a slight difference between the two theories. 
Dual process theory makes a clear distinction between two systems, whereas the 
Jamesian-Cartesian trade-off idea of representation is a matter of degree. The trade-
off idea implies that every mental representation is more or less Jamesian or 
Cartesian. In other words, there is a spectrum that goes from very Jamesian to very 
Cartesian, instead of a strict split between two kinds. I hold that, although individual 
emotional representations might slightly vary in degree, they are all on the Jamesian 
end of the spectrum. Additionally, I claim that radically Jamesian representations are 
kept in balance by representations which are on the Cartesian end of the spectrum. 
The dual process theory makes a similar claim but in doing so it makes a strict 




In the introduction I asked what the function of emotional representation in our 
representational system is. I can now conclude: within a representational system 
where there is a trade-off between Jamesian and Cartesian reliability, it is often useful 
that instead of either a more Cartesian or a more Jamesian representation, one has a 
representation which is on the Jamesian end of the spectrum, followed by a 
representation which is more on the Cartesian end of the spectrum. An emotional 
representation is such a representation which is on the Jamesian end of the spectrum.  
In this chapter, I have defended the pragmatic account of emotional 
representation. This is the claim that emotional representations are reliable in the 
Jamesian sense, as they are aimed at maximizing accurate representations about 
relevant phenomena. They play an important role in our representational system 




The Complex Content of  Emotion 
2.1 The Linguistic Fallacy 
Emotional mental content is interestingly different from the mental content of belief. 
Kenny (1963) points that while beliefs can be about anything, the objects of emotion 
are restricted. You can believe anything you can think of, whereas an experience of 
fear is limited in its representational scope. Some argue, for instance, that fear can 
only represent danger. Kenny called the objects of emotions, such as danger, formal 
objects. 
The idea that emotions can only represent things like “formal objects” seems to 
be the second aspect of emotions that makes them “stand out” amongst other 
representational mental states. In the previous chapter, I discussed how emotional 
representations do not seem to fit the representationalist framework as they seem to 
be unreliable. In this chapter, I want to question whether it is in fact the case that the 
content of emotion is limited. The scope of this chapter is a bit wider than the 
previous one: I do not just discuss primitive emotional representations. Rather, when 
I say “emotional content”, I mean the totality of information that we learn from 
emotional experiences, ranging from the very primitive to the very complex. In the 
next chapter, I will clarify how the claims I made in the previous chapter and the 
claims of this one relate. 
There are two ways to think about emotional mental content. One theory says that 
there is a limited number of emotions. Some might want to call them “basic 
emotions”: fear, joy, anger, and so on. Each instance of these emotion types provides 
some fixed information about the world. Every instance of fear, for instance, tells 
you that there is “danger”, while anger tells you that something is “offensive”. Every 
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emotional experience has a fixed content, corresponding to the type it is an instance 
of. Call this the Simple Content View. Another theory of emotion tells you that there 
are many differences in emotional experiences and that this implies that in these 
different experiences different properties are represented. According to this view, 
two distinct instances of fear might have differences in content. Also, an instance of 
anger might have something in common with an instance of fear. Call this the 
Complex Content View.  
The Simple Content View is compatible with the claim that an emotion has a 
complex ontology. One could argue that an emotional experience is partially 
constituted by bodily feelings, or by perceptual states, or by another mental 
phenomenon, next to a component which emotionally represents the world as being 
a certain way. According to someone who defends the Simple Content View and 
holds that the ontology of emotion is complex, the representational component 
consists of fixed information corresponding to the emotional type. For instance, fear 
always has a component that represents the world as dangerous. The Complex 
Content View is consistent with the claim that the ontology of emotional is complex 
but it also claims that the representational component is complex: emotionally 
represented information can vary amongst different instances of a single emotional 
type and emotional experiences of different emotional kinds might have some 
represented information in common.19 
The Simple Content View is widely assumed in philosophy of emotion. In this 
chapter, I will argue that this theory might work as a tool to categorize emotions, but 
it would be a mistake to equate it with a theory of emotional mental content, that is 
a theory about what is represented in emotional experience. For this reason, I defend 
the Complex Content View. The confusion between a way to categorize mental states 
and a theory of the mental content of those states is what I will call the linguistic 
fallacy20. I think that this fallacy is widespread in philosophy of mind. A theory of 
mental concepts is often confused with a theory of mental contents. 
The target of this chapter is what I call the Core Relational Theme View. This is a 
variation of the Simple Content View, and currently, it is arguably the mainstream 
 
                                                     
19 This chapter is neutral on the ontology of emotion and is only concerned with the content of 
emotion. 
20 Note that this mistake is not always due to linguistic phenomena. But most of the time folk 




view of emotional content. It is meant to be a naturalized theory of emotional 
content. By “naturalized” I mean that it is supposedly grounded in, or at least 
consistent with emotion science. The Core Relational Theme View states that an 
emotion is a representation of a core relational theme, which is a concept from 
emotion psychology. The content of an emotional experience is thus supposedly a 
core relational theme. In this chapter, I will argue that the Core Relational Theme 
View commits the linguistic fallacy. It confuses a theory of emotion categorization 
with a theory of emotional content. 
The Complex Content View does not make this mistake, as it treats the 
categorization of emotion and the content of emotion as strictly distinct. I will argue 
that this is a better view of the mental content of emotion. Neuroscientist LeDoux 
compares an emotion to a soup with different ingredients (LeDoux, 2014). This is a 
useful metaphor to illustrate the Complex Content View. Small differences in 
ingredients make up different soups. Nevertheless, there are common ingredients to 
each kind of soup. Although all chicken soups have something in common, specific 
chicken soups can have slight variations, due to variations in ingredients. Likewise, 
each anxiety experience has something in common. Nevertheless, different instances 
of anxiety might vary in ingredients. What these ingredients are is heavily debated, 
but there is more or less consensus among emotion scientists that one should 
develop a scientific explanation of a number of emotional ingredients, rather than of 
a simple content.21  
I will argue that philosophers should also favor the Complex Content View (or let 
us call it “the Soup Theory”) over the Simple Content View. In the final section, I 
will discuss why philosophers might be sceptical about this way of thinking and why 
they should not be. 
  
 
                                                     
21 It is noteworthy that LeDoux’s soup view of emotion may allow for various ingredients to be 
part of an emotion which are not necessary representations of the world. LeDoux thus claims that 
not just emotional content is complex, but also that the ontology of emotion is complex.  
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2.2 Core Relational Theme View 
2.2.1 Formal objects 
To situate the Core Relational Theme View, we need to talk about what philosophers 
of emotion have called formal objects. As I mentioned earlier, Kenny (1963) 
introduced this term to the philosophy of emotion to describe what emotions can be 
“about”. Beliefs can be about anything, but emotional experiences cannot represent 
everything beliefs can. 
Emotions always seem to be “about” something. Let me give you the example of 
the lion in the coffee shop I used in the introduction of this dissertation again: 
 
I am discussing philosophy with my friend in a coffee shop. All of a 
sudden a lion walks in. As soon as I see this lion, I am afraid of it. After 
it has eaten my friend, I am sad that she is dead. This experience evolves 
into anger. In a heroic act, I manage to kill the lion. I am very proud of 
that act. Each of these emotions is about something. I am afraid of the 
lion, sad that my friend just died, angry at the lion for killing her and 
proud that I managed to kill the lion.  
 
In this way it seems uncontroversial to say that emotions are representations: I 
represent the lion as being a certain way. Another way of articulating this would be 
to say that emotions are intentional, as they are always directed at an object. 
In the philosophy of emotion, it has become quite common to distinguish between 
two kinds of objects an emotion can be about. Material or particular objects are 
distinguished from so-called formal objects. This distinction was introduced by 
Kenny (1963). The kind of object of emotion to which the lion in the example 
belongs is often referred to as the material or particular object of the emotion.22 The 
 
                                                     
22 Within a representationalist framework, a particular object is an “intentional object” and does 
not always qualify as an “object” as it is traditionally described in metaphysics. A particular object 
can also be an event, as one can, for instance, be frightened that “the lion is attacking me”. Besides 
fearing a real object it is also possible to fear an imaginary object. A child can, for instance, be 
afraid of an imaginary lion sleeping underneath her bed. According to the representationalist, 
particular objects can be represented in various ways. 
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particular object is what is feared in fear or what is loved in love. Kenny argues that 
this kind of emotional object is similar to the object of a transitive verb. One could 
distinguish two kinds of fear, by distinguishing their particular objects. Fear of a lion 
is different from fear of being lonely, for example. However, distinguishing fear from 
anger is another matter. One can say that one fears the fearsome, while one loves the 
lovable. There is also a non-tautological way of expressing this, according to Kenny. 
One can say that one fears the dangerous and is angry at the offensive. “Dangerous” 
and “offensive”23 are examples of so-called formal objects. Kenny rediscovered this 
scholastic notion and employed it to distinguish different emotion types. The formal 
object of an emotion also restricts what it is “logically appropriate” for an emotion 
to be about. For instance, it is appropriate to fear the dangerous and to be angry at 
the offensive. So formal objects seem to function as that which individuates emotion 
types and as that which determines which emotions are appropriate. 
Having said this, it should be noted that “formal object” is a somewhat confused 
notion, as various philosophers use it in different ways. It also is not clear whether 
Kenny thought that formal objects are related to mental concepts or to mental states 
themselves. The following quote seems to suggest the former: “to assign a formal 
object to an action is to place restrictions on what may occur as the direct object of 
a verb describing the action.” (Kenny, 1963, p. 189). Whereas this quote suggests 
that formal objects are the objects of mental states themselves: “the description of 
the formal object of a mental attitude such as an emotion, unlike a description of the 
formal object of a non-intensional action, must contain reference to belief. Only what 
is wet in fact can be dried; but something which is merely believed to be an insult 
may provoke anger.” (Kenny, 1963, p. 193-194). This quote, however, also suggests 
that formal objects figure in the contents of a belief, rather than in the content of the 
emotional experience itself. Kenny himself does not state that emotions are 
representations of formal objects, but he claims that they are responses to evaluative 
beliefs. Teroni (2007) rightly points out that this implies that emotions have, in fact, 
no content, and Deigh (1994, p. 80) argues that this idea is too cognitively demanding 
for primitive emotions.24  
 
                                                     
23 Kenny uses Aristotelian medieval concepts such as “future evil” for fear, “another’s good” for 
envy and “one’s own past sins” for remorse. (Kenny, 1963, p. 135). 
24 Teroni agrees but argues that this does not imply that emotions lack evaluative content, as Deigh 
does. For interesting discussions of how formal objects have been used in the philosophy of 
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Prinz, on the other hand, understands “formal object” as that which is represented 
in an emotional experience (Prinz, 2004, p. 62). Importantly, he finds in psychologist 
Lazarus’ definition of a “core relational theme” a better account of what this formal 
object is. This is the central idea of the Core Relational Theme View. 
2.2.2 Core Relational Themes 
The Core Relational Theme View does not merely rely on Kenny’s conceptual 
analysis, but presents a more naturalistic theory of emotion by identifying formal 
objects with what psychologist Lazarus (1991) calls “core relational themes”. By 
“naturalistic theory”, I mean that it is a theory that attempts to ground a philosophical 
account of emotion in emotion science, or at least tries to be consistent with it. I 
think naturalizing emotion theory is an important project, but I will argue that the 
Core Relational Theme View fails to be consistent with emotion science because it 
commits the linguistic fallacy.  
The Core Relational Theme View entails that the content of an emotional state is 
a core relational theme. Lazarus argues that emotions are constituted by appraisals 
which describe relations between a particular event and an organism’s well-being. 
Core relational themes are “gestalts of relational meaning” (see Smith & Lazarus, 
1993). Different emotional kinds can be distinguished by different core relational 
themes. Some examples of these core relational themes (from now on abbreviated 
as CRTs) are:  
 
Emotional kind:  “CRT” 
Anger: “A demeaning offense against me and mine” 
Anxiety:  “Facing uncertain, existential threat” 
Fright:  “Facing an immediate, concrete and overwhelming 
physical danger” 
Happiness:  “Making reasonable progress toward the realization of 
a goal” 
Sadness:  “Having experienced an irrevocable loss” 
(For the full list see Lazarus, 1991, Table 3.4, p. 122.) 
 
                                                     
emotion, see (Deigh, 1994; Deonna & Teroni, 2012; Green, 1970; Lyons, 1980, pp. 99-114; 




Prinz (2004) argues that these CRTs are what philosophers have called formal 
objects and he understands these gestalts of relational meaning in terms of mental 
content: the subject experiencing the emotion is representing a CRT. He claims that 
“Lazarus’ list should be reconstrued as an account of emotional content.” (Prinz, 
2004, p. 65). For instance, an emotional experience of anger is essentially constituted 
by a representation of “a demeaning offense against me and mine”.  
Besides Prinz, there are other proponents of the CRT View. Barlassina and Newen 
(2014) update Prinz’s view and argue that emotional mental content is the integration 
of a representation of a CRT and a particular object. Martha Nussbaum (2001) thinks 
that Lazarus’ core relational theme theory is a good fit for her claim that emotions 
are evaluative judgements. Charles Nussbaum (2007) also defends the CRT View but 
claims that core relational themes are not the only necessary components of emotion. 
Others include, according to him, modes of arousal and bodily changes. Colombetti 
(2014) presents an “enactivist” version of the CRT View and argues that core 
relational themes are response-dependent, contra Prinz. In general, the CRT View is 
quite mainstream in contemporary philosophy of emotion. 
Most defenders of the Core Relational Theme View also claim that an emotion 
has a complex ontology, which I discussed in the first section of this chapter. Many 
argue that bodily feelings partly constitute an emotional experience. Barlassina and 
Newen (2014) include a representation of a particular object. Charles Nussbaum 
(2007) adds other components as well. They all argue, however, that an emotion also 
has a component which represents the outer world in an emotional way and they 
hold that the content of this component is a simple content, namely a CRT.  
2.3 Against the Core Relational Theme View 
By using a scientific concept in a philosophical theory, one might give the impression 
that one’s theory is backed up by scientific research. A reason why some might think 
the Core Relational Theme View is a convincing view is that it seems to be backed 
up by psychology. I will argue that the outcomes of Lazarus’ studies do not support 
the Core Relational Theme View and that a great number of contemporary emotion 
scientists do not think that a CRT is a useful concept. I will argue that the Core 
Relational Theme View commits the linguistic fallacy: it confuses a way to categorize 
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an emotion with its content. However, CRTs could be a useful tool to summarize 
the information processed in an emotional experience and to categorize different 
emotions. 
The results of the studies described by Smith and Lazarus (1993) are supposed to 
motivate the choice for describing emotions in terms of CRTs. The studies are based 
on self-reports. The participants are presented with a scenario which is meant to elicit 
an emotional experience. The questionnaires are aimed at finding correlations 
between CRTs, emotive adjectives (e.g. “sad” and “angry”) and patterns of what 
Lazarus calls “appraisal components” or “molecular appraisals”.  
“Appraisal components” or “molecular appraisals” are low-level, more 
fundamental appraisals. They are the building blocks of a complex emotion. They 
are “appraisals” in the sense that they are evaluations of the particular object in a very 
specific way. Examples of these appraisals are: evaluations of whether something is 
motivationally (ir)relevant, or motivationally (in)congruent (i.e. does it match with 
my desires and goals?); low/high coping potential (how well can I deal with the 
situation?) and self/other- accountability (am I or someone else responsible for the 
situation?).  
Smith and Lazarus define appraisals (both molar and molecular) as “the most 
proximal cognitive variables that directly result in emotion” (Smith & Lazarus, 1993, 
p. 234). Smith and Lazarus explicitly say that they want to discuss the “content of 
these appraisals”, and not “the cognitive processes underlying these contents” (Smith 
& Lazarus, 1993, p. 234). Molecular appraisals are therefore mental representations; 
they are contentful mental states.  
How do molecular appraisals and CRTs, also called “molar representations”, relate 
to each other? On a molar level of analysis, appraisal components are combined into 
“summaries or (...) gestalts of emotional meaning, referred to as core relational 
themes” (Smith & Lazarus, 1993, p. 236). So certain patterns of molecular appraisals 
make up a CRT, which is a meaning gestalt. Smith and Lazarus aim at finding specific 
correlations between a number of molecular appraisals, the fifteen CRTs and 
emotion categories. 
The results of their studies show that there are indeed such correlations. This is 
not so surprising, but does it prove that CRTs make up the actual content of 
emotion? I hold that the results of these studies do not support the CRT View. The 
studies are based on self-reports. Asking people whether they associate CRTs with 
their experience and an emotion label does not support the claim that CRTs are 
represented in their experience. One can categorize one’s experience with a particular 
emotional label, so it is not surprising that particular experiences correlate with 
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particular labels. Additionally, it is also not surprising that emotion labels correlate 
with different CRTs, because CRTs are in fact stereotypical scenarios we associate 
with these emotion labels. They correlate in the same way as words and their 
meanings correlate. For this reason, the experiences of the participants correlate with 
both the emotion labels and the CRTs. From this, it does not follow that the content 
of an emotional experience is a CRT.  
Concerned with the validity of self-reports related to the study of emotion, 
psychologists Grandjean, Sander and Scherer (2008) claim that emotional 
verbalization and communication as such are not fully reliable for detecting the 
nature of emotional experience. In verbalizing and communicating an emotion there 
is always a risk that some aspects of the mental state are not grasped by the words 
which are communicated. On the other hand, there is a risk that in communicating 
an experience, additional meaning which was not present in the initial experience 
itself, appears.25 I think this also applies to the CRT View. I hold that, when one 
identifies an emotional mental content with a CRT, some meaning is lost and some 
additional meaning is added. 
As CRTs are “summaries” of the contents of the molecular appraisals and 
molecular appraisals are representations in their own right, the sum of the molecular 
representations contains more information than a single CRT. Also, different sets of 
molecular appraisals may be summarized by an identical CRT. Therefore, meaning is 
lost in identifying the content of an emotion with a CRT. If one feels anxious, what 
one experiences might be summarized by “facing an uncertain existential threat”, but 
the summary misses out a great number of aspects. I think that feeling restless, 
helpless and not knowing what to do are also aspects of anxiety which are lost when 
summarizing an emotional experience with a CRT.  
Moreover, the meanings of words might interfere with the reports of mental 
content and in this sense, some meaning might be “added”. The outcomes of Smith 
and Lazarus’ study of sadness did not fit their predictions. They speculate that a 
possible reason for the fact that sadness did not have the expected correlations is 
that “the meaning of ‘sadness’ appears to be considerably less specific” than other 
emotions (Smith & Lazarus, 1993, p. 261). Other emotion words correlate more 
strongly with specific CRTs as well as with a pattern of molecular representations 
 
                                                     
25 For more criticisms of this type of emotion research see (Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001; Moors & 
Scherer, 2013; Parkinson, 1997). For an overview of these criticisms see (Moors, Ellsworth, 
Scherer, & Frijda, 2013). 
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because their meaning is more clear. This indicates that the meaning of emotion 
words and the content of the emotional states they refer to are not identical. And, 
indeed, why would they be?  
If a CRT is a “summary” of appraisal components and a “meaning gestalt”, as 
Smith and Lazarus claim it is, then this does not imply that a CRT is literally 
represented in emotional experience. I hold that the CRT View confuses the 
categorization of emotion with the actual content of emotion. Smith and Lazarus’ 
results are in line with this claim. The participants are able to see patterns in their 
experiences and they are able to categorize them with a specific label. The self-reports 
also show that these labels correspond to specific CRTs, which the participants can 
identify. As the meaning of sadness is vaguer than the meaning of other emotion 
words, the participants differ in the way they employ this word to label experiences. 
I hold that these studies indicate that we need to distinguish between the 
categorization of emotions and the actual content of emotions.  
Surprisingly, Prinz considers the studies by Smith and Lazarus to be problematic 
and claims that they do not support the CRT View (Prinz, 2004, pp. 15-17 & 31-32), 
and I agree. Peculiarly, he argues that Lazarus should not claim that molecular 
appraisals are personal level representations themselves. One should, according to 
Prinz, hold that only CRTs make up emotional content, which sums up the CRT 
account of emotion. Molecular appraisals are on this view elements of a subpersonal 
process which give rise to an emotional content.  
What is a subpersonal process? Compare this to perception. One might say that 
while a perceptual experience is representational, the subpersonal process which 
gives rise to this experience is not. Light on the retina contains certain information, 
which is processed by our brain. However, the light on the retina itself is not directly 
accessible. Therefore one might want to draw a distinction between the subpersonal, 
inaccessible perceptual process and the conscious perceptual experience. The CRT 
View seems to presuppose a similar view about emotion: the conscious emotional 
experience is a representation of a CRT, whereas the molecular appraisals are 
elements of a subpersonal emotional process. 
Molecular appraisals are not to be compared with subpersonal perceptual 
processes for the following reasons. First, the participants were able to answers 
questions about these molecular appraisals. They were able to determine the content 
of these representations. This implies that they could access the processed 
information. One cannot compare these representations with subpersonal perceptual 
processes. If you show participants a picture and then ask what is displayed on their 
retina, people would not be able to respond to this. This information, which is 
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processed by our brain, is not accessible to the subject. So the comparison between 
molecular appraisals and perceptual subpersonal processes does not hold.  
Secondly, a CRT is meant to be a “gestalt of relational meaning”, constituted by a 
set of molecular appraisals. A perceptual experience is not a gestalt of elements of its 
subpersonal process. If one perceives a gestalt, the elements of which this gestalt is 
made can be perceived as well. If one sees separate and discontinuous shapes as a 
shape gestalt, one also consciously represents the separate shapes. Likewise, if you 
call a CRT a gestalt, this implies that there are represented parts out of which this 
gestalt is made. These parts are what Lazarus calls molecular appraisals. 
Thirdly, molecular appraisals can be seen as tracking relations. Molecular 
appraisals represent elements of the environment and what they represent can be 
correct or incorrect. One can argue that the molecular appraisal that tracks 
motivational congruence, for instance, is set up, by evolution or learning, to be set 
off when something which is motivationally congruent occurs. Prinz understands 
representations as tracking relations; therefore, there is no reason to say that 
molecular appraisals are not representations in their own right.  
According to Prinz, CRTs are meant to be essences which are tracked, similar to 
H2O being tracked by representations of water, or a specific genome by 
representations of dogs. The claim that H2O is tracked by a representation of water 
is already controversial (he defends this view in Prinz, 2000). Even if one would 
accept this, then it is still hard to see why a CRT would be the essence of an emotion. 
Smith and Lazarus’ studies did not even establish that there is a correlation between 
“sadness” and its CRT “having experienced an irrevocable loss”. How then are we 
supposed to believe that CRTs have the same scientific robustness as H2O being the 
essence of water?  
Molecular appraisals seem to be more scientifically robust than CRTs. There are 
no empirical data which support the claim that CRTs make up the emotional mental 
content. On the other hand, the claim that molecular appraisals are representations 
is much more scientifically robust. One can argue that Smith and Lazarus’ studies are 
not robust proof of the existence of these molecular appraisals either. However, 
while their claims about which molecular appraisals are constitutive of an emotional 
experience have been criticized, there is a vast amount of literature on these low-level 
appraisals. Amongst emotion theorists, there is much disagreement about what the 
cognitive architecture of these appraisals is, but there is more or less consensus on 
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the fact that there are such low-level representations.26 Most emotion theorists agree 
that low-level representations are valenced, which means that they can be 
characterized as more or less positive or negative. It is however debated which kinds 
of valence (i.e. kind of positivity and negativity) they can represent.27 But there is 
more or less consensus on the fact that one should posit such representations. CRTs, 
on the other hand, are much more controversial.28 In the next section, I will discuss 
why this is the case. I do want to point out now that, as there are plenty of emotion 
theories developed by psychologists, a philosopher cannot cherry-pick that one 
theory that fits best their intuitions - certainly not if that theory is very controversial. 
In this section, I have argued that one should not confuse a categorization of an 
emotional experience by summarizing which information is typically processed with 
a theory of the actual mental content of the experience. This is what I have called the 
linguistic fallacy. I hold that CRTs are generalizations or summaries of emotional 
content, which one can use as tools to categorize different emotional experiences.  
Emotion categorization is in this respect somewhat similar to the categorization 
of mental disorders. A psychologist can categorize her patient with a “major 
depression”; and one can say that one “feels depressed”. This, however, does not 
imply that one has a mental state, a “depressive representation” with a content such 
as “loss of interest in one’s life”. Similarly, an emotion can be described by a CRT or 
 
                                                     
26 For good overviews of this debate see (Scherer, 1999; Moors, Scherer & Frijda, 2003; Moors, 
2014; LeDoux, 2012).  
27 Psychologist Scherer (1999) calls Lazarus a “minimalist” as Lazarus proposes a very limited 
amount of valenced kinds, based on prototypic themes. Another strategy would be to posit as many 
valenced kinds to allow you to explain the content of the specific emotion instance you want to 
describe, as Frijda (1986) does. This maximalism seems to imply that the number of valenced kinds 
is almost endless. Most appraisal theorists find themselves in between these two extremes on the 
spectrum. There is, however, another view that rejects the appraisal theorist’s claim that there are 
different kinds of valence (Russell, 2003; Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009). Instead, it takes the low-
level valenced representations to be “core affects”: brute representations of greater or lesser 
positivity or negativity (and high or low arousal). Instead of claiming that there are different kinds 
of positivity and negativity, it argues that there is one basic category. The additional content of the 
emotional experience is “filled in” by cognition. See also (Scarantino, 2009). 
28 See (Mauro et al., 1992; Moors, 2017) for further criticism of this view. 
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formal object, but this does not mean that the CRT or formal object is the mental 
content.29  
Attributing a CRT to an emotion is consistent with the intuition that emotions 
always seem to be “about” something. Fear is somehow “about” danger. I hold that 
this intuitive aboutness is similar to how a narrative is “about” its theme. CRTs are 
core relational themes, after all. Just like the theme of a horror story has likely 
something to do with terror, the theme of an emotional experience in the category 
of anger has something to do with “a demeaning offense against me and mine”. This 
does not imply that the content of the horror story is “terror”, nor that the content 
of anger is “a demeaning offense against me and mine”. A core relational theme is a 
mental theme and not a mental content.  
2.4 Why emotion scientists prefer the Complex Content 
View 
In the previous section, I have criticized the CRT View, which is a variation of the 
Simple Content View of emotion. In this section, I will discuss why many emotion 
scientists have switched their focus to low-level representations and away from CRTs 
or CRT-like notions. One could argue that emotion scientists are not so much 
concerned with mental content. I will prove this wrong by showing that the turn 
away from CRTs and similar notions is in fact a turn from the Simple Content View 
to the Complex Content View of emotion. Note that I do not mean that all emotion 
scientists reject the Simple Content View, but it seems that a lot of them do and they 
do so for good reasons.  
Defenders of the Complex Content View question the usefulness of simple 
contents such as CRTs and hold that a number of properties are represented in 
emotional experiences. Different instantiations of the same emotional type may have 
 
                                                     
29 Moreover, I think that Lazarus’ list of CRTs is similar to the DSM. A new DSM edition always 
gets a lot of criticism. Although it is of practical importance that we have such categories, it is 
debatable whether they actually are natural kinds. I think CRTs have a similar status. It might be 
useful that we have such categories in order to communicate how we feel, but it is debatable 
whether these categories actually refer to natural kinds. 
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differences in content, whereas emotional experiences may represent similar 
properties to other experiences across emotional types. Emotional content is like a 
soup, consisting of different ingredients. 
The reasons for rejecting CRTs or similar simple contents accepted by most 
contemporary emotion scientists are nicely summed up by Moors (2017). She 
mentions the following criticisms. Lazarus claims that emotion is an appraisal, but at 
the same time, he maintains that these appraisals cause emotions, which is a 
problematical contradiction (see also Moors, 2013). There is also a methodological 
issue. It is hard to empirically verify the correlation between a CRT (or similar 
structure) and an experience, while isolating this experience from other mental 
processes, such as the conceptual associations one makes (see also Parkinson, 1997). 
Furthermore, Moors mentions that assigning CRTs or similar notions to emotional 
kinds seem to be done arbitrarily; this is manifested in the lack of consensus on the 
matter. The same can be said about simple contents in general. What is the simple 
content of anger? Is it “offensiveness” or “a demeaning offense against me or mine” 
or “a manageable threat” or “I should fight”? And what would the simple content of 
“love” or “joy” be? If one attributes simple content to an emotional type, there 
always seems to be some arbitrariness involved.  
Furthermore, Moors mentions that some emotion scientists (Ortony & Turner, 
1990; Smith, 1989) hold that correlations on the molecular level are more robust than 
on the molar level. The correlation between the CRT “a demeaning offense against 
me and mine” and a tendency to fight or fighting behaviour and the stereotypical 
facial expression of “anger” is arguably less robust than the correlation between the 
molecular appraisal of “goal incongruence” (i.e. representing something as not 
congruent with one’s goals) and a tendency to undo the incongruence. Moreover, 
this representation can be a component of instantiations of different emotional kinds 
(in this case, most of the negative ones: anger, sadness, disappointment and regret) 
and it can arguably occur in the absence of a full-blown emotional experience. Thus 
one has a good reason to believe that an emotion has complex content: some 
properties represented in an instantiation of one emotional kind are also represented 
in instantiations of different emotional kinds. But one has no sufficient empirical 
reasons to believe that an emotion has simple content. 
This last criticism is in line with Barrett’s emotion paradox (Barrett, 2006, 2009). 
Cognitive neuroscientist Barrett shows that although we are really good at labelling 
our own and other people’s emotions, there is no empirical proof whatsoever that 
might suggest that those emotional labels such as “fear” and “anger” reflect natural 
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kinds or even scientifically relevant categories. This is what she calls the “emotion 
paradox”:  
 
In the blink of an eye, perceivers experience anger or sadness or fear 
and see these emotions in other people (and in animals, or even simple 
moving shapes) as effortlessly as they read words on a page yet 
perceiver-independent measurements of faces, voices, bodies, and 
brains do not clearly and consistently reveal evidence of these 
categories.  
(Barrett, 2009, p. 4)  
 
Barrett claims that no correlates were found for the basic categories of emotion 
after several years of studying faces, voices, bodies and brains. Meta-analyses of the 
emotion science literature showed no evidence for these correlates. In all the 
empirical studies in which these models were tested, there was a great variation in 
the responses (in behaviour, bodily arousal, experience, etc.) corresponding to the 
same emotion category. Additionally, there were also many similarities between 
responses across kinds. Barrett concludes that, because there are major differences 
in instances of the same emotions type and similarities between instances across 
types, there is no scientific basis for the claim that there are emotional kinds. 
Emotional categories are attributed by people in everyday life, but from a scientific 
point of view, these categories are not relevant.30  
One should note that Barrett’s conclusions about emotional kinds are very 
controversial. In this chapter, I am more interested in the content of emotion rather 
than in emotion kinds.31 But Barrett’s claims are relevant for an account of emotional 
 
                                                     
30 Barrett is not the only one who claims this. The cross-cultural studies done by Mauro et al. (1992) 
indicate that more complex appraisal dimensions are not universal but more primitive appraisal 
dimensions are. This view supports the claim I made in the previous section, namely that molecular 
appraisals are more scientifically robust that CRTs. 
31 I do not need to make the more radical claim which Barrett makes, namely that emotions are not 
natural kinds. Griffiths (1997) is the most famous philosophical defender of this claim. He is 
criticized by Murphy and Stich (1997) who argue that according to Griffiths’ reasoning, names for 
mental disorders such as “panic disorder” lack the same scientific rigor. They hold that both mental 
illnesses and emotions may be normative kinds. On this view categorizing emotions might be of 
social and practical importance, despite emotions not being natural kinds. One can argue that 
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mental content because if it is true that there is enormous variety amongst instances 
of an emotional kind, and similarities between instances across emotion types, the 
Simple Content View becomes problematic. The Simple Content View states that 
the content of an emotional experience presents fixed information, corresponding 
to an emotion type. The best explanation for Barrett’s paradox, however, is that one 
categorizes different mental states with the same label and that one should not 
confuse the label with the state. This would be a variation of the linguistic fallacy.  
For these reasons, a great number of emotion scientists reject the idea of a simple 
content and focus instead on low-level representations, which are the key ingredients 
of the emotion soup. In the next section, I will discuss why philosophers should also 
accept the Soup Theory of emotion. 
2.5 Why philosophers should also defend the Complex 
Content View 
Barrett’s emotion paradox is very intuitive and could be formulated in folk 
psychological terms. Different emotional experiences with the same emotion label 
are phenomenologically experienced differently. The difference does not just lie in 
the particular object of that experience, but in the experience itself. Different fear 
experiences feel different. They can be more or less intense and more or less nagging. 
This phenomenological intuition is supported by the emotion paradox. Given that 
there is a great variety of emotional experiences which can be labelled with one 
category, both phenomenologically and in the empirical measurable features, one has 
good reason to believe that emotional experiences can vary within one category. 
A good explanation for a difference in experience is that there is a difference in 
content. The Simple Content View implies that every emotional experience of the 
same kind has the same content. There is a great amount of variety in experiences, 
as well as in empirically measured features within different instances of one 
 
                                                     
emotion concepts are valuable for communication and self-understanding. In fact, this is not a real 
criticism of Griffiths as he only claims that emotions are not “natural kinds” and does not claim 
that emotions are not social kinds. I do not wish to elaborate any further on the debate on whether 
emotions are natural kinds, as I want to limit myself to the topic of mental content.  
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emotional kind. Also, there are many commonalities between similar features across 
emotional kinds. If one accepts that emotions have complex contents instead of 
simple contents, one can easily explain this phenomenon. The same emotional 
ingredient can occur amongst different instantiations of the same emotional kind. 
And different instantiations of an emotional kind differ in the sense that there are 
little variations in their content. To use the soup metaphor again: every emotional 
experience has a different recipe. These differences in recipes are constituted by 
differences in ingredients. John might put carrots in his chicken soup, while Lucy 
does not put carrots in hers. Still, both soups are chicken soup. It is possible that 
some ingredients are common to emotional experiences across different kinds, just 
like soups of different kinds might be prepared with an identical stock.  
Take, for instance, the idea that fear is a representation of “danger.” If you put a 
spider in front of somebody, the reaction you get will vary from person to person. 
Some will experience great fear, others mild fear and some will not experience fear 
at all. If you put a lion in front of a person, that person will arguably react more 
intensely than when you put a spider in front of them. You can have greater or lesser 
fear or different kinds of fear, such as acute fear or a nagging fear. One can categorize 
all these cases as “fear” because they are all representations of instances of “danger.” 
However, this model is not useful if one wants to explain and predict the different 
responses of people confronted with different physically dangerous objects. This is 
a problem for the Simple Content View, which wants to identify the content of fear 
with “danger”, “offensiveness” or something similar. We have good reasons to 
believe that different emotional experiences which are categorized as “fear” have 
different contents. This does not mean that there cannot be similarities between 
different experiences. Maybe one can use CRTs or formal objects to describe these 
similarities, but one should not confuse a way to categorize mental contents, with a 
theory of the mental content itself. To define “fear” as that experience one has as a 
response to an instantiation of danger is a different claim than to say that in this 
experience “danger” is literally represented.  
Another example: some instances of fear and anger have a lot in common. They 
are both negative; they both represent an object as “incongruent” with one’s goals; 
and they both respond to an acute situation. I am inclined to say that the difference 
between most cases of fear and anger is that in fear one feels that something bad is 
going to happen that seems impossible to overpower, whereas in anger one feels that 
one can deal with the situation if one responds in an aggressive way. Different kinds 
of anxiety have different components. Some anxiety instances have more in common 
with acute fear; for instance, social anxiety that kicks in when you hear a bunch of 
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people gossiping about you. This has a lot in common with the fear response you get 
when seeing a physical threat. An existential anxiety instance has a lot more in 
common with existential sadness than with an instance of fear. Both emotional 
experiences might have in common that one is overwhelmed with the problems of 
one’s life, and one does not really know how to deal with it. One feels helpless and 
thinks that there is no way out. Anxiety might be a little more intense than sadness 
of this kind. Existential anxiety has a more restless character to it, while the sadness 
creates a status of immobility and apathy. The Soup Theory can break down 
emotional contents into little ingredients, which one can use to describe the 
similarities and differences between these emotional experiences. (To be clear, the 
Soup Theory is the same theory as the Complex Content View.) 
Only a few philosophers have argued for a something similar. Robinson (2005) 
argues that an emotion is an episode, which starts off with a non-cognitive appraisal. 
Goldie (2002) argues that emotions have a narrative structure. Both an episode and 
a narrative could be seen as a “soup” with a number of ingredients. I prefer to say 
that an emotion has complex content. Many philosophers are, however, sceptical of 
such a claim. 
2.6 Why philosophers prefer the Simple Content View and 
why they should not 
While a great number of emotion scientists accept the Complex Content View, 
philosophers seem to be hesitant to do so as well. Most emotion scientists posit a 
number of representations in order to account for the complexity of the information 
which is processed when one experiences an emotion. This is something that 
philosophers might find hard to accept for various reasons. I will argue that they 
should not. 
A first reason why we might want to reject multiple representations is language. 
This is related to the linguistic fallacy: the fact that we have one word for “fear”, or 
for “I am afraid of the lion” does not mean that this corresponds to one singular 
representation. I have argued in this chapter that one should not confuse a 
categorization of an emotion with the actual mental reality of the emotion. I am not 
saying that our word “fear” does not refer to a mental reality, but it might be that the 
mental reality the word fear is referring to is not as singular and unitary as the word 
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is. One word might refer to a set of representations. Linguistic considerations should 
not stop us from positing multiple representations as constitutive of a complex 
emotional experience. 
Prinz formulates two further objections against the Soup Theory:  
 
The Problem of Parts asks: What components of an emotion episode 
are really essential to its being an instance of some particular emotion? 
The tempting answer is that all parts are essential. The Problem of 
Plenty then asks: If all parts are essential, how do they hang together 
into a coherent whole? Put differently, the Problem of Parts asks for 
essential components, and the Problem of Plenty asks for an essential 
function of emotions in virtue of which they may have several essential 
components. 
   (Prinz, 2004, p. 18) 
 
The Problem of Parts does not exist for most emotion scientists who reject the 
Simple Content View, as they think that there is always some level of arbitrariness to 
assigning the essential components to a particular emotional kind (see Moors, 2017). 
Barrett’s emotion paradox also seems to suggest that there are no empirically verified 
essential features of an emotional kind. The revolutionary aspect of these 
contemporary emotion theories is the rejection of the idea that the aim of an emotion 
theory is to look for a set of essential features of emotional kinds. No Problem of 
Parts arises for them. 
The Problem of Plenty can be seen as a valid objection: how does an emotional 
experience appear as a coherent whole if it is not a monolithic representation? A 
problem for positing multiple representations as constitutive of a singular emotion 
is that one might argue that it fails to explain how an emotional experience is 
phenomenologically unified. A similar objection is raised by Teroni & Deonna (n.d). 
I do have to say that if I introspect I can distinguish between the different elements 
of my emotional experience. The only reason why I would say that an emotional 
experience is unified is because it hijacks my entire mind. However, one can disagree 
with my introspective analysis, and introspection is notoriously unreliable and 
disagreement about introspection seems hard to settle.  
So, let us grant that emotional experience is phenomenologically unified. This does 
not imply that there has to be a unified representation. Phenomenological unity is a 
matter of consciousness rather than of representation. A priori there is no conflict 
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between the statement that an emotion consists of multiple components and the 
statement that it is unified in experience. 
Given this, phenomenological unity is an additional problem to be solved after 
one has defended a theory of emotional mental content. Many emotion scientists 
have put forward a theory of emotion consciousness while presupposing the Soup 
Theory. Grandjean, Sander and Scherer (2008) argue that if multiple components are 
synchronized, a unified emotional experience comes to consciousness. Recently, 
LeDoux used a variation of the higher order theory of consciousness to explain 
emotional consciousness (LeDoux & Brown, 2017). All these theories of emotional 
consciousness are not only consistent with the Soup Theory, but Grandjean, Sander, 
Scherer and LeDoux also endorse this view. Thus, a theory of emotional 
consciousness, or phenomenological unity, is distinct from a theory of emotional 
mental content.  
One last remark. The emotional soup that the Complex Content View talks about 
can be conceived of in two ways: one emotion equals multiple representations or one 
emotion has one content consisting of different represented properties. Emotion 
scientists are not shy to posit multiple representations, whereas philosophers might 
prefer a unified, albeit complex content. I do not think much hangs on this. Here is 
how I would describe it. Kenny was right in pointing out that the contents of our 
emotions are more limited than beliefs. However, a simple content, such as one 
property or CRT per emotional kind, is not going to have much explanatory power 
if you want to determine the content of an experience, instead of categorizing a 
content. One needs to figure out what the elements of these contents are. For this, 
you need to claim that one content consists of more than one property. It does not 
really matter whether you call this a complex of represented properties or a complex 
of representations each representing a single property. 
The important point is that the class of emotional experiences does not contain a 
fixed number of emotions each representing a single fixed property, formal object or 
CRT. An emotional experience is a soup, consisting of different ingredients. Whether 
this emotional soup is a complex of multiple representations or a single 
representation of multiple properties is a terminological question rather than a 




The fact that emotion concepts can be distinguished on the basis of formal objects 
or CRTs does not imply that formal objects or CRTs make up the contents of 
emotional experiences. A categorization of a mental state is not necessarily identical 
to the content of that mental state. This is what I have called the linguistic fallacy. A 
theory that explains the difference in meaning between the concepts “belief” and 
“perception” is not necessarily a theory about the contents of beliefs and perceptual 
experiences. Likewise, a theory that explains the difference between “fear” and 
“anger” does not necessarily tell us anything about the contents of experiences of 
fear and anger. Formal objects and CRTs might be useful in a theory about emotion 
concepts or in other explanatory contexts. The Simple Content View of emotion, 
however, makes a claim about the mental reality of emotional experience. In doing 
so it fails. The Complex Content View of emotion has gained a lot of popularity in 
emotion science. And for good reasons: it has much greater explanatory power than 
the Simple Content View. For instance, differences between instances of emotional 
experiences of the same kind and similarities across emotional kinds can be better 
explained by breaking down an emotional experience into several components. 
Philosophers might be sceptical about this approach for several reasons. I hope to 
have shown that there is nothing to worry about. It is time for philosophers to 




Emotional and Affective Representation 
In this chapter, I will show how the ideas of Chapter One and Chapter Two relate 
to each other. In doing so, I will briefly discuss the possibility that emotions have a 
complex ontology, an idea that I have mentioned in the previous two chapters. The 
main idea I want to convey in this chapter is that what I call emotional representation 
in the first chapter can be part of a complex emotional content, which I have 
discussed in the second chapter. However, the content of emotion might not be 
exhausted by Jamesian representations. I also do not want to claim that the mental 
phenomena we refer to with ordinary language emotion words are to be identified 
with the representational components of emotion. In other words, I do not wish to 
claim that a theory of how emotions represent the world is necessarily a theory of 
what an emotion is. This is another way in which emotion does not strictly fit a 





3.1 Complex Content and Jamesian Representations 
In the first chapter, I argued that emotional representations are Jamesian-reliable. 
This was a claim about how emotions represent and what their representational 
strategy is. In the second chapter, I argued that either emotional content is complex 
or an emotion is constituted by a complex of representations. Either way, emotions 
have complex contents which consist of different ingredients, just like soup. 
Different instances of one emotional kind can have differences in content and 
instances of different emotional kinds can have elements in their content in common. 
This was a claim about what emotions represent. 
In the first chapter, I described the content of emotional representations as 
representations of how things are relevant for oneself but I did not discuss the details 
of this idea as the main aim of that chapter was to describe the function of emotion 
in a representational system. In the second chapter, I referred to emotion science to 
introduce the idea of a complex emotional content. 
I simplified the content of emotional representations a bit in the first chapter and 
in the second chapter I did not mention their pragmatic nature. If you combine the 
ideas of the first and second chapter, one can say that emotional content is a complex 
soup and the pragmatic emotional representations I talked about in Chapter One are 
part of that soup. For instance, when I said in Chapter One that in fear “danger” was 
represented in a pragmatic way, I was simplifying. The actual content of an instance 
of “fear” consists of multiple components. Those components might be for instance 
the representations of something like “goal incongruence” and “not being able to 
cope with it” depending on which model of emotion you defend. In the previous 
chapter, I referred to these components as “appraisal components”, “molecular 
appraisals”, and “low-level valenced representations”. Let us call these mental 
representations “affective representations” for the remainder of this dissertation. 
What these affective representations exactly represent is still debated. This is, I 
think, a predominantly empirical question as it concerns the functional relations 
between input and output. In the first chapter I tried to capture the essence of what 
emotions represent: they represent how things are relevant to us. In doing so they 
compare an object to what I have called “personal significance”. In this way, one 
ends up with a representation of something as more or less relevant in a good or bad 
way. A belief, a perception or another kind of representation of an object, which is 
similar to what Deonna and Teroni (2012) call the cognitive base of emotion, is 
compared to “personal significance”. This results in the representation of a 
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“relevance relation” which is, when consciously experienced, a positive or negative 
experience.  
Emotion scientists often refer to that kind of positivity or negativity that affective 
representations represent as “valence” (for an overview of different accounts of 
valence, see Colombetti (2005) and Prinz (2010)). Each account of emotion has its 
own theory of valence. In a footnote in the second chapter, I presented a short 
overview of all these accounts. It might be useful to cite myself here:  
 
Psychologist Scherer (1999) calls Lazarus a “minimalist” as Lazarus 
proposes a very limited amount of valenced kinds, based on prototypic 
themes. Another strategy would be to posit as many valenced kinds to 
allow you to explain the content of the specific emotion instance you 
want to describe, as Frijda (1986) does. This maximalism seems to 
imply that the number of valenced kinds is almost endless. Most 
appraisal theorists find themselves in between these two extremes on 
the spectrum. There is, however, another view that rejects the appraisal 
theorist’s claim that there are different kinds of valence (Russell, 2003; 
Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009). Instead, it takes the low-level valenced 
representations to be “core affects”: brute representations of greater or 
lesser positivity or negativity (and high or low arousal). Instead of 
claiming that there are different kinds of positivity and negativity, it 
argues that there is one basic category. The additional content of the 
emotional experience is “filled in” by cognition. See also (Scarantino, 
2009). 
(Footnote 27 on p. 36)  
 
I do hesitate to say that all these affective representations are what I have called 
“emotional representations” in the first chapter. Some of these components might 
be less straightforwardly “Jamesian”. Remember that I said in the first chapter that I 
just wanted to discuss the primitive “emotional representation” to which the 
emotional unreliability problem applies. 
I would like to distinguish between “emotional representations” and “affective 
representations”, the first being a subclass of the second kind. I do not want to 
commit to the claim that all the representations that I call “affective representations” 
are also the Jamesian “emotional representations” of the first chapter, whereas I do 
think that all Jamesian “emotional representations” are “affective representations”. 
As I also mentioned in the first chapter, the Cartesian re-evaluations might be part 
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of the complex state the folk concept of “emotion” refers to. So the emotional 
content soup might consist of both Jamesian and Cartesian representations.  
Let me illustrate this thought with an example: compare fear of a fictional 3D 
snake with fear of an actual snake. I have used the example of the 3D snake in the 
first chapter. Suppose that you are watching a 3D movie and all of a sudden a 3D 
snake jumps towards you; you experience an instance of fear but you will immediately 
calm down. If you encounter a real snake you will probably feel fear towards the 
snake. Unlike in the 3D example you will not calm down and you will run away as 
fast as you can. I think that, in these two cases, similar yet slightly different 
information is processed. I would say that, given what I said in the previous chapter, 
you have two different emotion soups. They are different because they have different 
ingredients, although they also have a lot in common. The initial Jamesian 
representation in both cases is very similar, while the Cartesian re-evaluation is very 
different.  
However, I think that it is hard to determine when the emotion “stops” and 
another mental state such as thinking “begins”. Maybe this border is indeterminate 
or just arbitrary. This is, I think, related to the nature of emotion words. I think we 
have good reasons to believe that our ordinary language emotion words refer to very 
complex mental phenomena. I will discuss this in the next section. 
3.2 Complex Ontology 
Our ordinary language emotion words might refer to complex mental phenomena 
that consist of more components than just representational features. In other words, 
an emotion might have a complex ontology. I have mentioned in the previous two 
chapters that many emotion scientists think that an emotion indeed consists of more 
components than just representational states. These other components might include 
bodily feelings, action tendencies and even actions themselves. In this dissertation, I 
wish to focus on how we emotionally represent the world, so I do not want to 
commit to strong claims about emotion ontology. I do want to point out that I do 
not claim that an emotion can be reduced to its representational features. 
Neuroscientist LeDoux (1996) argues that an emotional experience is constituted 
by several ingredients. For instance, the emotional experience of fear is constituted 
by a representation of a particular object and an activation of a survival circuit that 
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detects something similar to “danger” (this is what I call an emotional 
representation), prepares the organism to respond and triggers bodily changes such 
as an accelerating heart rate. These components are not sufficient to generate an 
emotional experience, according to LeDoux. The additional components of an 
experience of fear include an attention shift to the stimulus, the information 
integration between working memory and semantic memory which establishes object 
recognition, and episodic memory which enables you to be aware that it is “you” 
who is experiencing the emotion. In addition to this, there is a change in how 
information is processed in the brain: in an experience of fear, there is an increase in 
“brain arousal”. Different connections between different brain circuits are 
established. If you combine all these components with the registration of 
physiological changes and a motivational component (i.e. a motivation to act), which 
are consequences of some of the previously mentioned components, then you have 
an emotional experience of fear (LeDoux, 2015, pp. 334-340). Other emotional 
experiences have a similar structure, according to LeDoux. On his model 
representational features are just components of a complex mental phenomenon. I 
do not wish to reject this claim. 
In dimensional appraisal theories, which are defended by many emotion 
psychologists (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013), similar emotional 
components are posited: several evaluations (or what I would call affective 
representations), physiological changes, a motivational component, a behavioral 
component and an emergent experiential component. Again, representational 
features are just components of a more complex emotional ontology, a claim that I 
do not want to deny. 
Leaving emotion science aside, if you think about which phenomena our emotion 
words in ordinary language pick out, they seem to refer to very complex episodes of 
mental life. More intense emotions seem to take over one’s entire mind. Take 
jealousy, for example.   
 
52 
Proust’s often quoted passage on jealousy describes it as a very complex emotion: 
 
Suffering, when we are in love, ceases from time to time, but only to 
resume in a different form. We weep to see the beloved no longer 
respond to us with those bursts of affection, those amorous advances 
of earlier days; we suffer even more when, having relinquished them 
with us, she resumes them with others; then, from this suffering, we are 
distracted by a new and still more agonising pang, the suspicion that 
she has lied to us about how she spent the previous evening, when she 
was no doubt unfaithful to us; this suspicion in turn is dispelled, and 
we are soothed by our mistress’ affectionate kindness; but then a 
forgotten word comes back to us; we had been told that she was ardent 
in moments of pleasure, whereas we have always found her calm; we 
try to picture to ourselves these passionate frenzies with others, we feel 
how very little we are to her, we observe an air of boredom, longing, 
melancholy while we are talking, we observe like a black sky the slovenly 
clothes she puts on when she is with us, keeping for other people the 
dresses with which she used to flatter us. If, on the contrary, she is 
affectionate, what joy for a moment! But when we see that little tongue 
stuck out as though in invitation, we think of those to whom that 
invitation was so often addressed that even perhaps with me, without 
her thinking of those others, it had remained for Albertine, by force of 
long habit, an automatic signal. Then the feeling that she is bored by us 
returns. But suddenly this pain is reduced to nothing when we think of 
the unknown evil element in her life, of the places, impossible to 
identify, where she has been, where she still goes perhaps during the 
hours when we are not with her, if indeed she is not planning to live 
there altogether, those places in which she is separated from us, does 
not belong to us, is happier than when she is with us. Such are the 
revolving searchlights of jealously. Jealousy is moreover a demon that 
cannot be exorcised, but constantly reappears in new incarnations. 
Even if we could succeed in exterminating them all, in keeping the 
beloved forever, the Spirit of Evil would then adopt another form, 
more pathetic still, despair at having obtained fidelity only by force, 
despair at not being loved. 




It is, as we are used to from Proust, quite a lengthy passage, in which a number of 
thoughts and feelings are described. However, I think it is reasonable that what 
Proust describes here is a good description of an instance (or instances) of jealousy. 
His description of the emotion of jealousy consists of a number of thought patterns, 
feelings and certain behaviour. This presupposes that the word “jealousy” refers to 
a complex mental phenomenon. 
I think that many emotion words refer to such complex mental phenomena. 
Consider another example: anxiety. I am not as poetically talented as Proust but I 
will do my best. An experience of anxiety first of all seems to provide us with some 
information about the world. This information varies from instance to instance but 
it has something to do with the following: there is something really bad and 
threatening which will cause the subject harm and the subject is completely helpless. 
However, another important aspect of severe anxiety is a specific thought pattern, 
namely excessive worrying and rumination (i.e. thought patterns that keep going in 
loops, repeating the same pattern over and over again). Besides this thought pattern, 
being anxious often includes being hyper self-conscious and being in a state of 
permanent self-doubt. Also, a great number of bodily changes occur: shortness of 
breath, muscle tension, a racing heart and so on. Anxiety also goes with specific 
behavioral patterns such as perfectionism and obsessive behavior. An intense 
experience of anxiety might include a feeling that one is “losing it” or that one is out 
of touch with reality.  
I think it is reasonable to believe that our ordinary language concept of “anxiety” 
refers to the complex phenomenon that includes all these components. So I think 
there are good reasons to argue that an emotion has a complex ontology. Therefore, 
I certainly do not wish to claim that the phenomena that our ordinary language 
concepts of emotions refer to should be reduced to their representational features. I 
want to distinguish the ontology of emotion from the representational features of 
emotion.  
This idea is also present in Döring’s (2013) discussion of novelist Musil’s view of 
emotion. Musil argues that emotional experience is constituted by smaller 
components which are combined into an emotional gestalt. However, we should not 
think of these gestalts in representational terms, but in adverbial terms, as Döring 
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(2013) claims. This idea fits my dissertation project quite well.32 The emotional gestalt 
is an internal property, belonging to a person’s mind and not a representation or 
something which is represented. I think it is a good idea to claim that the unity of 
emotion is not something we should interprete in representational terms, but as 
something that emerges out of a number of intentional states. There is much more 
interesting psychological and philosophical work to be done on how these gestalts 
are constituted. In this section, however, I wanted to make clear that I think that this 
is another project than my dissertation project. I do not wish to claim that a theory 
of how emotions represent the world is thereby also a theory of what an emotion is.  
3.3 Bodily feelings 
Jesse Prinz, whose theory I have attacked in the previous chapter, strongly rejects the 
claim that emotions have a complex ontology. In the previous chapter, I have already 
addressed what he calls the Problem of the Plenty and the Problem of the Parts. 
Those could be directed at both the claims that emotions have complex content and 
that emotions have a complex ontology. 
An additional objection Prinz could make to my claims is that it is a weakness of 
my theory that I distinguish between the ontology of emotion and an emotion’s 
representational features. Prinz’s (2004) project is to present a theory which identifies 
an emotional ontology with its representational features. Prinz is, again, my most 
important opponent and I will criticize his theory in the remainder of this chapter.  
Prinz’s theory unifies sensations of bodily feelings and the representational 
features of emotion. He was inspired by James, who could be read as saying that 
sensations of bodily changes are the essence of emotion.   
 
                                                     
32 There are more interesting connection between Musil’s ideas and the ideas presented in this 
dissertation, although he does not emphasize the representational character of emotion as much as 
I do. Musil’s idea of “fixation” resembles my idea of Jamesian-reliable emotional representation, 
and he also warns for the misleading nature of language in the analysis of emotion as I do in the 
second chapter (see Döring, 2013).  
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James famously states the following: 
 
If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our 
consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, 
we find we have nothing left behind, no “mind-stuff” out of which the 
emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of 
intellectual perception is all that remains. (…) What kind of an emotion 
of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of quickened heart-beats 
nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened 
limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is 
quite impossible to think. Can one fancy the state of rage and picture 
no ebullition of it in the chest, no flushing of the face, no dilatation of 
the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action, 
but in their stead limp muscles, calm breathing, and a placid face? The 
present writer, for one, certainly cannot. The rage is as completely 
evaporated as the sensation of its so-called manifestations.  
(James, 1984, pp. 193-194) 
 
James invites us to introspect and to discover what the most fundamental aspect 
of an emotional experience is. It is intuitively clear to James that the core of emotion 
phenomenology consists of bodily feelings, such as “quickened heart-beats”, 
“shallow breathing” and “trembling lips”. If one would imagine a fear response 
without bodily feelings then the emotion would simply not exist. One can have fear 
without the accompanying thoughts, but not without bodily feelings. In other words: 
emotion phenomenology is in fact bodily phenomenology. 
I think it is plausible that bodily feelings do have some role to play in felt 
experiences of emotion. I have said before that it is hard to make objective claims 
about phenomenology and that I wanted to limit myself to the topic of mental 
representation in this dissertation. However, I hold that James gets it wrong when 
he says that bodily changes induce an emotion. I maintain that emotional or affective 
representations cause bodily changes. James reverses an intuition we all share. He 
argues that it is not the case that our heartbeat increases because we are afraid, but 
that we are afraid because our heartbeat increases. He reverses the causal order we 
all take to be true.  
I think the original intuition that James attacks makes more sense than the 
Jamesian account. I do think that in order to have bodily changes, or any changes in 
a person at all, one has to represent something first. This is a presupposition of 
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cognitive science and representationalism. Before one gets a fight/flight response, 
one should register something which should be responded to with a fight/flight 
response. This process might be automatic and unconscious. Compare this to regular 
action. You can say that bodily movement is essential to action, but bodily movement 
needs to be caused by something. The experience of our body moving might be 
essential to action phenomenology, but the perception of your body moving is not 
identical with the action, and phenomenology certainly does not cause the action to 
occur. Instead, something like an intention or action representation causes the action. 
Analogously, mental representations cause emotional bodily changes, not the other 
way around. 
Prinz (2004) has put James’ idea back on the map. He argues that both “the body” 
and the core relational theme can be part of a singular representation. It is for this 
reason that he calls emotions “embodied appraisals”. The appraisal is the core 
relational theme and in order to embody this appraisal Prinz recycles a theory he 
formerly used to explain concept representation.  
Prinz uses an idiosyncratic teleosemantic notion of mental representation. A 
representation is something that is set up to be set off by something. The “setting 
up” is done by evolution or by learning. So emotional representations are set up to 
be set off by something. Prinz agrees with James that emotions are “set off” by bodily 
changes. However, Prinz argues – and this is I think the most original aspect of his 
theory – that bodily changes are not just “representations of the body” (see Prinz, 
2004, pp. 52-60). 
There is a discrepancy between two kinds of “content”. In order to make this 
sensible, Prinz refers to his earlier developed Lockean theory of concept 
representation (Prinz, 2000) that distinguishes “real content” from “nominal 
content”. If one represents something as a dog, this representation is in fact an 
essence detector. How does such a detector work? Detectors represent “real 
content” by registering “nominal content”. In the case of the dog concept 
representation, the essence of “dogness” would be the real content, whereas the 
nominal content is not the essence of the dog, but rather the appearance of it, which 
makes up the features by which a detector can detect that it is a dog. For instance if 
one represents a dog as a “dog” (real content) one does so by tracking features of 
the appearance of the dog. This “dog” representation is set up to set off when one 
encounters the appearance of dogs. The dogness reliably co-occurs with the 




Likewise, Prinz argues, a CRT is reliably caused by bodily changes (Prinz, 2004, 
pp. 67-69). So a CRT is real content, whereas nominal content is made out of bodily 
changes. So one represents a core relational theme by registering bodily changes. If 
one registers that one’s heart is beating faster and that one’s adrenaline level is 
increasing, the core relational theme of “a demeaning offense against me and mine” 
is represented. In other words, Prinz argues that emotional content is constituted by 
the registration of bodily changes while it is in fact a representation of a core 
relational theme. 
To clarify, here are some examples of nominal and real content: 
 
Concept DOG 
Nominal content: perceptual properties; colours and shapes (registered) 
Real content: specific genome (represented) 
 
Emotion 
 Nominal content: bodily changes (registered) 
 Real content: core relational theme (represented) 
 
Note, first, that this theory of emotion is very controversial as it is based on a 
theory of concept representation which is already controversial and idiosyncratic. 
Secondly, Prinz uses his theory of the content of concepts to explain the content of 
emotion. Yet he does not explain why this is supposed to be a theory of the content 
of emotional experience, rather than of the content of emotional concepts. If it were 
a theory of concepts the analogy with the dog concept would make more sense. Just 
as you recognize a dog as a dog by registering its perceptual features, you can 
recognize which emotion you are experiencing by registering the different bodily 
sensations. I do not see why this should be an account of emotional content, instead 
of an account of emotional categorization. 
Thirdly, let us take a look at the analogy with the dog perception again. It seems 
that the way Prinz presents this analogy is wrong. It seems to be more correct to say 
the following: you sense a heartbeat by registering bodily sensation; the essence you 
track is the biological function of the heartbeat.   
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Nominal content: perceptual properties (registered) 
Real content: specific genome (represented) 
 
HEARTBEAT 
 Nominal content: bodily sensations (registered) 
 Real content: biological function of heartbeat (represented) 
 
This analogy makes more sense than to say that when you register bodily 
sensations, such as a heartbeat, you represent a CRT.  
Moreover, I think that Prinz’s idiosyncratic account of representation that 
distinguishes between real and nominal content is not a good account of bodily 
feelings. If an experience of one’s heart beating provides us with any information, it 
seems that it gives the information that one’s heart is beating at a specific rhythm. 
One can feel one’s heart beating even if one does not have a concept of what a 
beating heart is: then you just feel something beating in your body. Therefore it seems 
wrong to say that such an experience tracks the “essence” of heart beating.  
A final remark: Prinz’s theory implies that CRTs are the essences of emotions 
which are “tracked” in experience. The idea that the concept “dog” has a specific 
genome as real content is already controversial but one could refer to scientific 
research to support this claim. Most emotion scientists are hostile to the idea of a 
CRT, let alone to the idea that CRTs make up the essences of emotions. Thus, one 
cannot just claim that a CRT is to an emotion what H2O is to water. I have already 
discussed this idea in the previous chapter. 
I think Prinz fails to successfully reduce an emotion’s representational features to 
bodily feelings. If one excepts that emotions have a complex ontology, then one can 
also hold that representational features and bodily feelings are different components 
of a complex emotion. The bodily feeling component then needs an additional 
explanation, just like any other emotional component.  
An alternative account of bodily changes in emotion is posited by Frijda (2007). 
We can understand the changes that our bodies undergo in terms of “action 
readiness”. Our body prepares to act in an appropriate way to the emotionally 
represented phenomenon. We need to fight or flee; therefore certain hormones are 
released, our heart rate goes up, our muscles tighten and so on. In other words, it 
 
 59 
might be the case that bodily feelings are more closely related to the action-directed 
components of emotion than to the representational features. Frijda’s account has 
been very influential in psychology of emotion. Of course, this is not the only theory 
available. 
In any case, I do not want to commit to a theory of bodily feelings as part of an 
emotion. I hold that an emotion’s representational features are not necessarily 
reduced to those bodily feelings. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to show how one can combine the ideas of the previous 
two chapters. In Chapter Two, I argued that emotions have a complex content. The 
Jamesian emotional representations I have discussed in the first chapter are part of 
that complex content. However, an emotion’s representational content might not be 
exhausted by emotional representations alone. Moreover, an emotion in its entirety 
or those phenomena that we refer to when we use our ordinary language emotion 
words might include more components than just representations about the world. I 
do not wish to commit to strong claims about the ontology of emotion, as in this 
dissertation I focus solely on the representational features of emotions. I do, 
however, want to emphasize that I do not claim that an emotional experience should 





The Affective Experience of  Aesthetic 
Properties 
As mentioned in the introduction, I will now discuss aesthetics as I believe that 
emotions are a great source of information about aesthetic value. 
In philosophy of perception, it is debated which properties can be represented in 
perceptual experience (see Bayne, 2009; Siegel, 2006). During the last few years, this 
has become a hot topic in philosophy of perception. We can all agree that we perceive 
colours and shapes, but can we also perceive other properties such as seeing a pine 
tree as a “pine tree”? In addition to its colours and shapes, do we see the “pine-
treeness” of the pine tree? I want to introduce a similar question to the philosophy 
of emotion: which properties can be represented in emotional experience?  
An aesthetic property is an obvious candidate. You can argue that, in addition to 
seeing the colours and shapes of a painting, you can experience the balance of its 
composition, the elegance of certain brushstrokes or perhaps even its beauty. I will 





4.1 The Experiential Attribution of Aesthetic Properties 
A few words about aesthetic properties. Aesthetics was initially conceived of as the 
philosophical enquiry into the beautiful. However, aesthetic attributions, by art critics 
as well as by ordinary people, are rarely predicated with the statement “this is 
beautiful”. It is for this reason that most contemporary aestheticians prefer to talk 
about a variety of aesthetic properties.33 Sibley introduced the notion of an “aesthetic 
concept” in order to distinguish between artworks’ aesthetic and non-aesthetic 
properties (Sibley, 1959, 1965).34 Suppose that an art critic says that what makes a 
certain painting balanced is the red mass in the left corner. “Balance” is an aesthetic 
property that differs from non-aesthetic properties, such as “red”. The essential 
differences between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties remain controversial, but 
there are several properties commonly taken to be aesthetic, including graceful, 
balanced, dainty, dumpy, elegant, dynamic, garish, ungainly, beautiful, ugly, pretty, 
and sublime (for an extended list see De Clercq, 2008, p. 895). 
As there is no uncontroversial definition of “aesthetic property”, the common way 
to start a paper on aesthetic properties is to give some paradigm examples, instead 
of a definition.35 A reason for this might be that “aesthetic properties” is a name 
given to a number of properties that may not belong to a clearly defined category. In 
this chapter, I avoid this problem by focusing solely on a clear category of aesthetic 
properties: evaluative properties which are somehow related to aesthetic value or to 
aesthetic appreciation.36  
Evaluative aesthetic properties are properties that can be characterized as more or 
less positive or negative. They are distinct from purely descriptive properties, such 
as those which refer to art history. For instance, “Cubist” and “Impressionist” are 
 
                                                     
33 Interestingly, Nanay (2016) introduced a new concept, “aesthetically relevant property”, as an 
alternative to aesthetic properties. 
34 Note that Sibley uses the term “aesthetic concept” and not “aesthetic property”. These papers, 
just like the majority of philosophical texts back then, were embedded within linguistic philosophy. 
This framework is not as mainstream now as it used to be; therefore, contemporary philosophers 
are more likely to use the term “aesthetic property”. I will do so as well. 
35 De Clercq (2002) is one notable exception.  
36 Some argue that aesthetic properties are necessarily evaluative (f.i. De Clercq, 2002), others argue 
that not all aesthetic properties are evaluative (f.i. Levinson, 2001). 
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not evaluative properties. One might have positive or negative associations with 
these art movements, but these properties are not intrinsically evaluative. The same 
goes for the descriptive property of “dynamic”. In some contexts, possessing  this 
property is aesthetically positive; in others, it is not. Evaluative aesthetic properties, 
on the other hand, are intrinsically related to aesthetic value or to aesthetic 
appreciation. This is what sets them apart from other evaluative properties, such as 
moral properties.  
I will focus solely on the psychology and cognitive architecture of experiential 
aesthetic property attribution. Although most literature on aesthetic properties 
focuses on metaphysics, I wish to remain neutral in that debate.37 I am more 
interested in aesthetics from a philosophy of mind perspective. I want to discuss how 
we as human beings experientially attribute aesthetic properties to objects. I say 
“experiential attribute properties” because I want to distinguish it from attributing 
aesthetic properties with a dry eye; this is what “experientially” amounts to. Secondly, 
I take “aesthetic property attribution” to be a more neutral description of what I 
want to discuss than “having access to aesthetic properties”. The latter would 
presuppose some kind of realism about aesthetic properties, while I wish to remain 
neutral on the metaphysics of aesthetic properties. Instead, I want to investigate how 
we experience them. Hence, I will focus on the psychological and cognitive 
architecture of experiential aesthetic property attribution. I take the “experiential 
attribution of properties” to be a neutral way of phrasing of how to think of 
experiential content (see Nanay, 2013, 2015). For instance: “you experience the 
dancer’s pirouette as elegant” can be described as: “you experientially attribute the 
aesthetic property of elegance to the dancer’s pirouette”. I do not want to discuss the 
nature of aesthetic properties but rather focus on the nature of the experiential 
attribution of these properties.  
In aesthetics, this seems to be the standard view: aesthetic properties are perceived. 
I reject this claim and I will argue that the standard case of experiential aesthetic 
property attribution is affective experience. With affective experience, I mean a 
consciously experienced affective representation.  
As I said in the previous chapter, I am hesitant to claim that affective 
representations are what I call emotional representations in Chapter One. I do not 
 
                                                     
37 An interesting overview and discussion of the ontology of aesthetic properties is presented by 
(Levinson & Matravers, 2005). On the question in which way aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties 
relate, see (Levinson, 1984) and (Currie, 1990). 
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know whether the representation of aesthetic properties is as primitive as an 
emotional representation and I do not know whether they are Jamesian reliable. 
Therefore I claim, more carefully, that aesthetic properties are “affectively 
experienced”. 
I will discuss why most aestheticians think that aesthetic properties are perceived 
before presenting the affective account of experiential aesthetic property attribution. 
I will also consider some objections.  
4.2 Perceiving Aesthetic Properties 
Shelley (2003) observes that most aestheticians presuppose the standard account of 
experiential aesthetic property attribution which entails that aesthetic properties are 
perceived. This claim - although problematic - is rarely criticized. Arguably, the most 
often cited passage on aesthetic properties, by Sibley, is taken to be a formulation of 
the standard view:  
 
It is important to note first that, broadly speaking, aesthetics deals with 
a kind of perception. People have to see the grace and unity of a work, 
hear the plaintiveness or frenzy in the music, notice the gaudiness of a 
colour scheme, feel the power of a novel, its mood, or its uncertainty 
of tone . . . the crucial thing is to see, hear, or feel. To suppose that one 
can make aesthetic judgements without aesthetic perception . . . is to 
misunderstand aesthetic judgement. 
(Sibley, 1965, p. 137) 
 
Binkley (1977) argues that Sibley’s statement that aesthetic properties are 
perceived, is supported by a long tradition of aestheticians. From aesthetics pioneers 
such as Baumgarten, through formalists like Bell, to Beardsley: all of them agree, 
according to Binkley, that aesthetics is all about perception.   
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We can conclude from the quotes below, by two of the most prominent 
aestheticians of the last few decades, that the perception view is still the standard 
view:  
 
Aesthetic attributions to works of art, and the terms used to effect such 
attributions, are largely descriptive; that is to say, they are based on, and 
obliquely testify to the occurrence of, certain looks or feels or 
impressions or appearances that emerge out of lower-order perceptual 
properties. In so far as an aesthetic attribution is intended as objective, 
that is, as the attribution of a property of intersubjective import, such 
impressions or appearances are relativized to a perceiver who views a 
work correctly... 
(Levinson, 2001, p. 62) 
 
Furthermore, the use of aesthetic terminology in such accounts of our 
interactions with artworks is, most essentially, “experiential” or 
“perceptual” where those terms are generally understood by contrast to 
responses mediated by the application of concepts or reasoning. 
(Carroll, 2001, p. 5)  
 
One could argue that this reading of these authors is uncharitable. They could be 
read as saying that aesthetic properties are “experienced” in a broad sense of the 
term. Then, the question a philosopher of perception would ask is: which kind of 
experience are they talking about? Is it literally a perceptual experience? In any case, 
I think that there should be more clarity about which kind of experience is 
responsible for the experiential attribution of aesthetic properties.  
One reason why aestheticians think that aesthetic properties are “perceived” is 
that you can distinguish between experiencing something as 
beautiful/balanced/graceful and merely judging it as having a certain aesthetic 
property. Hopkins calls these two different ways of aesthetic assessment “savouring 
beauty” and “judging beauty” respectively (Hopkins, 1997). The latter is nothing but 
a belief that something is beautiful, whereas the former involves a certain sensible 
response.  
“Judgement” can be a confusing concept as it means something different in 
aesthetics than it does in the philosophy of mind. “Aesthetic judgement” is often 
understood as a person’s evaluation of an artwork, which can be (partly) experiential. 
However, Hopkins seems to understand judgement as a non-experiential state. I 
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share Hopkins’ intuition that you can have two kinds of aesthetic assessment: one is 
experiential and the other is not. There is a difference between the belief (a non-
experiential state) that X has aesthetic property P on the one hand, and the 
experiential attribution of aesthetic property P to X on the other.  
Let me illustrate this distinction with an example. When Lucy sees the Rothko 
paintings at the Tate Modern, she is moved by their beauty. Afterwards, she buys the 
poster version of one of these paintings in the museum shop. Because Lucy is getting 
used to seeing the Rothko on the wall of her apartment, she no longer strongly senses 
its beauty every time she looks at it. One day, Nick, who has come over for dinner, 
asks Lucy why she likes the Rothko painting. Lucy can describe the different features 
of the painting that make the painting beautiful without experiencing its beauty. In 
this case, she “merely” believes that it is beautiful. But sometimes she can look at the 
painting and feel the sensation she felt when she first saw it in the museum. At these 
moments, she really “experiences” its beauty. 
The question remains, though: what is meant by “experiencing” or “savouring”? 
It would be a mistake to identify “experience” too quickly with “perception”. That 
is what I will argue for in the next section. 
4.3 Non-Perceptible Aesthetic Properties 
The claim that aesthetic properties are literally perceived implies that aesthetic 
properties are part of perceptual content. For instance, the balance of the painting is 
literally part of the content of one’s perceptual experience, in the same way the 
painting’s colours are part of the perceptual content of the person looking at the 
painting.  
This claim is problematic, as there seem to be aesthetic properties that can be 
experientially attributed without a perceptual experience thereof. A mathematician, 
for instance, can experience the elegance of a brilliant mathematical proof, without 
thinking that the way the proof looks is “elegant”. The proof is not perceptible, but 
it is aesthetic nevertheless. More commonly, we are moved by reading novels all the 
time. When we experientially attribute aesthetic properties to the novel, we usually 
do not attribute them to the type font, but to the non-perceptible content. A novel 
can be beautiful, a passage sublime, a phrasing can be experienced as very elegant 
and graceful, and the narrative’s structure can be experienced as well balanced.  
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Another example of non-perceptible art is conceptual art. In conceptual art, the 
material object is less important than the idea behind it. You can, of course, think 
that the Fountain is aesthetically valuable because the urinal Duchamp presented as 
art has an elegant shape. But, in doing so, you might be missing the point. It is the 
idea behind the artwork that is “witty”, “challenging”, “provocative”, and 
“brilliant”— or, if you dislike it, “uninspired” and “shallow”. 
The claim that we can attribute aesthetic properties to non-perceptible objects is 
not a new one. Schellekens (2007) argues that we can attribute aesthetic value to 
ideas, particularly when we appreciate conceptual art. The aesthetic value of 
conceptual art is usually not attributed to the physical object, but to the idea behind 
it. Similarly, Shelley (2003) argues that we do attribute aesthetic properties to non-
perceptible artworks, such as conceptual art and literature.  
An account along these lines that goes into the details of the concept of mental 
representation is (Lopes, 2016). Lopes tries to accommodate the idea that one can 
experientially attribute aesthetic properties to non-perceptible artworks, such as 
conceptual art and literature. Lopes argues that we need a broader conception of 
“experience”, of which sensory perception is a proper subset. Lopes uses Dretske’s 
account of mental representation to define such a broad conception of experience. 
Dretske sees mental representation as a way of encoding information; sometimes the 
representation is experiential, sometimes non-experiential. Seeing a red chair and the 
subsequent belief that that chair is red are two states with similarities in content. 
What makes a representation experiential is its way of encoding this information 
together with its functional role. An experience of red encodes the information 
differently than a perceptual state for instance. Such a conception of experience 
allows Lopes to argue that aesthetic properties can be experientially represented 
without sense perception. If you read a novel, several non-experiential states will 
contain information about that novel. However, an experiential representation might 
encode aesthetic information on the basis of these states. Aesthetic properties can 
thus be experientially attributed to non-perceptible artworks. 
This idea is a problem for the standard account which says that aesthetic properties 
are perceived; because it suggests that the experiential attribution of aesthetic 
properties is not perceptual. A possible objection to this claim is to say that we do 
not experience aesthetic properties when engaging with non-perceptual art. This is 
the best bet for someone who is defending the standard account. One can argue that 
literature and conceptual art are not “aesthetic”, given that they are non-perceptible. 
The framework of aesthetic properties, then, only works for perceptible art and not 
for non-perceptible art. Schellekens, Shelley and Lopes reject this strategy. However, 
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it is hard to see how one would settle this debate when “aesthetic property” is, as 
mentioned before, not a clearly defined concept. It is unclear what will determine 
whether the elegance of a mathematical proof is truly an aesthetic property just as 
the elegance of a painting is. 
Here is a reason why we should consider non-material elegance as being not that 
different from material elegance. First of all, we use the same word. As most articles 
on aesthetic properties start with paradigm examples, instead of clearly defining what 
aesthetic properties are, and “elegance” is used as a paradigm example, it is hard to 
argue that some instances of elegance are aesthetic properties and others are not. 
One is committed to saying that elegance is a paradigm case of an aesthetic property, 
no matter to which entity it is attributed. Secondly, we use the same word because 
phenomenologically different experiences of elegance have something in common, 
regardless of which object it is attributed to. Elegant brushstrokes, elegant 
mathematical proofs and the elegant behaviour of people all have something in 
common: they feel the same. Again, it seems hard to settle this debate, but we have 
good reasons to doubt whether the standard view is true. Therefore, an account that 
gives a unified explanation of aesthetic property attribution to both perceptual and 
non-perceptual objects seems to be a more satisfactory account than one which does 
not. 
In order to experience a painting as balanced, one needs to perceive the non-
aesthetic properties such as colours, shapes, and spatial properties. The experience 
of these properties is commonly referred to as “perception by means of the five 
senses” (see Shelley, 2003). In the philosophy of perception, the properties that are 
obviously literally perceived are called “low-level properties”, which make up the 
bottom-up information that we get from our senses (see Siegel, 2006). Aesthetic 
properties are not represented by “low-level perception”.  
Aesthetic properties are distinct from low-level perceptible properties because 
something else is required to get from specific colours and shapes to “elegance”. Yet, 
what mental state or process is responsible for this? I think we have good reasons to 
reject the idea that this is a perceptual process. As the cases of literature, conceptual 
art and elegant mathematical proofs show: one can experientially attribute aesthetic 
properties to non-perceptible objects. Thus, there is an experiential state which is 
able to represent an aesthetic property on the basis of perceiving colours and shapes, 
as well as on the basis of non-perceptual input such as a mathematical proof. It 
cannot be perceptual as it is inconceivable that one has a perceptual experience 
without low-level perceptual properties, but instead a “mathematical proof” as 
represented, instead of colours and shapes. This is absurd. 
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Which state would this be: experiential but not perceptual? A straightforward 
answer is that the experience of aesthetic properties is affective. In the next section, 
I will argue why this is the best explanation. I will defend an account that can 
accommodate the experiential aesthetic property attribution of both perceptible and 
non-perceptible aesthetic objects. I will call this the affective account and it says that 
the standard case of experiential aesthetic property attribution is an affective 
experience.  
4.4 The Affective Account 
The affective account that I will defend is the claim that the standard case of 
experiential aesthetic property attribution is an affective experience. An experience 
of a painting’s elegance then consists of a perceptual experience combined with a 
positive affective experience. The mathematician who experiences the elegance of 
the mathematical proof has a similar positive affective response. While reading a 
novel or assessing a conceptual artwork, aesthetic attribution works via affective 
experience.  
As I said before in this dissertation, affective representation is a mental 
representation which represents its object as more or less positive or negative. The 
term “valence” is often used to refer to this experience of lesser or greater positivity. 
When I say “affective experience”, I mean a consciously experienced affective 
representation and I do not refer to entities such as qualia or mere feelings without 
representational content.  
It will be helpful to illustrate the notion of an affective experience with an example: 
the experience of something as “refreshing”. When I perceive a glass of water, I can 
represent the water as “drinkable”. The statement that the water is drinkable is a 
statement that can either be true or false, representing the water as drinkable is either 
accurate or inaccurate. In other words, the representation of the water as drinkable 
does or does not “match” reality. In this sense, representing the water as “drinkable” 
is what I will call objective representation or an objective mental state. 
When I am thirsty, I will have a different experience of a glass of water than after 
having been forced to drink ten litres of water. If I am thirsty, I will represent the 
water as desirable, whereas in the second case, I will feel repulsed by the sight of 
another glass of water. This is not entirely objective because, in addition to a 
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representation of the mind-independent reality, my perspective or condition matters 
considerably. I represent the water as “desirable” or “not-desirable”. I understand 
that different people in different conditions will each experience water differently. 
This is an example of what I have called “personal significance” in the first chapter. 
What is personally significant can refer to a desire but it does not have to be; it can 
also be a goal, a preference, a disposition, a norm, a value or a personal association. 
Let us call every state which does not represent reality as it is, but which is rather 
concerned with what is significant or valuable to one’s own, a perspectival state. 
“Personal significance” refers to the class of perspectival states.  
So, imagine that I represent the water as drinkable, which is an objective 
representation, and at the same time, because I am thirsty, I also represent it as 
“desirable”, which is a perspectival representation. Now, when I drink the water, I 
will have a positive affective experience. There is a specific kind of positivity that you 
experience when you are drinking water when you are thirsty. Commercials for 
bottled water and soda do a good job of representing this experience. They seem to 
call the combination of drinkable, desirable, and pleasurable “refreshing”. This, in 
my view, is a property which is similar to an aesthetic property. 
“Refreshing” is an experienced property. However, the representation of 
“refreshing” is not just the representation of its “drinkability” combined with the 
representation of its “desirability”. The essential feature that links objectivity and 
desire is the positive affective experience we undergo in drinking the water. It is the 
experienced “positivity” that represents “this is good”, or “my desire is fulfilled”. 
This is why affective experience is an evaluative mental representation. The 
“evaluation” consists of considering how an objective representation (f.i. the content 
of perception or belief) matches one’s personal significance or perspectival state (i.e. 
a goal, desire, preference, disposition or personal association). This results in a 
representation of what I have called a relevance relation, which appears to 
consciousness as an experience that can be characterized as more or less positive or 
negative.  
The example of a “refreshing” experience can illustrate the structure of affective 
representation. You represent the water as “drinkable” (objective state) and you are 
really thirsty (perspectival state). If you drink the water, your desire will be fulfilled. 
This results in a positive affective representation. The “positivity” enters your mind 
by means of affective representation. 
Let us see how well the affective account applies to aesthetic properties. To 
experience the elegance of a painting, one needs a mental process that establishes the 
representation of an aesthetic property on the basis of the representation of low-level 
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perceptible properties. Evaluative aesthetic properties are somehow “positive” or 
“negative”. As the mental state that represents positivity and negativity is affective 
experience, it is the obvious candidate for the missing link between low-level 
properties and aesthetic properties. One has good reason to maintain that affective 
experience is the standard case of experiential aesthetic property attribution. 
The affective account says that if you “savour” beauty, beauty is attributed by 
means of affective representation. Remember Lucy who after getting used to the 
sight of the Rothko poster at her place, does not experience it as beautiful anymore. 
Yet, she still beliefs that it is beautiful. What is the difference between this aesthetic 
assessment and the first time Lucy was moved by the Rothko painting? In the latter 
case, her experience was literally “positive”. This positivity is represented in 
experience by means of affective representation. 
The experience of beauty lacks a strong descriptive component; an experience of 
beauty is an unspecified experience of “aesthetic positivity”. Most aesthetic 
properties seem to have both a descriptive and evaluative component and are, 
therefore, more specific than beauty. This category of properties includes elegance, 
grace, gaudiness, garishness, and balance.38 These properties are very similar to the 
property of refreshingness. If you say “drinking this water feels good” then you are 
just describing a subjective state, but if you say “this water is refreshing” you are 
being more specific. “Refreshing” does not seem to be entirely subjective, given that 
it says that the water is “good” because it is drinkable and quenches your thirst. It is 
also possible that instead of experiencing the “refreshingness” of the water, you 
attribute the property of “refreshing” to the water without affect. When you read in 
this chapter that is refreshing to drink water when you are thirsty, you did not 
experience it, but I presume that you believe that my claim is correct. If you literally 
experience the refreshingness, the experience of positivity has to be part of your 
experience as well. The same goes for the experience of a dancer’s pirouette as 
graceful. You represent the movement as having a particular form, but you also 
represent the movement as “good”. If there is a difference between holding the belief 
that the dancer’s pirouette is graceful and experiencing the gracefulness, the 
 
                                                     
38 It is debated how the evaluative and descriptive components stand in relation to each other. For 
instance, Levinson (2001) claims that they can easily be separated, while De Clercq (2002) criticizes 
this view. For an original take on this debate see (Zangwill, 1995). 
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difference is that in the latter case you experience the positivity. Literally experiencing 
greater or lesser positivity or negativity is affective experience.39  
Although “refreshing” and aesthetic properties are similar, there is also a 
significant difference. The perspectival state which is at the basis of the 
refreshingness experience is thirst, while the perspectival state responsible for 
aesthetic properties is arguably not the satisfaction of an occurrent desire. What, 
then, is the perspectival state that gives rise to an affective experience of an aesthetic 
property? It is that aspect of the human mind that craves for the aesthetically good: 
an aesthetic sensitivity. In the philosophy of emotion, there is an ongoing debate on 
what the nature of what I call a “perspectival state” is. The account that Price (2015, 
pp. 116–131) calls the “interest-based account” claims that perspectival states are not 
to be reduced to desires or mere preferences. Perspectival states are “interests” which 
are our longings for a list of objective “goods” such as “health; security; adequate 
material resources; good social status; autonomy; good social relationships; 
intellectual stimulation” (Price, 2015, pp. 117–118). Emotions are not just sensitive 
to our preferences and desires, but to what we value. Think about it: most of our 
profound emotions are not triggered by desire satisfaction but by the things that are 
of value to us for complex and possibly obscure reasons. The aesthetic is no different: 
we are sensitive to objects of aesthetic value for complex and obscure reasons. It is 
a research project on its own to investigate how and why we got such an aesthetic 
sensitivity but I think we have good reasons to believe that we have an aesthetic 
interest and that this is what I call a perspectival state. 
The affective account presents a unified explanation of how aesthetic properties 
are experientially attributed to both perceptible and non-perceptible objects. 
Experiencing the elegance of a dancer’s pirouette and experiencing the elegance of a 
mathematical proof are both instances of affective experience. In the former case, 
the objective content is constituted by a perception of the dancer’s pirouette, while 
in the latter case, perception does not do this work. People who disagree with the 
affective view will have to provide an explanation as to why both a mathematical 
proof, as well as a dancer’s pirouette, can be experienced as “elegant”. 
The affective account gives a satisfactory explanation of the experiences of the 
variety of properties that are called “aesthetic”. Affective experience is not an 
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is the case, then aesthetic attribution consists of judging that something is aesthetically valuable 
without experiencing it. 
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optional add-on to the attribution of aesthetic properties, but it is the standard case 
of the experiential attribution of aesthetic properties. In the next section, I will 
discuss objections one can raise against this statement. 
4.5 Possible Objections 
4.5.1 The Affective Penetration of Perception 
One can argue that affective experience itself cannot represent aesthetic properties, 
only a perceptual state which is penetrated by an affective experience can. In this 
sense, aesthetic properties are perceived and affective experience is not doing the 
work of representing the aesthetic property. Some philosophers maintain that 
emotion, like other mental states, can penetrate perceptual experiences (see Siegel, 
2012). This claim is not uncontroversial, but one might hold that an emotion can 
influence the content of a perceptual experience. For instance, when you are afraid 
of a dog, you might say: “its teeth look bigger”. One might argue that this is literally 
true: the experience of fear changes something in your perceptual experience. The 
teeth are literally perceived as bigger. The same can be argued for aesthetic properties. 
When you experience gracefulness, this might be a case of “affective penetration”, 
which involves the penetration of an affective experience into a perceptual 
experience. If one takes this to be true, one can argue that aesthetic properties are 
not attributed by means of affective experience but they are perceived by an 
affectively penetrated perceptual state (see also Prinz, 2014 and Stokes, 2014). 
I reject this claim and hold that an aesthetic property can be represented by an 
affective experience. To represent water as refreshing, it is not the case that an 
affective experience penetrates the perception of the water resulting in an experience 
of refreshingness. The affective experience needs an objective state, which is, in this 
case, the perception of the water. You are always afraid of something or angry at 
someone and the object of your emotion needs to be given to you by an objective 
state. This does not imply that every objective state is penetrated by the emotional 
experience. First of all, this objective state does not have to be a perceptual 
experience. One can be afraid of an imaginary lion. Moreover, to have an experience 
of fear of a lion, it is not required that the affective experience penetrates the 
perceptual experience of that lion; affective experience is enough. Likewise, 
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experiential aesthetic property attribution does not have to be based on a perceptual 
state. Moreover, if one experiences certain colours as elegant, it is not the case that 
the affective experience penetrates the perceptual experience of those colours and 
changes its content. Affective experience alone can represent an aesthetic property. 
4.5.2 Affect is perceptual 
If one holds that affective experience is perceptual, then the whole set up of this 
chapter falls apart. If this is true then claiming that aesthetic properties are affectively 
experienced is not contradictory with saying that they are perceptually represented. 
Johnston (2001), for instance, claims that affect is perceptual because it is a 
refinement of the senses and he uses the experience of beauty as an example of such 
an affect. However, I agree with Wedgwood’s criticism of Johnston’s account 
(Wedgwood, 2001). Wedgwood argues that affect is often a reaction to a non-
perceptual phenomenon, and thus not essentially a refinement of the senses. The 
affective account of aesthetic property attribution entails that affective experience 
can be a response to a non-perceptual object, such as the experience of a 
mathematical proof as elegant. 
Brady (2013) rejects what he sees as the epistemological presupposition of most 
philosophers who claim that emotion or affect is a kind of perception, including 
Johnston. He rejects the claim that emotions and affects silence the demand for 
justification for that which it discloses. Emotion and affect are supposedly perceptual 
because they justify evaluative beliefs, just as seeing that the cup is red justifies the 
belief that the cup is red. Brady argues that the opposite is true: emotions do not 
silence the demand for justification. When you are alone at night in your apartment 
and you hear a weird noise, you might be afraid, but this does not silence the demand 
for justification for the belief that you are in danger. You are not going to call the 
police, just because you are afraid. When you see a stranger in your apartment, on 
the other hand, you will likely call the police. If you see a person in your apartment 
you will not look for other evidence that there is, in fact, somebody in your 
apartment. That is what silencing the demand for justification means. Like other 
affective experiences, I do not think that an experience of an aesthetic property 
silences the demand of justification in the same way as perception does. One can 
have interesting debates about whether something is beautiful or not, whereas there 
are no interesting disagreements about what one sees unless your discussion partner 
is hallucinating. I agree with Brady that emotion and affect have a different 
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epistemological status than perception and that this is one good reason to reject the 
claim that they are perceptual. There are more reasons to reject this claim, but this 
is, I think, the most important one. 
Tappolet (2016) argues for a new version of the perceptual view of emotion. In 
response to Brady’s remark that perception and emotion have a different 
epistemological status, she argues that we need to reject “reliable 
representationalism” about emotion. Tappolet (2016, pp. 41–45) states that, because 
emotions misfire more often than not, we have to give up thinking of emotion in 
terms of reliable correlation altogether. The reason why emotions do not silence the 
demand for justification is because they are not reliable: they misfire more often than 
not. In Brady’s example, it is likely that one’s fear caused by a weird noise, is a false 
alarm. It is not likely that there is actually danger present, just because there is a weird 
noise. According to Brady, emotions, therefore, do not silence the demand for 
justification.  
Tappolet on the other hand, claims that because emotions are unreliable one 
should not think of them as reliable representations. The alternative that one should 
endorse, according to Tappolet, is what Dokic and Lemaire (2013) call (without 
endorsing it) the direct access thesis. This is the claim that emotion is the direct 
perception of value. Since emotion directly presents the evaluative world, it provides 
direct evidence for empirical judgements about this evaluative world.40 It is, however, 
a strange move to defend the direct access thesis about emotion as a response to the 
claim that they are unreliable. The claim that emotions are unreliable and often 
misfire seems almost in contradiction with the claim that they directly present us with 
values themselves. If emotions are unreliable, it also seems wrong to say that they are 
direct evidence for empirical judgements.  
Let us compare this to perception. Suppose that someone argues that because 
perception is unreliable, you should think of perception as that which directly 
presents reality as it is and that, therefore, perception is direct evidence for your 
empirical judgements. If your perception is unreliable and you misperceive the world 
most of the time, it does not follow from this that perception immediately shows 
you reality as it is. Likewise, Tappolet’s move to defend the direct access thesis about 
emotions because they are unreliable is unjustified. So I hold that Brady’s criticism 
of the perceptual view still holds. 
 
                                                     
40 The direct access thesis about emotion is very similar to direct realism about perception. For a 
good criticism of a (hypothetical) direct realism about emotion, see (Brady, 2013, pp. 78–82). 
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As a matter of fact, in (Tappolet, 2016), Tappolet does not actually claim that 
emotion literally is perception. Instead, she argues that emotion and perception have 
a lot of significant features in common. Tappolet also lists a couple of differences 
between emotion and perception. I think that very few people would deny that 
emotion and perception are somewhat similar but this is something else than 
claiming that emotion literally is perception. Indeed, many “perceptual theories of 
emotion” describe an analogy between sense perception and emotion and do not 
claim that these two are identical (see e.g. Döring, 2007). The aim of most of these 
theories is to argue that an emotion is not a belief or a belief-like state but rather an 
experiential or perception-like state. The affective account is consistent with such an 
idea. 
4.5.3 Metaphysics and Sentimentalism 
This chapter meant to put metaphysics aside, but one could criticize the affective 
account for presupposing a metaphysical position. Anti-realism and emotivism are 
often used synonymously. Given that I claim that the experience of aesthetic 
properties is an affective experience, one may have the idea that I presuppose anti-
realism. However, my account does not necessarily agree with, nor does it oppose, 
the anti-realism of aesthetic properties. If one accepts the affective account, one can 
go both metaphysical ways. An anti-realist will claim that there is nothing more to 
aesthetic properties than this experience alone. The properties are constituted by this 
experience, and therefore they do not exist mind-independently. A realist about 
aesthetic properties could say that the experience of aesthetic properties picks out 
something in reality. Alternatively, one can defend a position that occupies the 
middle ground between these positions, and which argues for some kind of mind-
dependent realism. In either case, my account remains neutral on this metaphysical 
debate and is consistent with most metaphysical accounts of aesthetic properties.  
In this sense, the affective account of aesthetic property attribution is different 
from the branch of emotivism that presupposes that emotions are merely feelings 
and not representational in themselves. Most emotion theorists today think that 
emotions are representational, and rightly so.41 If you fear a lion, you represent the 
lion as being a certain way. It is not the case that you just feel something in your 
 
                                                     
41 See (Lyons, 1980) for a historical overview of the rejection of the Humean feeling theory of 
emotion and the branch of emotivism which presupposes this theory.  
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body. Likewise, the affective experience of aesthetic properties is not just a feeling 
that happens after we represent an aesthetic property. The affective experience is the 
experiential representation of the aesthetic property.  
As a last note to this section, I want to emphasize that the affective account is also 
very different from sentimentalism.42 Sentimentalists also describe a similar relation 
between emotion and value, just like the affective account does. Sentimentalism is, 
however, not a theory of how we attribute evaluative properties to objects, but it is 
an account of the nature of evaluative properties. The affective account remains 
neutral on the metaphysics of aesthetic properties. Sentimentalism, which is also 
more general than the affective account as it is meant to be a claim about all 
evaluative properties, is the claim that something has an evaluative property if and 
only if a particular response to it is appropriate or fitting. For instance, a particular 
object is fearsome if and only if fear is the appropriate or fitting response to that 
object. This account received a lot of criticism (see f.i. Brady, 2013, pp. 114-115). I 
only want to point out here that the affective account is not a version of 
sentimentalism. No metaphysical claims about aesthetic properties follow from the 
claim that aesthetic properties are affectively represented. The appropriate or fitting 
affective experience to something which has an aesthetic property would be, 
according to the affective account, an accurate affective representation of that 
property. This says, in fact, nothing substantial about the nature of that property. It 
is similar to the claim that something is red if and only if the fitting response to it is 
an accurate perception of red, which says nothing about the metaphysical nature of 
red. For this reason, the affective account is not a version of sentimentalism. 
  
 
                                                     
42 Examples of sentimentalism arguably include: (Gibbard, 1990; McDowell, 1998; Wiggins, 1987). 
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4.5.4 The Negative Experience of “Positive” Properties 
Experiencing positive aesthetic properties does not always result in positive 
experiences. For instance, “balance” seems to be a positive aesthetic property, but 
Baroque painters saw balance in a negative light, as it was the opposite of their 
aesthetic ideal.  
It is important to notice that “possessing positive aesthetic properties” is not 
necessarily synonymous with “having a positive aesthetic or artistic value”. Aesthetic 
properties are, however, the building blocks of these more complex phenomena and 
can contribute to a work’s artistic merit in a less predictable way. Compare this to 
wine tasting. If you drink wine, you perceive different aspects of the wine. You might 
just say you like it, by which you mean that in general, you have a positive experience 
thereof. A wine connoisseur is very good at distinguishing between the various 
representations she has formed while tasting. When addressing the evaluative 
aesthetic properties of the wine, she is describing the various affective 
representations she has had. Not all these qualities have to be positive to make a 
good wine: you can have an excellent “balance” of an extremely bitter taste and a 
sweet and elegant aftertaste. The same holds for artworks. A painting can be 
successful in expressing sadness by virtue of its ugly features. Paintings can be 
considered kitsch because they are over-the-top pretty. Rubens might have thought 
that if the compositions of paintings are too balanced, then the painting becomes 




4.6 To Conclude: Two Sets of Aesthetic Properties 
I have argued that aesthetic properties are experientially attributed by means of 
affective experience. The affective account provides a satisfactory explanation of 
how we experientially attribute aesthetic properties to both perceptual and non-
perceptual objects. However, this does not hold for every property that has been 
called “aesthetic”. In the introduction, I pointed out that the claims and arguments 
in this chapter are limited to the aesthetic properties that are evaluative and somehow 
related to the aesthetic. Given that nobody has provided a strict definition of what 
“aesthetic properties” actually are, in the broad sense of the word, I suspect that this 
notion does not make up a natural kind. The aesthetic properties that fall within the 
scope of the affective account, on the other hand, are a better candidate for forming 
a natural kind. 
Consider these two sets of properties: 
 
A. The set of properties that have been called “aesthetic”43 
B. The set of properties that are affectively experienced 
 
There is a significant overlap between those two sets. However, not all properties 
that belong to A also belong to B and vice versa. It is hard to argue that A forms a 
natural kind, whereas the set of properties that overlaps between A and B is a better 
candidate to form a natural kind. These properties are aesthetic properties that are 
affectively experienced, which implies that some kind of positivity or negativity is 
represented. What sets them apart from other affectively experienced properties, like 
“fearsomeness” and “danger”, is that there is a different kind of positivity or 
negativity being represented; namely, aesthetic positivity or negativity.  
It might be helpful for aestheticians to focus on this category of affectively 
experienced aesthetic properties, rather than on the broad notion of aesthetic 
properties. It is this category that is the most controversial regarding different topics 
in aesthetics, such as those related to aesthetic value, normativity, and testimony.  
 
 
                                                     




An Empirical Investigation of  Guilty Pleasures 
It is common in contemporary aesthetics to think of aesthetic value in terms of 
aesthetic properties. I, however, think that our experiences of artworks and aesthetic 
objects should not be narrowed down to the attribution of aesthetic properties. 
Therefore, I want to approach aesthetics from a different angle in this last chapter. I 
investigate in this chapter how ordinary people think about aesthetic value. I think 
that the phenomenon of guilty pleasures is an interesting phenomenon to study for 
reasons I will explain later in this chapter. 
I will use a different methodology in this chapter, namely experimental 
philosophy. For this project, I collaborated with Florian Cova, who is an expert in 
experimental philosophy. I chose to do experimental philosophy for this chapter 
because, when discussing earlier versions of this chapter, other aestheticians had 
collectively different intuitions about guilty pleasures than I did.44 What constituted 
my own guilty pleasures has not so much to do with objective features of artworks 
but more with my own personal ideals and values. Most aestheticians with whom I 
have discussed this idea seem to think that the phenomenon of guilty pleasures 
indicates that even ordinary people presuppose there is a standard of taste that 
determines that some works of art are better than others; that is why they feel 
“guilty”. 
How should we determine whose intuitions are right? Do experiments! This is the 
reasoning behind many experimental philosophy projects. Therefore, it seemed a 
good idea to do experimental philosophy. Also, a number of experimental 
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philosophers have already studied how ordinary people think about aesthetics. So, 
experimental philosophical aesthetics seemed to be a good starting point for my 
guilty pleasures project. I, however, wish to be very modest about the claims I make 
in this chapter. It is not a work in social psychology nor does it pretend to be. I 
needed stronger evidence about what is going on in experiences of guilty pleasures 
than just presenting my intuitions about guilty pleasures and the empirical studies 
that we did provided that evidence. The remainder of this chapter is joint work with 
Florian Cova.  
5.1 Guilty Pleasures and Folk Aesthetics 
Nowadays, when we discuss the works of art (or, more largely, the objects of 
aesthetic consumption) we like and appreciate, there is a chance that we end up 
discussing our respective “guilty pleasures”. However, the expression “guilty 
pleasures” has not always been part of our aesthetic repertoire: journalist Szalai 
(2013) traces the rise of the expression back to the late 90s. 
But what are “guilty pleasures” anyway? The Urban Dictionary suggests as its top 
definition for the expression that guilty pleasures are “something you shouldn’t like 
but like anyway” (Urban Dictionary, n.d.).45 Of course, this definition is not restricted 
to objects of aesthetic consumption and also extends to other kinds of objects (such 
as food) and activities (such as certain sexual activities), but certain objects of 
aesthetic consumption clearly fall in the target category. Thus, among the examples 
of guilty pleasures offered by the Urban Dictionary, we can find “keeping a secret 
collection of ABBA and Carpenters and listening to their albums when no one else 
is around” or “listening to and secretly loving Taylor Swift” (Urban Dictionary, 
n.d.).46 
The existence of guilty pleasures shows that our aesthetic experience can 
sometimes be conflicted: there are cases in which we enjoy a certain object but feel 
we should not. The conflict can even be described as an emotionally ambiguous 
experience: we enjoy something (a positive affect) but simultaneously feel bad about 
 





it (a negative affect). But what these conflicts reveal is first and foremost that we view 
our enjoyment of aesthetic objects as subject to norms: to feel that it is wrong to enjoy 
something, or that we should not enjoy something. This is even one of the reasons 
why certain persons dismiss the experience (and even the expression) of guilty 
pleasures: Szalai (2013) sees it as “the distillation of all the worst qualities of the 
middlebrow—the condescension of the highbrow without the expenditure of 
effort”, while journalist Sternbergh (2014) sees it as a “pernicious linguistic remnant 
of the 20th century”, conveying the idea that “certain cultural pleasures are more 
edifying than others”. Ten years before them, essayist Chuck Klosterman (2004) had 
already condemned the concept of a guilty pleasure on the basis that “the only people 
who believe in some kind of universal taste—a consensual demarcation between 
what’s artistically good and what’s artistically bad—are insecure, uncreative elitists 
who need to use somebody else’s art to validate their own limited worldview. It never 
matters what you like; what matters is why you like it.” 
Thus, the fact that we readily and commonly speak about guilty pleasures seems 
to indicate that, to the dismay of many essayists, we distinguish between right and 
wrong aesthetic enjoyment and accept the idea that our aesthetic appreciation is 
subject to norms. This, it turns out, is of the utmost importance for the study and 
understanding of “folk aesthetics” (i.e. the way non-philosophers commonly think 
about aesthetics and aesthetic objects). Indeed, in recent years, experimentally 
minded philosophers have been investigating the structure and content of folk 
aesthetics. One topic of interest has been whether ordinary people consider aesthetic 
judgements and attitudes to be subject to norms. Overall, experimental philosophers 
have tended to claim that folks, in contrast with many aestheticians, do not think that 
aesthetic judgements and attitudes can be “correct” or “incorrect”. To put it 
otherwise, they have suggested that “there is no accounting for taste” is the basic 
principle of folk aesthetics. 
Budd (2007) called this view, according to which aesthetic judgements do not have 
correctness conditions that go beyond one’s mere subjective preferences, “aesthetic 
nihilism”. Aesthetic nihilism opposes the claim that aesthetic judgements are by their 
very nature “intersubjectively valid” and that, by making an aesthetic judgement, one 
does not merely express “personal responses to the objects of judgement, but claims 
meriting the agreement of others” (Budd, 2007, p. 333).47 It has often been 
 
                                                     




contended that we are naturally drawn to the idea that aesthetic judgements are 
intersubjectively valid and that aesthetic nihilism goes against common sense 
(Carroll, 1999; Réhault, 2013; Zangwill, 2001). However, this is exactly what 
experimental philosophers have come to deny (Cova et al., n.d.). 
The phenomenon of guilty pleasures seems to be a counterexample to the claim 
that ordinary people are aesthetic nihilists. Indeed, when one is experiencing a guilty 
pleasure, it seems that one does not think that “there is no accounting for taste” 
because one takes one’s own response to be “bad” or “incorrect”. This is why, in 
this chapter, we investigate the experience of guilty pleasures as a possible 
counterexample to the claim made by experimental philosophers that folk aesthetics 
surrenders to aesthetic nihilism. This is not the only question raised by the concept 
of guilty pleasures48. However, we focus in this chapter on the nature of the norms 
involved in the experience of guilty pleasures and what guilty pleasures can teach us 
about the everyday norms that weigh upon our aesthetic responses. 
5.2 The Empirical Study of Folk Aesthetics: recent 
developments and criticism 
But first, why think that “folk aesthetics” is nihilistic? Indeed, this conclusion might 
seem surprising given that philosophers have traditionally described lay people as 
granting “intersubjective validity” (and thus the potential to be “correct” or 
“incorrect”) to aesthetic judgements (e.g. Zangwill, 2005). 
In fact, this conclusion seems to derive from a series of empirical results that have 
come to challenge the view that common sense grants “intersubjective validity” to 
aesthetic judgements. For example, Goodwin and Darley (2008) ran a series of 
studies probing folk realism about moral judgements. Quite ironically, they used 
aesthetic judgements as controls for comparison, assuming that aesthetic judgements 
constituted a good example of “subjective claims”. As part of these experiments, 
participants were thus presented with aesthetic comparisons, such as “Shakespeare 
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was a better writer than Dan Brown”, “Miles Davis was a better musician than 
Britney Spears”. In each case, participants had to say if these judgements were either 
(i) true, or (ii) false, or (iii) just “an opinion or an attitude”. The results suggested that 
participants did not attribute much “intersubjective validity” to aesthetic judgements: 
84% of the participants chose the third possibility in the comparison between 
Shakespeare and Dan Brown and 96% in the comparison between Miles Davis and 
Britney Spears. 
A methodological problem with Goodwin and Darley’s studies is their use of 
“opinion or attitude” as an equivalent for “claims that cannot be true or false”, which 
are arguably not obviously synonymous. More recent studies do not make this 
mistake. Across three studies, Cova and Pain (2012) probed people’s beliefs about 
the intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgements. In their first two studies, they 
presented participants with vignettes describing several kinds of disagreements 
between two interlocutors coming from different cultures: typical subjective 
disagreement (e.g. disagreement about whether some food tastes good or bad), 
typical factual disagreement (e.g. disagreement about whether Proust is the author of 
In Search of Lost Time), and aesthetic disagreement (e.g. whether a given painting, song, 
or landscape is beautiful or ugly – this included famous works of art such as Da 
Vinci’s Mona Lisa, or Beethoven’s Fur Elise). For each kind of disagreement, 
respondents were asked to indicate which of the four following possibilities best 
described the situation (Cova & Pain, 2012, p. 245): 
 
a) One of the interlocutors is right while the other is wrong. 
b) Both are right. 
c) Both are wrong. 
d) Neither is right or wrong. It makes no sense to speak in terms 
of correctness in this situation. Everyone is entitled to his 
own opinion. 
 
As expected, most respondents chose (a) for factual disagreements (showing that 
they did not interpret the question they received as merely asking them about the 
characters’ personal preferences), and (d) for subjective disagreements (showing that 
the measure was sensitive enough to capture the perceived subjectivity of judgements 
typically considered as such by philosophers). However, it also turned out that most 
respondents chose (d) for aesthetic disagreements: in fact, the likelihood of choosing 
(d) did not significantly differ between subjective and aesthetic disagreements. This 
suggests that laypeople do not view aesthetic judgements as possessing 
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intersubjective validity, which is the possibility of being “correct” or “incorrect” for 
a larger range of individuals. 
There is, however, a problem with Cova and Pain’s methodology: maybe 
respondents did not attribute intersubjective validity to the aesthetic judgements they 
were presented with because they were not personally involved, or were not familiar 
with the works of art discussed in these vignettes. To control for this possibility, 
Cova and Pain designed a third study in which respondents were first instructed to 
describe an object they personally found very beautiful, then asked to imagine that 
someone was disagreeing with them, claiming that said object was not at all beautiful. 
Here again, respondents were asked to choose, among answers (a) to (d), the one 
that best described the situation according to them. As with their first two studies, 
Cova and Pain found that very few respondents (10%) chose answer (a) and that 
most of them instead chose answer (d). 
Cova and Pain’s results are limited by the nature of their sample: across three 
studies, they only interrogated a total of 80 French students. We are thus justified to 
doubt the generalizability of their results. This is why Cova et al. (n.d.) replicated 
Cova and Pain’s third study at a cross-cultural scale, interrogating over 2,000 
participants across 19 countries. Although there were notable cross-cultural 
variations, they found that answer (a) was rarely chosen in every country they studied: 
rather, depending, on the country, participants tended to claim either that “both 
interlocutors were right” or that “neither was right or wrong”. 
Put together, these results strongly suggest that lay people do not attribute 
intersubjective validity to aesthetic judgements and that folk aesthetics is aesthetically 
nihilistic. One important criticism can be raised against this conclusion: that these 
studies all appeal to participants’ explicit judgements. However, it could be that 
participants explicitly deny intersubjective validity to aesthetic judgements while 
implicitly attributing them such validity. To put it otherwise: interrogating participants 
the way these studies did only inform us about their explicit theories, not about the 
deeply held commitments that actually guide their practices (Réhault, 2013). 
In order to vindicate this line of reasoning, one might show that some of our 
aesthetic practices can only be explained by an implicit commitment to the idea that 
aesthetic judgements have intersubjective validity – or, to put it otherwise, to the idea 
that there are intersubjective norms that apply to aesthetic judgements. As it turns out, 
guilty pleasures seem to imply such a commitment. Indeed, the notion of guilty 
pleasures seems to indicate that, in some cases, we feel that we are wrong to enjoy 
certain works of art. But, this idea is precisely incompatible with aesthetic nihilism - 
that is, with the idea that all aesthetic preferences are created equal. Thus, the fact 
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that we experience guilty pleasures might show that, even if most people explicitly 
endorse aesthetic nihilism, they do not implicitly live by it, as their own affective 
experiences show. 
5.3 Two Accounts of Guilty Pleasures 
Thus, the existence of guilty pleasures might show that we indeed submit our 
aesthetic attitudes to norms. But, if this is indeed the case, is it enough to reject the 
claim that folk aesthetics is committed to aesthetic nihilism? Not necessarily. Indeed, 
to reject this claim, we must first show that the norms at stake in guilty pleasures are 
aesthetic norms. It might well be the case that, in guilty pleasures, we judge our 
aesthetic attitudes to be wrong by a standard that has nothing to do with aesthetic 
considerations. In such a case, the phenomenon of guilty pleasures would not 
contradict the idea that most people are aesthetic nihilists, for aesthetic nihilists might 
be open to the idea that non-aesthetic (e.g. prudential, social or moral) norms apply 
to aesthetic judgements and attitudes. This is why we can distinguish between two 
possible accounts of the experience of guilty pleasures. 
5.3.1 The Aesthetic Account of Guilty Pleasures 
According to the aesthetic account of guilty pleasures, a straightforward description of 
our experience of a guilty pleasure is the following: one feels bad because one should 
not enjoy a particular work of art, and one should not enjoy this particular work of art 
because it has no aesthetic value or because it is aesthetically bad. This seems to be a natural 
explanation, after all: claims such as “I know it is a horrible movie, but I still enjoy 
watching it” seem an apt description for guilty pleasures. Moreover, it is in line with 
several popular characterizations of guilty pleasures. For example, another definition 
of “guilty pleasures” given by the Urban Dictionary is “something that someone 
likes, even if they’re aware of its faults (Urban Dictionary, n.d.).49 In some cases, they 
may even have difficulty finding something positive to say about it.” Similarly, the 
 




TVTropes entry for “guilty pleasure” tells us that guilty pleasure “implies that a 
person feels guilty for enjoying a show or product, either because they believe it is of 
low-quality or because they fall out of the product’s target demographic, but for some 
reason like it anyway.” (Tvtopes, n.d.)50 
More precisely, one could formulate the idea behind this account of guilty 
pleasures in the following way. Works of art in general have certain aesthetic properties: 
they can be beautiful, elegant, original, ugly, etc.51 These aesthetic properties provide 
the ground for corresponding aesthetic norms: that one should not enjoy an ugly 
painting or a novel filled with plot holes, but one should enjoy a deep, intelligent 
movie. Thus, a guilty pleasure is an experience in which one enjoys a given work of 
art but is aware (or at least believes) that this enjoyment contravenes one of these 
aesthetic norms, and is thus unwarranted by its object’s aesthetic properties. 
According to this aesthetic account of guilty pleasure, the “should not” that gives rise 
to the experience of guilty pleasures expresses and embodies an aesthetic norm. 
If this account of guilty pleasures is correct, then their existence seems to be 
incompatible with the fact that laypeople are really aesthetic nihilists: guilty pleasures 
can only occur if one considers that one has aesthetic reasons not to enjoy a given 
work of art. Of course, one might note that this does not straightforwardly imply 
that people attribute “intersubjective validity” to their aesthetic judgements and 
attitudes. After all, even if the experience of guilty pleasures suggested that people 
considered their aesthetic judgements and attitudes to be subject to norms, it might 
still be possible that people considered said aesthetic norms and reasons to be only 
valid for them (that is: relative, rather than intersubjectively valid). However, this might 
not be the most likely outcome and, coupled with other observations such as the fact 
that people do debate about aesthetic matters, the correctness of this account of 
guilty pleasures would still provide solid reasons to doubt the claim that people are 
aesthetic nihilists and do not attribute intersubjective validity to aesthetic judgements 
and attitudes. 
 
                                                     
50 http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/GuiltyPleasures 
51 The aesthetic account of guilty pleasures presupposes some kind of realism about aesthetic 
properties. I did not commit myself to this in the previous chapter. Here, “aesthetic property” is 




5.3.2 The Non-Aesthetic Account of Guilty Pleasures 
However, this is not the only possible account of guilty pleasures. It might be that 
guilty pleasures arise from norms that are not aesthetic. To explain the distinction 
between the aesthetic and non-aesthetic account, one can draw an analogy with 
norms that apply to emotions. Indeed, there are two ways in which emotional 
reactions can be deemed inappropriate (D’Arms & Jacobson, 2000; Deonna & Teroni, 
2012). In a first way, the inappropriateness of an emotional reaction can depend on 
its object’s properties: for example, it might be inappropriate to be afraid of a small 
dog because the dog is not dangerous and whether one should or should not feel fear 
depends on the dangerousness of its object. Similarly, it might be inappropriate to feel 
anger at someone who just helped us, because anger is supposed to be directed at 
things (and people) that prevent us from reaching our goals. In this case, the norms 
that apply to emotions (“should I have this emotional response or not?”) depend on 
their objects’ properties.52 In a way, this sort of inappropriateness is very close to the 
one we discussed in our first, aesthetic account of guilty pleasures. According to this 
account, guilty pleasures were aesthetically inappropriate to the extent that one’s 
enjoyment did not fit its object’s aesthetic properties.53 
There is, however, a second way in which emotion can be said to be inappropriate: 
when it violates a non-aesthetic norm that has nothing to do with its objects’ 
properties, but with other considerations. For example, if someone tells me a really 
funny joke at a funeral, my feeling of amusement might be justified by the joke’s 
intrinsic properties (its funniness) – however, it might be socially unacceptable. 
Similarly, it might be morally inappropriate to laugh at a racist or sexist joke, even if it 
is funny. And it might be prudentially inappropriate to get angry at your boss, even if 
he behaves in a perfectly unjust manner. 
 
                                                     
52 Friend (2010) presents a more sophisticated account of this type of emotional inappropriateness. 
She distinguishes between three ways of assessing “emotional warrant”: fittingness, justification 
and correctness. A lot of philosophers of emotion seem to confuse these three.  
53 Drawing on the notion of “affective normativity”, Frierson (2014) suggests a similar account of 
“guilty pleasures”: “‘Guilty’ pleasures are not limited to sadism and chocolate (which can be 
criticized on volitional grounds) but include cheesy movies, corny pop music, and garish garage-
sale landscape paintings. One might interpret the guilt-making features of these pleasures 
volitionally or cognitively, but they more naturally seem to be aesthetic judgements in the Kantian 
sense, that is, something like a recognition that we are treating as beautiful what is really merely 
agreeable or settling for the merely agreeable when we should aim for ‘higher’ feelings.” (p. 179) 
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Thus, emotions can be inappropriate in two ways: either because they are not 
warranted by their object’s properties, or because of some other standard. The same 
might be true for our enjoyment of works of art. Our first account of guilty pleasures 
considered that the norm that is considered to be violated in guilty pleasures is a purely 
aesthetic one, that is that the inappropriateness of our enjoyment depended on the 
properties of its object. But it might simply be that, in guilty pleasures, we feel bad 
because our enjoyment violates a non-aesthetic norm: a prudential, social or moral 
norm. 
The non-aesthetic account of guilty pleasures is perfectly compatible with the idea 
that people are aesthetic nihilists. Indeed, one can hold that there is no proper 
aesthetic normativity and that aesthetic judgements are just expressions of subjective 
preferences and consistently believe that enjoying certain works of art might violate 
prudential, social or moral norms. For example, I might think that it is immoral to 
enjoy works of art that objectify women or celebrate shallow lifestyles, and thus feel 
“guilty” about enjoying such works without committing to the idea that it is 
aesthetically right or wrong to enjoy these works. 
Interestingly, the non-aesthetic account of guilty pleasures is also in line with 
popular characterizations of guilty pleasures. Take for example prudential norms: it is 
striking that people do not only use the expression “guilty pleasures” to talk about 
objects of aesthetic consumption, but also use it to speak about food or substances 
that can be consumed, such as chocolate, cigarettes, and drugs. In this case, what 
makes these pleasures “guilty” is not that their enjoyment is not warranted by the 
gastronomical properties or the quality of the drug-induced high, but the fact that 
their consumption is detrimental to our health. One example of “guilty pleasures” 
given in the Urban Dictionary is “a cigarette every now and then is a guilty pleasure 
for me” (Urban Dictionary, n.d.).54 A search for “guilty pleasures” on Google Scholar 
returns a certain number of psychological studies that are all about (unhealthy) food 
consumption (see for example Houben, Roefs & Jansen, 2010). In this sense, “guilty 
pleasures” are things that we enjoy but should avoid for prudential reasons. Extended 
to aesthetic consumption, this account of guilty pleasures would give us a 
characterization of guilty pleasures as aesthetic objects that either has pernicious 
effects on one’s psychological condition or are a waste of time.  
As for social and moral norms, it is interesting to note that everyday discourse tends 
to connect “guilty pleasures” with shame rather than with guilt itself. Also other 
 




people’s judgement seems to play a crucial role in the definition of guilty pleasures. 
Another definition of guilty pleasures according to the Urban Dictionary is: “a usually 
secretive, sick and twisted activity/hobby that someone does, that (sic) KNOWS 
they shouldn’t and feel downright ashamed for.” (Urban Dictionary, n.d.)55. Some of 
the examples given include so-called “perverse” sexual activities. The “Guilty 
Pleasures” playlist on Spotify (n.d.)56 is prefaced by the words “here are some of 
those songs that we all know and love... Secretly”, while the NPR books list entitled 
“my guilty pleasure” is introduced by the sentence “authors recommend 
embarrassing, but addictive reads” (NPR books, n.d.).57 All of this points to a 
definition of guilty pleasures as things we enjoy but would be ashamed to admit 
enjoying, because others will disapprove. Applied to aesthetic objects, this would lead 
to a definition of guilty pleasures as aesthetic objects we enjoy but enjoy secretly 
because our enjoyment violates social norms and would thereby attract the 
disapproval of our peers. 
As one can see, the popular and everyday characterization of guilty pleasures is all 
over the place and can be brought to support very different accounts of guilty 
pleasures. This complicates the task of determining what exactly guilty pleasures 
imply for the nature of norms on which this particular experience rests. 
5.3.3 Two Competing Hypotheses 
To determine whether the existence of guilty pleasures threatens the idea that most 
of us are, at heart, aesthetic nihilists, we must distinguish between the following two 
possibilities: 
 
(1) The normativity at play in guilty pleasures is properly aesthetic: it 
depends on the object’s aesthetic properties. 
 
(2) The normativity at play in guilty pleasures is non-aesthetic (that is: 
external to the aesthetic realm): guilty pleasures are judged to be 
inappropriate from a prudential, social, moral or another non-
aesthetic standpoint.  
 






If (1) is correct, then the experience of guilty pleasures does constitute a 
counterexample to the experimental philosophers’ claim that most people are 
aesthetic nihilists. But, if (2) is correct, then the phenomenon of guilty pleasures falls 
perfectly in line with the aforementioned empirical work on folk aesthetics. It might 
even provide an explanation for the seemingly appearance of aesthetic normativity 
in folk aesthetics, while there is supposedly no such thing. 
Both accounts make different predictions. The first (aesthetic) account predicts 
that people’s experience of a guilty pleasure (their “feeling bad”) will be explained 
and predicted by their perception that the aesthetic properties of the object of their 
enjoyment do not warrant their enjoyment. The second (nonaesthetic) account 
predicts that people’s experience of a guilty pleasure will be explained and predicted 
by their perception that their enjoyment violates certain moral, social or prudential 
norms. 
These predictions can hardly be tested from the armchair. Unfortunately, there is 
not much empirical work on the experience of guilty pleasures: the only study we 
were able to find only investigated the different justifications people give for their 
indulging in guilty pleasures such as “trash” TV shows (McCoy & Scarborough, 
2014). This is why we decided to conduct our own series of experiments, through 
which we aimed at reaching a better understanding of the source of guilty pleasures, 
and of the norms at play in such cases. 
5.4 Study 1: What counts as a guilty pleasure? 
5.4.1 Materials and Methods 
As a first step, we tried to get a better grasp of what people actually call “guilty 
pleasures”. As we just saw, guilty pleasures can be characterized in very different 
ways: either as arising from an object’s not possessing aesthetic properties that would 
warrant our enjoyment, or as arising from our enjoying of something that is not good 
for us to enjoy, or that we are ashamed of enjoying since it violates social and / or 
moral norms. 
To determine which of these characterizations best capture the everyday use of 
the expression “guilty pleasures”, we recruited 100 participants (55 men and 45 
women) living in the United States through Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online 
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platform for conducting surveys.58 Participants were on average 35 years old 
(SD=10.9) and paid $0.50 for their participation in our survey. 
 
As a first step, participants were asked to complete the following task: 
 
We are researchers investigating how people think about artworks, 
media and other objects of aesthetic consumption. You will be asked a 
few questions about the kind of artworks you enjoy. Note that artwork 
should be understood in a broad sense, encompassing such things as 
novels, movies, shows, songs, etc. 
 
Sometimes, when we discuss works of art (in the broad sense) we enjoy, 
we call some of them “guilty pleasure”. Please, explain in your own 
words what a “guilty pleasure” is. 
 
After that the participants were asked: 
 
Think of your own guilty pleasures and give an example. 
 
Which of the following statements best describes your feelings about 
this object (multiple answers are allowed): 
 I consider this to be a guilty pleasure because I enjoy it though it 
has no (or little) artistic value. 
 I consider this to be a guilty pleasure because I enjoy it though it 
would be best for me not to enjoy it. 
 I consider this to be a guilty pleasure because I enjoy it though it 




                                                     
58 There are reasons to be cautious about generalizing from participants recruited through Mturk. 
However, it has been observed that MTurk participants are slightly more demographically diverse 
than standard Internet samples, that they are significantly more diverse than typical American 
college samples, and that data obtained through Mechanical Turk are at least as reliable as those 
obtained via traditional methods (Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 2011) 
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The first choice refers to aesthetic norms59, the second refers to prudential norms, 
and the third refers to social and moral norms. Choices were presented in a random 
order. 
5.4.2 Results 
We first analyzed participants’ answers to the open-ended question asking them to 
explain what a guilty pleasure is. We noted that a certain number of participants, 
disregarding our instructions, tried to give a definition of “guilty pleasures” that was 
not limited to objects of aesthetic consumption. We still kept their answer, as we 
were interested in understanding people’s concept of “guilty pleasures”. After going 
through the participants’ answers once, we were able to distinguish different 
categories of answers: 
 
 Enjoyment: Participants only state that a guilty pleasure is something they 
enjoy. 
 General definition: Participants define a guilty pleasure as something they 
enjoy but should not / do not want to / are wrong to enjoy. 
 Artistic: Participants describe guilty pleasures as objects of low artistic 
quality. 
 Prudential: Participants describe guilty pleasures as having no utility / as 
being bad for those who indulge in them. 
 Against others: Participants state that a guilty pleasure is something that the 
majority of people regard with contempt / that should be kept secret and 
hidden from others. 
 Shame: Participants describe guilty pleasures as embarrassing/shameful. 
 Moral: Participants describe guilty pleasures as something the enjoyment of 
which should be considered as immoral. 
 
Each answer could potentially fall in several categories. We went through the 
answers a second time and classified each answer accordingly. Results are presented 
in Table 1.   
 
                                                     
59 Some philosophers distinguish between “aesthetic” and “artistic” but in this context, folk 





Artistic Prudential Against 
others 
Shame Moral 
6% 14% 5% 27% 37% 17% 1% 
 
Table 1. Percentage of participants’ answer falling into each category (Study 1) 
 
As one can see, the “against others” and “prudential” categories are the ones in 
which most answers fall, with the “artistic” category being almost empty. This seems 
to speak in favor of the idea that the norms at play in the experience of guilty 
pleasures are mostly non-aesthetic ones.  
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of participants choosing each statement (Study 1) 
 
However, the results are not so straightforward as they seem. Figure 1 describes 
participants’ choices in the second part of the study. As one can see, the pattern of 
answers we obtained seems to be the exact opposite of the one we obtained when 
we analyzed the participants’ open-ended answer: artistic considerations were given 
a much more important weight than moral and social considerations. How are we to 





5.4.3 Discussion: Aesthetic Taste and Personal Norms 
Our results suggest that our everyday use of the expression “guilty pleasure” covers 
very different things: it can be used to describe things we enjoy despite their lack of 
artistic quality, things the enjoyment of which is a waste of time or bad for us, and 
even things we would be embarrassed to publicly admit we enjoy. Of course, it might 
be the case that all these distinct phenomena might be brought together under the 
category “things we enjoy but think we should not”, but even that is not clear. Those 
who experience a guilty pleasure only because others would find their enjoyment 
wrong, do not have to believe that others are right. 
One big problem in our results is the tension between the results of the first and 
second part of our study. The results of the first part put a great emphasis on how 
others would react if they knew about our guilty pleasures, on the need to keep our 
guilty pleasures a secret, and on emotions such as embarrassment and shame. This 
strongly suggests that what is at stake in guilty pleasures are social norms. However, 
the results of the second part suggest that social norms play a very small role, at least 
compared to the artistic properties of the object. How are we to reconcile these 
results? 
One possible solution might come from a type of norm we did not discuss so far: 
personal norms. What we call personal norms are the norms we impose on ourselves, 
the one that derives from our self-ideals, from our idea of the person we aspire to 
be. For example, an individual who aspires to be ‘manly’ will impose on himself 
norms such as ‘never cry’ or ‘show no weakness’, but also ‘never enjoy girly shows 
and romantic comedies’. Another individual who aspires to be ‘independent’ or 
‘rebellious’ (in contrast to so-called ‘sheep’) might impose on herself norms such as 
‘never go with the majority’, ‘never dress as others’ or ‘never enjoy mainstream 
productions’. To put it otherwise: to the extent that we aspire to be a certain kind of 
person, we impose norms on ourselves, on both our behaviour and taste. 
Indeed, aesthetic taste is tightly connected with our self-image: our aesthetic 
defines us to a great extent. Introducing ourselves as a classical music lover, a punk 
rock amateur, or a Star Wars fan will give very different images of ourselves. 
Admitting that one loves 50 Shades of Grey is not hard because of the poor quality of 
the book, it is hard because doing so will lead others to make a lot of uncharitable 
inferences about you. 
What if personal norms were at the center of our experience of guilty pleasures? 
Personal norms are not reducible to moral and social norms and have a direct 
connection to the artistic properties of things we enjoy (such as its genre, intellectual 
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complexity, mainstream appeal, etc.), which fits the results of the second part of our 
study. However, to the extent they are connected with our self-image, they are likely 
to be connected to emotions like shame, and to what we take others to think about 
us, which fits the results of the first part of our study. To test for this possibility, we 
introduced personal norms along artistic, prudential, moral and social norms in our 
subsequent studies. 
5.5 Study 2: Where does the “guilt” of guilty pleasures 
come from? 
5.5.1 Materials and Method 
In our first study, we interrogated people about their definition and conception of 
“guilty pleasures”. However, we are more interested in what makes people “feel bad” 
about their enjoyment, and it turned out not to be the same thing, as some 
participants did not seem to feel very bad about their guilty pleasures. To explore the 
source of this discomfort, we recruited 140 participants (68 men and 72 women) 
living in the United States through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were on 
average 37 years old (SD=13.6) and paid $0.40 for their participation in our survey. 
First, participants received the following definition of “guilty pleasures”: “a 
seemingly paradoxical experience of a work of art (in a broad sense: e.g. a movie, a 
song, a painting, a TV show): you enjoy it, but at the same time you feel bad about 
enjoying it.” Then, they were asked (i) to remember and describe one of their own 
guilty pleasures and (ii) explain in their own words why they feel bad about enjoying 
this particular object. 
After answering these two open questions, participants were asked to rate their 
agreements with a series of 15 statements about the object they remembered (on a 
scale ranging from 1= “TOTALLY DISAGREE” to 7= “TOTALLY AGREE”. 




Two statements were control statements, in order to ensure that the particular 
experience they remembered actually fits our definition of a guilty pleasure: 
 
(C1) “I really enjoy this work” 
 
(C2) “I feel bad about enjoying this work” 
 
Then, an additional series of statements probed the normative dimension of their 
experience: 
 
(N1) “I feel like I should not enjoy this work” 
 
(N2) “I feel like my enjoyment of this work is wrong and misguided” 
 
The following statements probed the extent to which they identified with their negative 
feeling, or instead rejected it: 
 
(I1) “I feel bad about enjoying this work because my enjoyment is in 
conflict with my own opinions and thoughts about the work” 
 
(I2) “Though I feel bad about enjoying this work, I do not think this 
feeling is warranted and I would be happy to get rid of it” 
 
(I3) “I consider my negative feelings about enjoying this work as 
warranted and I really want to be able to change myself and no longer 





The remaining statements were designed to test different explanations for the 
negative experience of guilty pleasures. The following two statements probed the 
aesthetic account of guilty pleasures. According to this account, participants feel bad 
because they think their enjoyment does not match the intrinsic aesthetic value of its 
object. 
 
(Art1) “I feel bad about enjoying this work because there is nothing in 
this work that could possibly justify my enjoyment.” 
 
(Art2) “I feel bad about enjoying this work because there is, objectively 
speaking, nothing good about it.” 
 
 
However, one might consider that these statements are a bit too much committed 
to aesthetic realism: maybe people think that there are such things as aesthetic norms, 
but consider them to be culturally variable, and thus determined by what is judged 
to be aesthetic valuable by most people in their culture. This is why we also tested 
for the intersubjective explanation, according to which negative feelings arise due to a 
perceived mismatch between one’s experience and the experience of others: 
 
(Int1) “I feel bad about enjoying this work because most people I know 
do not enjoy it.” 
 
(Int2) “I feel bad about enjoying this work because my enjoyment does 
not match other people’s experience.” 
 
We then tested for a variety of non-aesthetic accounts of guilty pleasures. According 
to the personal explanation, negative feelings are triggered by the belief that the person 
one aspires to be would not enjoy this kind of work. This was tested by: 
 
(Personal1) “I feel bad about enjoying this work because people I 
admire would probably not enjoy this kind of work.” 
 
(Personal2) “I feel bad about enjoying this work because the person I 




Then, we tested for the social explanation, according to which one feels bad 
because one is afraid (and ashamed) of what other people might think of one’s 
enjoyment. Negative feelings are triggered because one violates non-aesthetic norms 
which are endorsed by other people. This was probed by the following statements: 
 
(Social1) “I feel bad about enjoying this work because, if someone else 
learns that I enjoy this kind of work, this would reflect poorly on me.” 
 
(Social2) “I feel bad about enjoying this work because I’m afraid of 
what other people think of people who enjoy this kind of artwork.” 
 
Finally, participants had to answer a list of additional questions about their 
aesthetic experiences (for example, about the frequency of their experience of guilty 
pleasures) that we do not report here due to the lack of direct relevance to our 
project.  
5.5.2 Results 
We began by ensuring that all our participants described the kind of situations we 
were interested in (i.e. situations in which they enjoyed a work but felt bad about 
enjoying it) by excluding participants who gave an answer inferior to 4 (the midpoint) 
to one or both of our control questions, or participants who described an irrelevant 
situation in the open questions (e.g. guilty pleasures about food). After exclusion, 
only 89 participants remained, which might reflect the fact that an important number 
of participants did not use the term “guilty pleasures” in the particular sense we 
wanted to explore (most excluded participants reported enough enjoyment but too 
low degrees of negative feelings). Focusing on these remaining participants, we first 
analyzed to what extent a normative dimension infused their guilty pleasure 
experience, and to which extent they identified with this perceived normativity. 


































Table 2. Mean (and Standard Deviation) for agreement with the five first statements. The 
difference from the scale’s midpoint was tested using Student t-tests. *: p>.05, **: 
p>.01, ***: p>.001 
Bear in mind that, for all statements, the midpoint is 4: answers below tend to 
indicate disagreement while answers above tend to indicate agreement. What these 
answers suggest is that participants acknowledge some kind of normativity (N1: they 
feel like they should not enjoy a given object) but do not believe their enjoyment to be 
misguided (N2). Moreover, while they tend to perceive a tension between their 
enjoyment and their other cognitive states (I1), they would rather get rid of their 
negative feeling (I2) than their enjoyment (I3), suggesting that most of our 
participants identify with the “pleasure” rather than the “guilt” of guilty pleasures. 
Rather, they tend to consider this negative feeling as alienating and would rather get 
rid of it. 
So, what is the source of this normativity? Results concerning the competing 





Statement 1 3.74 (1.82) 3.91 (1.86) 4.58 (2.04) 4.44 (1.92) 
Statement 2 4.16 (2.03) 3.57 (1.80) 4.76 (1.94) 4.47 (2.08) 
AVERAGE 3.95 3.74 4.67*** 4.45* 
 
Table 3. Mean (and Standard Deviation) for agreement with the remaining statements. For each 
explanation, Student t-tests were used to test whether the average score significantly 




As can be seen, the highest rated explanations are those concerning personal and 
social norms: the focus seems to be not on the object and its properties, but on the 
appraiser and what her enjoyment reveals about her character and dispositions. This 
is also apparent in participants’ open answers, which rarely focus on the object’s 
aesthetic properties, but rather on the kind of person who usually enjoys this kind of 
work, or the moral and personal value the work conflicts with. For example, one 
participant gave the following example of a guilty pleasure: 
 
50 shades of Grey - the book. I enjoyed reading this book yet, at the 
same time felt terrible for enjoying it. 
 
And, when asked why she felt bad about reading the book, this participant replied: 
 
I felt bad about enjoying this book as it was degrading to women. It 
gave great detail (sic) the torture and pain given to the lady and the 
emotional blackmail used towards her. 
 
Thus, it seems that the normativity for most participants is mostly tied to non-
aesthetic standards, either one’s personal ideals, or social expectations one is 
concerned to match. The importance of social norms might also explain why the 
negative feeling in guilty pleasure is perceived by most (but not all) participants as 
“alienating” and not as something one wants to identify with (since it can be imposed 
by others’ judgements). 
5.5.3 Discussion 
The results of the present study strongly suggest that, when people feel bad about 
enjoying certain works of art (i.e. experience guilty pleasures), this is not because they 
consider their enjoyment as missing its target. They do not negatively assess their 
enjoyment on the basis of aesthetic standards: rather, normativity seems to come 
from non-aesthetic sources, such as one’s personal ideals and social norms about 
enjoyment. 
There is, however, one main problem with our study. It directly asks people for 
their explanation of their negative feelings. But people might be incorrect in assessing 
their own feelings. If so, then we would only be tapping in people’s explicit theories 
about the source of their guilty pleasures, rather than their real sources. To make up 
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for this limitation, we decided to run a third study, in which participants were not 
directly asked for an explanation. 
There was also a second shortcoming in the present studies. Questions supposed 
to probe the aesthetic explanation might not have been precise enough and might have 
been interpreted by participants as concerning reasons in general, rather than 
aesthetic reasons in particular. For example, the statement “I feel bad about enjoying 
this work because there is nothing in this work that could possibly justify my 
enjoyment” can give rise to many different interpretations, given that one can think 
that one’s enjoyment of given work can be justified by non-aesthetic properties of 
this work. We also tried to correct this in Study 3 and made the questions to probe 
the aesthetic explanation more precise. 
5.6 Study 3: Which factors drive the negative component of 
guilty pleasures? 
5.6.1 Materials and Method 
In this study, our goal was to explore the determinants of the negative experience of 
guilty pleasures, by exploring the variable that can predict participants’ negative 
feelings. To do so, we recruited 109 participants (54 men, 53 women, 2 non-
identified) living in the United States through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants 
were on average 36.8 years old (SD=13.6) and paid $0.50 for their participation in 
our survey. 
As in the first study, participants received a definition of guilty pleasures, asked (i) 
to remember and describe one of their own guilty pleasures, and (ii) to explain in 
their own words why they feel bad about enjoying this particular object.   
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After answering these two open questions, participants were then asked to rate 
the degree to which they agreed with a series of 18 statements about the object they 
remembered (on a scale ranging from 1= “TOTALLY DISAGREE” to 7= 
“TOTALLY AGREE”). Statements were displayed in random order. Again, two 
statements were control statements, in order to ensure that the particular experience 
they remembered actually fits our definition of a guilty pleasure: 
 
(C1) “I really enjoy this work” 
 
(C2) “I feel bad about enjoying this work” 
 
Then, an additional series of statements probed the normative dimension of their 
experience: 
 
(N1) “I feel like I should not enjoy this work” 
 
(N2) “I feel like my enjoyment of this work is wrong and misguided” 
 
The following statements probed the extent to which they identified with or 
rejected their negative feeling. These statements were slightly different from the ones 
we used in Study 1, as they no longer started with “I feel bad about enjoying this 
work because”: 
 
(I1) “My enjoyment is in conflict with my own opinions and thoughts 
about the work” 
 
(I2) “I don’t think that enjoying this work is warranted and I would 
prefer not to enjoy it anymore” 
 
(I3) “I consider my negative feelings about enjoying this work as 
warranted and I really want to be able to change myself and no longer 
enjoy this kind of work.” 
 
The remaining statements were designed to test different explanations for the 
negative component of guilty pleasures. For example, the aesthetic interpretation, 
according to which participants feel bad because they think their enjoyment does not 
match the intrinsic aesthetic value of its object, was probed by the following three 
 
 105 
statements. Note that these statements differ from the ones used in Study 2, for 
reasons discussed in the previous section: 
 
(Art1) “From a purely artistic and aesthetic point of view, there is 
objectively speaking nothing good about this object.” 
 
(Art2) “If I were to write an art review, I would say the object of my 
enjoyment is a poor work of art.” 
 
(Art3) “Putting aside my personal feelings, I would not recommend this 
object to other people on the sole basis of its artistic qualities.” 
 
While the intersubjective explanation was tested by the following statements: 
 
(Int1) “Most people I know do not enjoy this work.” 
 
(Int2) “My enjoyment of this work does not match other people’s 
experience.” 
 
The personal explanation was tested by: 
 
(Personal1) “People I admire would probably not enjoy this kind of 
work.” 
 
(Personal2) “The person I aspire to be would not enjoy this kind of 
work.” 
 
The social explanation was probed by: 
 
(Social1) “If someone else learns that I enjoy this kind of work, this 
would reflect poorly on me.” 
 
(Social2) “I’m afraid of what other people think of people who enjoy 





Finally, based on the analysis of participants’ answers to open questions in Study 
2, we tested for an alternative explanation, which we did not discuss in Studies 1 and 
2, according to which people feel bad because they see very little intellectual value and 
utility in the relevant work: 
 
(Intellectual1) “This work is not very complex or intellectual.” 
 
(Intellectual2) “This work conveys false information.” 
 
After that, people answered the same additional questions as in Study 2. 
5.6.2 Results 
 
This time, we did not exclude participants who gave an answer inferior to 4 to at 
least one of our control questions. Indeed, in order to test our hypothesis, the nature 
of which was correlational, it was better to have a wide array of answers and a great 
variability. We first analyzed the extent to which a normative dimension infused 
participants’ experience of a guilty pleasure, and to which extent they identified with 









































Table 4. Mean (and Standard Deviation) for agreement with the seven first statements. *: p>.05, 
**: p>.01, ***: p>.001 
 
What these answers suggest is in line with the results we obtained in Study 2: the 
participants acknowledge some kind of normativity (N1: they feel like they should not 
enjoy a given object) but do not claim that their enjoyment is misguided (N2): thus, 
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the normativity at stake does not seem to be internal to enjoyment itself. Moreover, 
while they tend to perceive a tension between their enjoyment and their other 
cognitive states (I1), they would rather get rid of their negative feeling (I2) than their 
enjoyment (I3), which suggests that, once again, most of our participants identify 
with their “pleasure” rather than with the “guilt” of guilty pleasure. 
So, what is the source of this normativity? Again, we averaged participants’ 
answers to the 11 remaining questions to form five different scores corresponding 
to our five possible explanations: Aesthetic, Intersubjectivity, Personal, Social and 
Intellectual. We then observed to which extent these different scores correlated with 
each other, and more importantly, to which extent they correlated with participants’ 









Aesthetic .29** - .43*** .66*** .55*** .57*** 
Intersub-
jectivity 
.11 - - .43*** .41*** .24* 
Personal .48*** - - - .61*** .47*** 
Social .42*** - - - - .21* 
Intellectual .26** - - - - - 
 
Table 5. Inter-correlations table for Study 3. *: p>.05, **: p>.01, ***: p>.001 
 
In Table 5, the second column (Negative feelings) indicates correlations between 
participants’ answers to the different questions and the intensity of their guilty 
pleasures. The higher the number, the greater the correlation. P-values, indicated by 
the *, **, and *** symbols represent the probability of observing the difference we 
obtained given the “null hypothesis” according to which there is no real relation 
between the two variables. Only when these values are under the threshold of .05 are 
we justified in rejecting the null hypothesis. As one can see in Table 5, all scores are 
positively correlated with negative feelings (C2), with the exception of Intersubjectivity. 
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At this point, it would be tempting to conclude that, since all other scores are 
positively correlated with the intensity of negative feelings, all other hypotheses are 
true and that all our variables, with the exception of interpersonal agreement, explain 
some part of the negative component of guilty pleasures. However, such a conclusion 
would be premature. Indeed, as can be seen by looking at the other columns in Table 
5, all scores are strongly correlated with each other. This poses a problem because it 
might be that certain scores only predict intensity of a guilty pleasure because they 
predict another score that itself predicts guilty pleasures. Take the following example: 
people wearing warm clothes is a variable that is positively correlated with people 
catching a cold. However, it would be absurd to conclude that there is a direct 
relationship between wearing warm clothes and catching a cold. Rather, both 
variables are only indirectly related, because they are both directly related to a third 
variable: temperature. It is only because wearing warm clothes is negatively correlated 
to temperature, and catching a cold also negatively correlated to temperature, that 
both wearing warm clothes and catching cold end up being positively correlated. 
However, once we take into account the third variable (temperature), we see that this 
correlation does not correspond to any direct and real relationship between the two 
variables. 
In the present case, this means that mere correlations between scores and negative 
feelings cannot teach us what factors really drive participants’ negative feelings: we 
also need to control for correlations between said scores. This is why we decided to 
use a linear regression analysis. 
We ran a multiple linear regression analysis with all five scores (Aesthetic, 
Intersubjectivity, Personal, Social and Intellectual) as predictor variables and participants’ 
negative feelings as the dependent variable. Results are presented in Table 6.  
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Model B SE-B β p 
(Constant) 2.21 .51  <.001 
Aesthetic -.12 .11 -.14 .27 
Intersubjectivity -.15 .09 -.16 .10 
Personal .41 .061 .42 <.01 
Social .24 .10 .28 <.05 
Intellectual .12 .10 .12 .25 
 
Table 6. Multiple linear regression analysis for Study 3. Beta coefficients (β) indicate the 
strength of the relationship between a given variable and the target variable 
(negative feelings), while p-values (p) once again indicate the probability of 
observing our results given the null hypothesis that there is no real relationship 
between the two. 
 
Multiple regression analyses allow for the investigation of the relationship between 
a target variable and other variables while correcting the potential relationships 
between these other variables. As shown in Table 6, once this correction is applied, 
only two scores really predict participants’ negative feelings: Personal and Social. This 
means that only participants’ ideals and social norms predicted their bad feelings, 
while other factors did not. Considerations about the intrinsic aesthetic value of the 
work did not predict negative feelings: on the contrary, they even tended to negatively 
predict those (though this negative relationship did not turn out to be significant). 
Thus, one can say that the relationship between aesthetic considerations and negative 
feelings that we observed in Table 5 is mediated by personal and social norms: the 
object’s aesthetic properties are only relevant to our negative experience to the extent 
that enjoying an object with such properties is detrimental to our self- or social image. 
So, as in Study 2, it seems that the normativity of guilty pleasures is primarily tied 
to non-aesthetic standards, either one’s personal ideals, or social ideals one is 
concerned to match. Though considerations about the intrinsic aesthetic value of 
objects of enjoyment might seem relevant at first sight, they only are relevant to the 
“guilt” we experience to the extent that enjoying objects of poor aesthetic value is 
seen as violating some social norm or personal ideal. 
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5.7 External Norms and Appraiser-Directed Normativity 
The results of our studies confirm that most people occasionally feel bad about 
enjoying certain aesthetic artefacts: they feel that they should not enjoy them. However, 
for most of our participants, it seems that this feeling stems not from violations of 
aesthetic norms, but rather from violations of personal and (to a lesser extent) social 
norms. 
These results point to an interesting dimension of everyday aesthetics which is 
often overlooked in philosophical discussions. Indeed, our results suggest that the 
normativity people subject their own aesthetic attitudes to has more to do with 
people’s dispositions and character traits that transpire through their enjoyment than 
with the object of their enjoyment itself and its properties. This is in line with the 
way people cope with their guilty pleasures: as investigated by McCoy and 
Scarborough (2014), people can and try to escape their “guilt” by changing the nature 
of their enjoyment: they may originally feel bad about enjoying certain TV shows, 
but they can overcome this feeling by persuading themselves that they enjoy it in a 
special (meta- or ironical) way. Thus, what they change is not the object of their 
enjoyment, but the kinds of inferences one can draw from their enjoyment: liking a 
TV show for what it is and appreciating it in an ironic way does not allow for the 
same kind of inferences about character traits and intellectual aptitudes. 
From this perspective, what people feel ‘guilty’ about is not so much the fact they 
enjoy ‘bad’ artworks than the ‘bad’ traits their enjoyment supposedly reveals: as 
shown in our three studies, guilty pleasures are not so much about guilt (what they 
do), but about shame and embarrassment (who they are).60 This is why we label the 
kind of normativity at play in guilty pleasures “appraiser-directed normativity”, as 
opposed to the “object-directed normativity” mainstream aesthetics tends to focus 
on. 
The importance of appraiser-directed normativity supports an idea which is very 
common in sociological approaches of aesthetic taste: aesthetic preferences are often 
used as cues for character traits attributions (Bourdieu, 1984). Aesthetic preferences 
can be used as a basis for attributions of intellectual aptitudes (e.g. some works are 
more intellectually demanding than others), moral traits (e.g. enjoying sexist TV 
shows can be seen as a sign of sexist dispositions), or deviation from social standards 
 
                                                     
60 See Supplementary materials for Studies 2 and 3. 
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(e.g. men who enjoy shows aimed at women will be considered as failing social 
standards of masculinity). This is why the clothes we wear often indicate something 
about our personality and why many teenagers use taste in music as a statement of 
personal identity. As one’s aesthetic assessment is closely (or, at least, thought to be 
closely) related to one’s personal ideals and internalized norms, a good way to know 
somebody is to just ask them about their aesthetic preferences. 
What our results suggest is that, when it comes to explaining the experience of 
guilty pleasures, and the negative feelings that come with them, appraiser-directed 
normativity plays a more significant role than object-directed normativity. When 
people think that their own enjoyment is wrong, they do not think so because they 
consider their experience not to match its object’s aesthetic properties. Rather, they 
feel bad because they think that having those pleasures does not match their ideal 
self or the social norms that they have incorporated. This means that taste can be 
evaluated from a whole range of perspectives, and that the construction and 
development of good taste can be motivated by various factors that are not inherently 
aesthetic. 
In the end, this suggests that the phenomenon of guilty pleasures is compatible 
with experimental philosophers’ claim that most people are aesthetic nihilists: 
because the normativity at stake in guilty pleasures takes its roots outside of the 
aesthetic realm, it can play a role in people’s lives even if those do not consider that 
there are genuine aesthetic truths. 
Of course, we do not claim to have fully understood the nature of guilty pleasures. 
So far, the topic has rarely been explored. As part of our contemporary aesthetic 
lives, and as a valuable window into folk aesthetics, we hope the topic will continue 







For those curious to directly read participants’ answers to open-ended questions 
(including descriptions of their own guilty pleasures), all materials (including data 
files) are publicly accessible at: osf.io/gvrfh  
You will also find additional analyses, including coding of participants’ answers 




Concluding Remarks and Further Research  
I started this dissertation with the question of how emotions represent the world and 
the remark that emotions do not seem to easily fit the representationalist framework. 
I would like to conclude this dissertation by turning the question around: how can 
what I said about emotion in this dissertation inform our understanding of mental 
representation? I have presupposed representationalism and then explored how 
emotions fit in. But let us now put our standard conception of mental representation 
into question. I want to explore the issues I address in this conclusion in future 
research projects. 
In Chapter One, I argued that our primitive emotional responses might not be 
reliable in the Cartesian sense, but they are in the Jamesian sense. It is better for the 
organism to be a bit overly sensitive to danger and be scared even though there is no 
danger present, than to miss an actual danger. Often one is better scared (and 
possibly wrong) than sorry (and dead).  
I think that the Jamesian-Cartesian trade-off idea can be applied to theories of 
mental representation in general. Take perception, for instance. Most philosophers 
of perception only discuss Cartesian-reliable perception or “Cartesian perception”. 
It would be interesting to investigate how the idea of “Jamesian perception” can 
elucidate several debates in philosophy of perception.  
In the last few years, cognitive penetration of perception has become a heavily 
debated topic in the philosophy of perception. If our perceptual experiences can be 
influenced by non-perceptual mental states, can they still justify our beliefs? Normally 
we take our perceptual experiences to provide us with information about the world. 
If these experiences are coloured by our beliefs, then the validity of perceptual 
justification can be put into question. One way to look at this phenomenon is to ask 
whether cognitively penetrated perception is a reliable process. Perceptual 
representation is often thought of as that which reliably correlates with what it is 
directed at. I hold that many paradigm cases of supposedly cognitively penetrated 
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perceptual experiences are not reliable in the Cartesian sense, but are reliable in the 
Jamesian sense. Moreover, one can understand these cases in terms of the Jamesian–
Cartesian trade-off. A paradigm example of cognitive penetration is the following: a 
case when, based on non-perceptual states, we perceive an expressionless face as 
expressive. For instance, during a job interview Lucy is very nervous. She really wants 
the job, so it is very important for her that she convinces Jack, who is interviewing 
her, that she is a good candidate. Jack, however, shows no emotion in his 
expressionless face. Lucy tries to detect approval and disapproval on his face. This 
can be a case of Jamesian perception: it is for Lucy more dangerous to miss that Jack 
approves or disapproves, than it is to misrepresent Jack as expressing these attitudes. 
This might lead Lucy to perceive Jack as expressing disapproval, while in fact his face 
is expressionless. 
In Chapter Two and Three, I argued that emotional content is complex: a number 
of affective representations constitute one emotional content. I also stated that we 
have good reasons not to equate an emotion’s representational features with an 
“emotion” or those complex mental phenomena that our ordinary language words 
refer to.  
This leaves much room for the further exploration of the nature of emotion. What 
are all the ingredients of an emotional ontology? How do these ingredients relate to 
one another? How do they all come together in one experience?  
Additionally, one can speculate that maybe emotions are not that different from 
other mental states after all. Maybe our ordinary language “folk psychological” words 
all refer to very complex mental phenomena rather than to monolithic 
representations. Maybe when we say that “she perceives X” or “she imagines that P” 
we are referring to complex mental episodes, consisting of a variety of 
representations. Maybe an “experience” as a whole might not just reduce to its 
representational features alone. The linguistic fallacy I discuss in Chapter Two might 
be more widespread in psychology and philosophy of mind. 
In Chapter Four and Five, I discussed the importance of emotion for aesthetics. I 
argued that aesthetic properties are affectively experienced. However, one should not 
reduce our emotional engagement with art to the representation of aesthetic 
properties, as I tried to show with my chapter on guilty pleasures. People are 
concerned with appraiser-directed normativity; they see the standards for aesthetic 
judgement as standards that relate to authenticity. Those standards involve a concept 
of the person one aspires to be and the social group one wants to belong to.  
Appraiser-directed normativity is a notion worthy of further exploration. 
Appraiser-directed normativity can be seen as a standard by which we judge our own 
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mental states which is distinct from accuracy and pragmatic usefulness. Our mental 
life is not simply directed at accurately representing reality and survival. These are 
certainly not the only aims of emotion. Emotions seek out what is relevant and 
valuable. This includes our primitive urge for survival but it also exceeds it. 
Appraiser-directed normativity regulates one’s emotional life. It aims at guiding 
emotions to be in accordance with one’s personality, one’s ideal self and the way one 
wants to be seen by others. Emotional experiences such as the “guilt” in guilty 
pleasure reveal which appraiser-directed normative standards we endorse; they reveal 
something about who we are and who we aspire to be. 
I said in the introduction of this dissertation that emotions are an important aspect 
of our mental lives. If you think of the mind in representational terms, then you have 
to investigate how emotions fit a representationalist framework. I hope to have 
convinced you that emotional representations have a specific fuction in our 
representational system because they are Jamesian-reliable, that emotions have a 
complex content, that a theory of how emotions represent the world is not 
necessarily a theory of what an emotion is, that aesthetic properties are affectively 
represented and that the phenomenon of guilty pleasures reveals that ordinary people 
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In my doctoral dissertation, I focus on how emotions provide us with information 
about the world. Philosophers have studied how perception and belief bring us in 
contact with the world in much greater detail than how emotions do so. To some 
extent, this is understandable as emotional representations do not seem to easily fit 
the representationalist framework. This is the aim of the dissertation: I explore how 
well emotional experiences fit a representationalist framework. I presuppose 
representationalism and discuss the difficulties this causes for theories of emotional 
experiences. 
Firstly, emotion does not seem to be as reliable as perception and belief. Often, 
emotional representations present us with false positives. For instance, while walking 
through the jungle, you hear a weird noise. You immediately feel fear, but the noise 
turns out to be nothing but a branch moving in the wind. This is what I call the 
emotional unreliability problem: if it is true that emotional representations are 
unreliable, then what function do emotional representations have in our 
representational system?  
As a solution to the emotional unreliability problem, I present the pragmatic 
account of emotional representation. I argue that emotional representations are 
reliable in the “pragmatic” sense. Most mental states strike an optimal balance 
between minimizing inaccurate representations and maximizing accurate 
representations, while emotional representations are only reliable in so far as they 
maximize accurate representations about relevant phenomena. They detect relevant 
phenomena, based on very little evidence, which implies that they often present false 
alarms. When it matters, however, an emotion detects the relevant information really 
fast. Careful reasoning aimed at minimizing false beliefs results in fewer false alarms, 
but it might miss some phenomena that emotions would have detected. Often one 
is better scared (and possibly inaccurate) than sorry.  
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The pragmatic view of emotional representation is an account of how emotions 
represent, but not of what they represent. Whereas beliefs can be about anything, the 
scope of what emotions can represent is limited. This is another aspect of emotion 
that might set them apart from other representational states. Some argue that an 
instance of fear can only represent “danger”. This is an example of what I call the 
Simple Content View of emotion, which is widespread in philosophy. It claims that 
each emotional experience has a fixed content, corresponding to the type of emotion 
of which it is an instance. Each instance of fear has, according to this view, the same 
content: “danger”, for example. I argue that the Simple Content View commits what 
I call the linguistic fallacy: it confuses a way to categorize emotions with the actual 
content of the emotion. The Complex Content View, on the other hand, does not 
make this mistake. It thinks of emotional content as a complex entity consisting of 
several components, just like soup consists of different ingredients. Different 
instances of an emotional kind might have slightly different ingredients. Some 
ingredients might be common to several emotional experiences of different kinds. 
Many emotion scientists endorse the Complex Content View. Philosophers have 
reasons to be sceptical of this idea, but I argue against this scepticism that emotional 
contents are indeed complex. 
In the third chapter, I discuss how the idea of a pragmatic emotional 
representation relates to the idea of complex emotional content. The main idea I 
want to convey is that pragmatic emotional representations can be part of a complex 
emotional content, but emotional content is not always exhausted by these pragmatic 
representations. Existential angst, for instance, might include more aspects than a 
pragmatic fear representation. I discuss the possibility that emotions have, besides 
complex content, also a complex ontology.  
In the remainder of my dissertation, I argue that emotion is a great source of 
information about aesthetic value. My main claim is that we affectively represent 
aesthetic properties, such as grace, balance, and elegance. I reject the claim that they 
are perceived, and I present a unified explanation of aesthetic property attribution to 
both perceptible and non-perceptible objects. My account explains how one can 
experience a mathematical proof as elegant, for instance. 
However, aesthetic properties are not the only features revealed by emotions in 
an aesthetic context, as I show with my empirical work on guilty pleasures. “Guilty 
pleasure” refers to instances where one feels bad about enjoying an artwork. You 
have a guilty pleasure when you feel that you should not enjoy a particular artwork. 
This implies that you believe that there are norms that determine that some aesthetic 
responses are better than others. However, assuming that these norms are aesthetic 
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norms, this runs directly against recent findings in experimental philosophy. Through 
three studies, Florian Cova and I investigate people’s experience of guilty pleasures 
and the norms that underlie this experience. We tentatively conclude that guilty 
pleasures are connected to one’s personal norms and social expectations rather than 
to aesthetic norms. This is another example of how emotions provide us with 
information about the world: they also reveal something about who we are and who 






In mijn proefschrift onderzoek ik de manier waarop emoties informatie over de 
wereld verschaffen. Filosofen leggen doorgaans meer de focus op de manier waarop 
perceptie en overtuigingen ons in contact brengen met de wereld, in plaats van hoe 
emoties dit doen. Tot op zekere hoogte is dit begrijpelijk aangezien emotionele 
representaties niet gemakkelijk in het representationalistische kader passen. Dit is het 
doel van het proefschrift: ik onderzoek in welke mate emotionele ervaringen in een 
representationalistisch kader passen. Ik vooronderstel representationalisme en 
analyseer welke moeilijkheden dit veroorzaakt wanneer je emotionele ervaringen 
bespreekt. 
Ten eerste lijkt emotie niet zo betrouwbaar als perceptie en overtuigingen. Vaak 
geven emotionele representaties ons foutpositieve resultaten. Bijvoorbeeld, je loopt 
door de jungle en je hoort een vreemd geluid. Je voelt meteen angst, maar uiteindelijk 
blijkt het geluid niets meer te zijn dan een tak die beweegt in de wind. Dit verschijnsel 
noem ik het emotionele onbetrouwbaarheidsprobleem: indien het correct is dat 
emotionele representaties onbetrouwbaar zijn, welke functie hebben deze 
emotionele representaties dan in ons representatiesysteem? 
Als oplossing voor het emotionele onbetrouwbaarheidsprobleem presenteer ik de 
pragmatische theorie van emotionele representatie. Ik beargumenteer dat emotionele 
representaties betrouwbaar zijn in de “pragmatische” zin. De meeste mentale 
toestanden vinden een optimale balans tussen het minimaliseren van inaccurate 
representaties en het maximaliseren van accurate representaties. Terwijl emotionele 
representaties alleen betrouwbaar zijn voor zover ze maximale representaties over 
relevante fenomenen maximaliseren. Ze detecteren relevante verschijnselen, 
gebaseerd op weinig bewijs, wat inhoudt dat ze vaak een vals alarm weergeven. 
Wanneer het er echter toe doet, detecteert een emotie de relevante informatie heel 
snel. Zorgvuldig redeneren, gericht op het minimaliseren van valse overtuigingen, 
resulteert in minder valse alarmen. Anderzijds kan het sommige verschijnselen, die 
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emoties zouden hebben gedetecteerd, missen. Vaak is men beter bang (en mogelijk 
fout) dan dat men spijt heeft. (“Better scared than sorry”.) 
De pragmatische theorie van emotionele representatie is een theorie die zich 
focust op hoe emoties representeren, maar niet op wat ze representeren. Terwijl 
overtuigingen over alles kunnen gaan, is de reikwijdte van wat emoties kunnen 
representeren beperkt. Dit is een ander aspect van emotie dat hen onderscheidt van 
andere representationele mentale toestanden. Sommigen beweren dat een geval van 
angst alleen “gevaar” kan representeren. Dit is een voorbeeld van wat ik de “Simple 
Content View” van emotie noem, een visie die wijdverspreid is in de filosofie. Het 
beweert dat elke emotionele ervaring een vaste mentale inhoud heeft, die 
overeenkomt met het type emotie waarvan het een instantie is. Elk geval van angst 
heeft volgens deze theorie dezelfde inhoud: bijvoorbeeld “gevaar”. Ik beargumenteer 
dat de “Simple Content View” zich schuldig maakt aan wat ik de “linguistic fallacy” 
noem: het verwart een manier om emoties te categoriseren met de feitelijke mentale 
inhoud van de emotie. De “Complex Content View” maakt deze fout echter niet. 
Het beschouwt emotionele inhoud als een complexe entiteit die uit verschillende 
componenten bestaat, net zoals soep uit verschillende ingrediënten bestaat. 
Verschillende voorbeelden van een emotionele soort kunnen enigszins diverse 
ingrediënten hebben. Sommige ingrediënten kunnen hetzelfde zijn voor 
verschillende emotionele ervaringen van verschillende soorten. Veel 
emotiewetenschappers onderschrijven de “Complex Content View”. Filosofen 
hebben redenen om sceptisch te staan tegenover dit idee, maar ik weerleg deze 
scepsis en beweer dat emotionele mentale inhoud inderdaad complex is. 
In het derde hoofdstuk bespreek ik hoe de notie van een pragmatische emotionele 
representatie betrekking heeft op de notie van een complexe emotionele mentale 
inhoud. Het belangrijkste idee dat ik wil overbrengen is dat pragmatische emotionele 
representaties onderdeel kunnen zijn van een complexe emotionele inhoud, maar 
emotionele inhoud hoeft niet exhaustief uit deze pragmatische representaties te 
bestaan. Existentiële angst kan bijvoorbeeld meer aspecten omvatten dan een 
pragmatische “angst-representatie”. Ik bespreek de mogelijkheid dat emoties, naast 
een complexe inhoud, ook een complexe ontologie hebben. 
In de overige hoofdstukken van mijn proefschrift betoog ik dat emotie een 
belangrijke bron van informatie over esthetische waarde is. Mijn belangrijkste claim 
is dat we esthetische eigenschappen, zoals gratie, balans en elegantie, affectief 
representeren. Ik verwerp de bewering dat ze perceptueel worden waargenomen en 
daarbij geef ik een uniforme verklaring van de toeschrijving van esthetische 
eigenschappen aan zowel waarneembare als niet-waarneembare objecten. Mijn 
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theorie legt uit hoe iemand een wiskundig bewijs kan ervaren als elegant, 
bijvoorbeeld. 
Esthetische eigenschappen zijn echter niet de enige kenmerken die worden 
onthuld door emoties in een esthetische context, zoal ik laat zien met mijn empirisch 
werk over “guilty pleasures”. “Guilty pleasure” verwijst naar het schuldgevoel dat 
iemand ervaart wanneer ze geniet van een bepaald kunstwerk. Je hebt een “guilty 
pleasure” wanneer je het gevoel hebt dat je, in feite, niet van een bepaald kunstwerk 
zou mogen genieten. Dit impliceert  dat je gelooft dat er normen zijn die bepalen dat 
sommige esthetische reacties beter zijn dan andere. Echter, ervan uitgaande dat deze 
normen esthetische normen zijn, gaat dit direct in tegen recente bevindingen in de 
experimentele filosofie. Door middel van drie studies hebben Florian Cova en ik 
onderzoek gedaan naar de ervaringen van “guilty pleasures” en de normen die ten 
grondslag liggen aan deze ervaring. We concluderen dat “guilty pleasures” eerder 
verbonden zijn met persoonlijke normen en sociale verwachtingen dan met 
esthetische normen. Dit is een ander voorbeeld van hoe emoties ons informatie over 
de wereld verschaffen: ze onthullen ook iets over wie we zijn en wie we aspireren te 
zijn. 
 
 
 
